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Chapter 1 - Introduction and approach 
1 
1. Introduction and approach 
 
1.1 Fisheries, poverty and politics in South Africa 
In many developing countries, the government serves as the main apparatus for attaining the goals of growth and 
development.  The South African government faces the additional task of transformation of the economy and society 
from the apartheid past.  Transformation is a term used to mean a change so as to better reflect the demographics 
of South Africa and to better distribute resources amongst the people of South Africa.  Often, in the primary 
sectors such as mining and fishing, resources are in the hands of a relatively few big companies.  These resource-
based sectors in South Africa are characterised by poverty-stricken communities with low skills levels (despite the 
fact that the large companies, at the same time, provide stable employment to many).  The goal of transformation 
in these sectors is not straightforward to achieve, given existing traditional livelihoods, legal issues around existing 
rights, and the realities of high unemployment levels. 
 
The fishing sector is one of many in the process of being transformed in South Africa and shares many of the 
characteristics described above, but has its own unique set of challenges.  (1) Access to fishing and fishing rights 
was not, in fact, prohibited or limited by apartheid.  However, the economic consequences of apartheid may have 
limited the degree to which people could take advantage of their rights to invest and prosper and the lack of 
freedom of movement may have limited the degree to which people could settle in fishing or coastal communities.  
(2). New legislation together with the dire state of many resources means that access must be limited.  Linefishing 
and netfishing were for example, until recently, open access permit systems with little or no control (3) 
“Transformation” is interpreted as meaning changes to reflect the demographics of the country rather than a 
region.  The population of South Africa is predominantly “black”, with relatively small populations of “coloured”1 
and “white” people2.  Black and coloured people are considered as “historically disadvantaged persons” (HDPs) 
and therefore both groups are considered in transformation goals, but the emphasis is increasingly on reflection of 
percentage representation of the different groups, rather than simply of HDP status (i.e. more black representation 
is desired, in order to reflect the higher numbers).  However, only in Kwazulu-Natal is there a significant tradition 
of marine resource use by black people.  In the Northern, Western and Eastern Capes, fishing has historically and 
almost exclusively (apart from small-scale Khoi-San use) been associated with white and coloured people (and 
therefore only really been of significance since colonisation).  Thus, transformation, if taken to its logical 
conclusion in these latter provinces, would remove rights or access from coloured people in order to increase 
access of black people. 
 
Fishing, worth about R3 billion in 2000 (Wesgro 2001), accounts for only about 0.5% of gross domestic product, 
but has drawn more attention than most other sectors (the brief background to fishing given here is expanded in 
Chapter 1).  Our project concentrates on the Western Cape fisheries (which accounts for about 90% of the total 
South African fisheries value (Wesgro 2001)) and fishing communities.  Quite different species, communities and 
industries dominate fisheries in the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal.  Commercial fishing peaked in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but stocks have dwindled in many fisheries since then and management has increased in the form of 
minimum size limits, seasons, gear restrictions, company and individual quotas (starting in the late 1970s). 
 
Up until the very recent past (the early, mid or late 1990s depending on the fishery), there tended to be a relatively 
small number of relative large fishing companies in the commercial industry and these tended to be white 
dominated.  However, fishing as a whole was not exclusively white.  For example, in 1994 (i.e. before the change 
to democracy), 0.75% of the total allowable catch (TAC) for quota managed fisheries was allocated to HDPs, of 
                                                        
1 People of mixed racial origins (e.g. black, Malay or Khoisan and white).  Although, during the “struggle” years, the 
term “Black” included anyone not of European descent, in current transformation terms, and for sake of clarity in this 
document, it is used exclusively to refer to people of purely African origin. 
2 There are also small populations of people of other ethnic origins (e.g. Khoi-San, Indian other Asian groups), but it is 
not necessary, for the purposes of this document to refer to these explicitly. 
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the 2700 registered commercial fishing boats, 7% were HDP-owned and of the 4000 fishing licences issued, 6% 
were to HDPs (Isaacs 1998) (the ‘HDPs’ in these statistics being primarily coloured). 
 
In parallel with this commercial ssector development, the small-scale (permit-based) and “informal” (no permit) 
sectors developed from the 1800s.  In the latter sectors (mainly coloured in the Western Cape), fishers were 
operating mainly in the less capital intensive, more accessible fisheries (e.g. linefishery, west coast rock lobster, 
abalone, beach seine and gillnets).  Many of these fishers have been involved in fishing for generations: 
grandfathers and great-grandfathers were fishers, operating from villages such as Kalk Bay, Simonstown, 
Gansbaai and Elandsbaai which have traditionally been associated with fishing (the larger fishing companies also 
have a long history, sometimes founded in the days of whaling).  While some small-scale fishers became rich on 
the proceeds, others made a pittance and barely survived from season to season.  Many continued to fish for a 
living during the apartheid years, but due to lack of access to education and other training opportunities, 
particularly lack of access to capital, few “non-whites” could flourish, enter or survive in the fishing industry and 
the fishing communities were generally places of poverty and high unemployment. 
 
The large companies built up a degree of co-management with the government (Hutton et al. 1999) and this, 
together with the limited number of participants, helped to keep some fisheries reasonably stable (e.g. deep-sea 
hake).  However, some fisheries have faced continued instability due to stock declines caused by environmental 
changes (e.g. west coast rock lobster, abalone) and/or extreme levels of poaching or overfishing (e.g. west coast 
rock lobster, abalone, linefish). 
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Figure 1.1.  Map showing the location of the study.  Hawston, Kalk Bay and Ocean View are the three communities 
who participated in the project, while the relevant government department is situated in the centre of Cape Town. 
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In response to plight of the fishing communities, government introduced ‘community quotas’ for west coast rock 
lobster and hake in the late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively3.  The Quota Board, responsible for granting 
quotas or rights also tried to broaden access to the fisheries around this time.  This process accelerated with the 
coming of democracy in 1994.  New fisheries legislation was adopted in 1998 (the Marine Living Resources Act, 
Act no 18 of 1998), and after some years of chaos a new allocation system in 2001.  In the macro-economic 
context, the transition from the apartheid economy to a transformed economy in South Africa has been characterised 
by the government’s focus on participation in the mainstream economy.  This is reflected in the approach to 
management and transformation of fisheries where different categories of fisher have been defined: full commercial, 
limited commercial and subsistence.  The first category loosely corresponds to the government’s commitment to 
economic growth as envisaged by the GEAR (growth, employment and redistribution) policy and the second to 
the RDP (reconstruction and development programme) (Isaacs 2003) which had been the earlier emphasis of the 
post-1994 government.  However, even within the limited commercial category, during the 2001 to 2005 
allocations, fishers were expected to demonstrate that they were effective businesspeople (e.g. by having adequate 
marketing plans, showing “business acumen” and financial viability etc.).  (Not all sectors of limited commercial 
had this as a criterion e.g. the gillnet- and beach seine sectors did not).  Subsistence permits were briefly allocated 
to west coast rock lobster and abalone in the Western Cape but the subsistence sector is mainly relevant in the 
other maritime provinces. 
 
With the coming of democracy and with the changes in policy, there were high levels of expectation of gaining 
access to fishing rights, but many were disappointed and rightly or wrongly accused government and others of 
mismanagement and corruption.  Levels of poaching of species such as abalone sky-rocketed (because of high 
demand and prices), poverty in fishing communities seemed to worsen and the communities became split into 
camps of rights-holder/non-rights-holder or poacher/non-poacher.   
 
The context of this project, therefore, is one of a high degree of change in political and allocation systems in 
recent years.  This has been accompanied by (a) high expectations and high levels of disappointment and mistrust, 
(b) high levels of overexploitation in some fisheries and consequent plummeting total allowable catches and 
individual quotas.  Therefore, in some cases, poverty worsened because of direct loss of access to food as well as 
due to loss4 of fishing rights or access.  In some cases this led to criminal behaviour (poaching) and potential 
worse criminalisation through the links of the poaching trade to gangsters / Triads in the drugs trade.  This in turn 
leads to breakdowns in community structures and stability. 
 
We have thus a juxtaposition of overexploitation of marine resources, poverty, and a lack of skills and community 
cohesion.  In this context, therefore, it is imperative to accompany new policies with adequate support to 
communities and previously disadvantaged individuals5 so that they can acquire the skills needed to participate in the 
economy and deal with or respond to changes in management approach, including the allocation process. 
 
A just and broadly acceptable process for allocating fishing rights, and the empowerment of local peoples to make 
effective and efficient use of these rights, is thus critical both to the protection of the fish stocks and related 
ecosystems and to the long run alleviation of poverty in these areas. 
 
                                                        
3 These were generally failures for various reasons. See Section 2.2. 
4 Loss encompasses a number of different things: (a) Because the new allocation system was introduced for some 
fisheries where a quota-based system or effort-limitation had not previously existed, people felt that their rights were 
removed, although technically speaking they did not have rights before, but operated with permits, informally or under 
‘exemptions’, (b) because of changes in policy and system some got rights for a short period of time, but did not qualify 
in a next allocation round, (c) some felt that they should have a ‘human right’ to catch fish without having to apply for a 
right from government, (d) some felt that they were owed restitution due to all the years of apartheid, but this was never 
a basis of the post-1994 allocation systems. 
5 See glossary for “historically disadvantaged person” and acronym HDP. 
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1.2 Research objectives, approach and methods 
Two levels of decision or policy making are relevant to this project.  The first refers to decisions by the state, as 
represented by Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) a branch of the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT).  Their decisions relate to the allocation of fishing rights.  Legislation lays down a variety of 
environmental, socio-economic and political goals that need to be met, and there is concern that a structured and 
transparent process for achieving these ends needs to be developed.   The second level of decision making relates 
to those in disadvantaged communities who might apply for fishing rights.  Rights are (generally) allocated to 
individuals or registered companies and not to communities.  Over the last 10 years with the changes in policy, 
communities have formed and joined various organisations (ranging from Fishing Forums, various fishing 
associations through co-operatives to Closed Corporations and Proprietary Limited companies) to either improve 
their chances of successfully applying for rights, or to improve the within community identification of “bona fide 
fishers”, or to increase the spread of benefits within communities.  These organisations have had varying degrees 
of success, but, generally speaking, it may be in the interests of members of a communities to co-operate to some 
degree in rights applications.  Furthermore, those allocated rights need to develop strategies for the efficient 
exploitation of these rights. 
 
With this in mind, the following objectives were identified as part of the original project proposal: 
1. To integrate resource economics and decision analysis into a comprehensive systems-oriented approach 
to rights allocation; 
2. To develop transparent procedures and associated decision support systems for the allocation of fishing 
rights particularly in respect of applicants from formerly disadvantaged fishing communities; 
3. To establish mechanisms whereby applicants from such fishing communities may be empowered 
effectively to compete for fishing rights allocations of adequate size to meet their needs; 
4. To develop entrepreneurial skills in these communities to manage the allocations made to them; and 
5. To combine these aspects in order to promote sustainable use of fish stocks such that the integrity of their 
ecosystems are not compromised. 
 
Based on these objectives, three main components of the project can be isolated: 
• Allocation: improving the approach to allocation of fishing rights 
• Empowerment: improving the representation of community interests in the allocation process and their 
ability to successfully apply for and utilise their rights. 
• Resource management: assessing the use of local knowledge in the refinement of fisheries management 
approaches (e.g. the timing of fishing seasons).  This component also has an empowerment aspect. 
 
At the outset, it was recognized that the achievement of the objectives and the integration of the components 
would require a broad interdisciplinary approach to the problem, with inputs from the social sciences, 
environmental economics, decision analysis and information technology.  This recognition led to three broad 
thrusts in undertaking the research, namely: 
• Interaction (workshops, informal discussions and questionnaires) with community representatives, to 
obtain an understanding of their goals and of their perceptions and knowledge of the ecosystems within 
which they worked; 
• Interaction (workshops and informal discussions) with officials from the Marine and Coastal 
Management (MCM) directorate of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, in order to 
gain understanding of national goals, of the manner in which these were interpreted, and of the practical 
and political problems of implementation; 
• Critical evaluation of historical rights allocations, viewed in the light of expressed goals, and the 
development of new support systems for this process in the future. 
 
Each of these three thrusts is elaborated in a little more detail below. 
 
Review of the rights allocation process.  Before the commencement of the project, MCM had already instituted 
formal procedures for evaluating and comparing applicants for fishing rights.  These had been recorded in 
spreadsheets, and subjected to independent audit.  The first step in the research was thus to analyze what 
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had been done, and the degree of congruence with both stated goals and the expressed aims of community 
representatives. 
 
Interaction with communities.  At the outset of the project, it was decided to concentrate on a limited number of 
fishing communities in the Western Cape.  Of the three chosen, Hawston is a small community some 
120 km from Cape Town, while Kalk Bay and Ocean View are suburbs of Cape Town (although 
geographically relatively distant from the main metropole) (see map, Figure 1.1).  It had initially been 
hoped that each of the communities (or “study frames”) selected for study would be associated with 
essentially single fisheries, as this might have simplified the analysis of results.  It turned out not to be 
possible to find suitable single-fishery communities, however, and in fact it emerged that it was precisely 
the existence of traditional multi-fishery activities that was an important contributor to the problems.  A 
number of fishing sectors are associated with these communities, but the more important ones for these 
communities are west coast rock lobster, abalone, hake handline (a recently established fishery) and 
traditional linefishing. 
 
Formal workshops were conducted in each community, involving representatives who had been identified 
in earlier informal discussions.  Time was given to participants to express or table views orally or in 
written form, after which formal brainstorming sessions, as described on pages 40-42 of Belton and 
Stewart (2002) (or in more detail by Ackerman and Eden, as Chapter 3 of Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001), 
were undertaken.  These were of a relatively ‘low-tech’ variety, but suited the range of participants’ 
backgrounds well.  Results were summarized in the form of ‘cognitive maps’ (e.g. Eden and Ackerman in 
Chapter 2 of Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001) and ‘value trees’ where possible for purposes of feedback to 
the communities and communication to MCM.  A value tree is a hierarchical organization of objectives 
and criteria - see Chapter 5 of this report for practical examples of cognitive maps and value trees derived 
from the various interactions and Chapter 3 of Belton and Stewart (2002) for background to their 
formation. 
 
In the case of the first study frame (Hawston), an additional exercise was undertaken in which 
questionnaires were administered by means of personal interviews, in order to obtain local information on 
the west coast rock lobster population dynamics, to be compared with conventional scientific results.  
This is described in more detail in Chapter 1 of the present report. 
 
Interaction with MCM. Subsequent to a study of the Marine Living Resources Act (Act No. 18 of 1998), 
interviews and discussions were held with senior officials of MCM, in order to clarify interpretation and 
understanding of the legal and practical policy framework implied by the Act.  This was followed up by a 
workshop (much along the lines of those conducted with the community groups) in order to develop a 
clear structure for management and policy objectives.  Within these activities, value trees were developed 
and fed back to MCM officials for comment and agreement that these do represent the overall goals. 
 
The analysis was conducted within the framework of the tools and principles of multiple criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA) (Belton and Stewart, 2002) or multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) using the approach of 
action research.  Within the MCDA framework a two-phase approach was adopted.  Firstly, implied value 
judgments inherent in the scoring systems were extracted and checked both for internal consistency, and for 
consistency with stated goals.  Insights from the project led to proposals around the allocation process and 
recommendations for new procedures using principles of MCDA both to ensure internal and external consistency, 
and to provide more meaningful user interfaces (for both planners and those conducting reviews).  Some of these 
procedures have been incorporated into a ‘demo’ database and spreadsheet-based decision support system.  The 
action research approach took the form of undertaking MCDA workshops with the various stakeholders who 
provided their views on values and criteria which were later integrated by the researchers and refined by the 
participants.  Some background to MCDA and action research and the outline of the approach followed are given 
in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. 
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1.3 Framework: Multi-criteria decision analysis 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis is the branch of Management Science or Operational Research that deals with 
providing structured decision support to decision makers confronting problems in which there is a substantial 
level of conflict between achievements of different goals or objectives.  In Belton and Stewart (2002, p. 2), we 
defined MCDA as “an umbrella term to describe a collection of formal approaches which seek to take explicit 
account of multiple criteria in helping individuals or groups explore decisions that matter”.  There are three key 
elements inherent in this definition: 
• The approaches are formal:  Although people may often take multicriteria decisions by “seat-of-the-
pants” flying, MCDA seeks to provide structured procedures to be followed, to ensure that all concerns 
are taken into account in an auditable manner. 
• There must be a clearly identifiable multiple criteria component to the problem, i.e. some form of non-
trivial conflict between different points of view, goals or issues that matter. 
• The process is one of exploring alternative options:  There is a recognition that there is not a single 
“right answer” which can be determined technocratically, but rather a set of difficult choices, usually 
involving trade-offs between different desirable goals, to which decision makers need to apply their 
minds in an informed manner. 
 
Certain key elements can be recognized as characterizing or constituting MCDA.  These are: 
1. The objectives or goals are defined; 
2. The distinct criteria used to judge goal achievement are identified explicitly in a problem structuring 
process; 
3. Means of comparing alternative courses of action are developed and made explicit, separately for each 
criterion defined in the previous step; 
4. The evaluations of alternative courses of action in terms of each criterion are aggregated across criteria to 
identify means by which the best overall satisfaction of goals can be achieved;  this usually involves the 
establishment of some form of relative importance weights, the interpretation of which depends on the 
particular mode of aggregation used. 
 
Within this general framework defining MCDA, at least three broad schools, or categories of approach have 
emerged, differing primarily according to the means by which (a) performance in terms of individual criteria are 
assessed, and (b) the methods of aggregation used.  These broad schools are discussed at length in Belton and 
Stewart (2002) where more detail may be found, but in essence can be described as follows. 
 
• Value scoring or measurement:  Degree of achievement or level of performance of an alternative in terms 
of each criterion is assessed by means of a numerical score.  The assessments may be based on an 
absolute scale anchored to two or more reference levels of performance, or may be derived by pairwise 
comparison of alternatives.  The final aggregate evaluation is often (although not necessarily) based on a 
weighted sum or average of the scores according to each criterion. 
• Goal programming or reference point methods: Target or aspiration levels are set for each criterion 
(usually in terms of more-or-less objective measures), so that the degree to which each alternative falls 
short of the targets or aspirations can be calculated.  Aggregation is achieved by defining some form of 
(weighted) distance measure. 
• Outranking (pairwise comparison) methods:  Alternatives are compared with each other to give measures 
of relative performance in terms of each criterion.  These comparisons are aggregated across criterion in 
order to identify (a) the degree of evidence favouring one alternative over another, and (b) the potential 
for preferences to be subject to a veto when there exist criteria for which one is very much worse than 
another. 
 
MCDA in various forms has been applied to different aspects of fisheries management around the world, 
including for example, the setting of TACs, the evaluation of management options, and “optimum” fleet design 
(for a review see Mardle and Pascoe (1999)).  Stewart (1988) experimented with various goal programming 
approaches to compare different TACs.  Moloney and Johnston (2002) used a value measurement approach to 
compare different operational management plans (i.e. algorithms for deciding on TACs).  The decision analysis 
technique of Bayesian networks was used by Peterson and Evans (2003) to evaluate different size limits for a 
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recreational fishery in order to try to achieve both “angler satisfaction” and ecological objectives.  Lamberth and 
Joubert (in prep) used a value measurement approach to prioritise fish for management attention.  Mardle and 
Pascoe (2002) used goal programming to investigate the trade-offs between long- and short-term objectives in 
deciding on TACs and fleet size, given, for example, the need for sustainable stock sizes, employment and profits.  
Soma (2003) shows how including stakeholders in a MCDA process (aimed at finding solutions to the need for 
reduced exploitation while maintaining basic social needs) helped to reduce conflicts and prepare the stakeholders 
for change.  Using a value measurement MCDA approach and working with stakeholders including fisheries 
managers, crew, vessel-owners, and fish sellers, objectives for the shrimp fishery of Trinidad and Tobogo were 
identified and criteria for evaluating management options (open access, gear restrictions, limited access etc.) were 
defined.  The different stakeholder groups’ priorities (weights) were assessed and overall preferred options 
identified.  Mardle et al. (2004) also compared and aggregated different stakeholder groups’ priorities regarding 
fisheries management objectives.  Leung et al. 1998, interacting with various stakeholders in the Hawaii pelagic 
fishery, developed a set of objectives, elicited priority weights for these and thus evaluated a set of alternatives 
(restricted vessel size, dual permits, open-access, etc.) aimed at managing the long-lining sector.  McDaniels et al. 
(1994) used MCDA and interviews with management and fishers to identify objectives and criteria for comparing 
and developing co-management strategies for fisheries involving first nations in Canada.  This approach helped to 
foster agreement and understanding between the different groups. 
 
An important feature of MCDA and a feature often missing in fisheries management is that of establishing clear 
objectives (the first key element above), and, if relevant, linking criteria to these objectives (the second key 
element).  For example, McDaniels et al. (1994) state that a key first step is to clarify the fundamental objectives 
that strategies are supposed to achieve.  This is particularly important in resource management contexts that 
involve many stakeholders and conflicting views about priorities.  They go on to say that “Yet, in most organisa-
tional contexts, direct focus on objectives as a basis for decisions is rare.” 
 
The current allocation system as adopted by MCM in 2001 (see Section 2.2.1, Chapter 4 and Section 6.1.1) can 
be described as a form of multicriteria analysis.  The system is based on policy objectives such as transformation.  
Criteria are linked to these objectives and applicants’ achievement according to the criteria are scored on, for 
example, 0-1, 0-3 or 0-5 scales.  The applicants are then ranked according to their total score.  Weighting is 
implicit through the variation in the ranges of the criterion scores: a criterion with a range of 0-5 has a higher 
weight than a criterion with a range of 0-3.  This approach is a form of value scoring or value measurement, 
specifically a form of weighted summation.  The current approach is simple to understand, the data are easy to 
process and results are easy to present.  However, there are flaws (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 and 
Section 6.1), including the important one that the link between policy objectives and criteria needs to be made 
more explicit and organised in a consistent way (such as a value tree). 
 
Based on the analyses in Chapter 4, the interactions in Chapter 5, various refinements for a new allocation system 
are proposed in Chapter 1.  In brief, the overall idea of the current approach (i.e. value scoring) is maintained 
while the interactions were designed to elicit the objectives and criteria from the fishers and MCM and this 
information was used to construct value trees.  All criteria are then scored on a 0-100 scale where 100 reflects the 
best possible and 0 the worst possible performance on a criterion.  Weights are linked to policy priorities and are 
made explicit.  The overall score is calculated as the weighted sum of the criterion scores.  In addition, a goal 
programming approach is proposed as a complementary analysis which can assist MCM in determining the 
effects of meeting specific objectives (e.g. percentage of historically disadvantaged people (HDPs6) involved in 
the resource). 
 
Of the three MCDA schools, value scoring methods are probably the simplest and most transparent.  They are 
useful for working with discrete alternatives (such as applicants) and for “workshopping” with stakeholders to 
define objectives, criteria, scores and weights.  Goal programming is often used for “back-room” analyses, and 
tends to be more appropriate to continuous problems such as engineering design or production scheduling, 
particularly when all criteria are objectively quantifiable, and is thus less appropriate to selection of applicants for 
allocation.   Outranking gives useful insights for strategic decision making, but involves algorithmic steps which 
are not very transparent to non-expert users.  Thus the value scoring approach was particular appropriate in the 
                                                        
6 See Glossary 
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context of fishing rights allocation with multiple stakeholders and a need for simplicity and transparency, while 
goal programming was appropriate for additional analysis. 
 
1.4 Approach: Action research 
In Section 1.1 we established the link between poverty and fishing rights in terms of sustainable livelihoods, and 
put forward the view of judicious allocation of fishing rights as a developmental tool in disadvantaged 
communities.  We have also (Section 1.3) made a case for the suitability of MCDA as a method which is able to 
accommodate the intrinsically multi-dimensional nature of rights allocation, particularly in the context of concepts 
such as ‘poverty’ or ‘well being’, concepts which underlie the construct of a ‘disadvantaged community’. 
 
The scientific approach to research highlights the importance of observable and measurable effects obtained 
through the medium of repeatable, controlled experimentation.  This approach has served humankind well, 
particularly in relation to natural phenomena, and has led to a wealth of knowledge that has improved our 
collective quality of life.  However, when the object of study is within the social or human sciences then what is 
broadly referred to as ‘the scientific method7’ has generally been less successful.  This can be attributed in part to 
the notion that “the causal determinants of the social sciences always include human intentions, while those of the 
natural sciences do not” (Caws 1988, in: Checkland and Scholes 1991, p2).  However it may also relate to the 
tendency of traditional science to highlight those aspects (of complex phenomena) which happen to be 
measurable.  The latter authors also observe (p3) that “In the social sciences repeatable experiments are difficult to 
achieve and virtually all knowledge gained by social science is heavily meaning-bearing.”  Thus the so-called 
positivist paradigm or one that advocates that knowledge can only be reliably advanced through empirical science 
(based on observation and experimentation only) has been heavily criticised for its inability to effectively 
investigate social issues. 
 
In real-world, complex, human situations, ill-defined and difficult to measure issues such as goals and values are 
of fundamental importance.  Consequently, successful practice in fields such as social work, planning, education 
and management “is often attributed to intuition and personal attributes rather than the skilful application of 
knowledge” (Friedman 2001, p160).  What is needed in an enquiry into the social and human sciences is an 
appreciation of knowledge gained via other mediums such as “experience-based knowledge” or “wisdom–based 
knowledge”. 
 
Thus, the epistemology consistent with the scientific method, objectivism, was felt to be insufficient, at least with 
respect to knowledge in the social and human sciences.  Constructivism, or the view that knowledge is constructed 
by means of an interaction between the observer and the observed, allows for an interaction with a richer set of 
knowledge forms than that admitted by ‘hard science’.  Action research has been put forward as a methodology 
which is consistent with a constructivist epistemology. 
 
As the name suggests, action research combines a commitment to take action (i.e. an interest to affect a change) 
with a focus on research through theory development and generalisation of the research findings to a context 
broader than that of the immediate decision arena.  It is typically associated with research of a more qualitative 
nature in the field of social sciences.  Greenwood and Levin (1998) refer to the importance in action research of 
participants and professional researchers being able to jointly define the issues to be examined and co-generate 
relevant knowledge about these issues.  Together the parties take actions and interpret the results of actions based 
on what they have learnt. 
 
The following list of core features of (good) action research is gathered from a number of different sources, 
principally Levin and Greenwood (2001) and Eden and Huxham (1996). 
                                                        
7 The components of the Scientific Method can broadly be described as: (1) determination of the operation (2) 
establishment of pertinent objectives and values (3) determination of suitable measures of effectiveness (4) formulation 
of the problem relative to the objectives (5) observation and data collection (6) formulation of hypotheses and models (7) 
observation and experimentation to test the hypotheses (8) analysis of data and verification of hypotheses (8) prediction 
of results and generalisation of findings (9) recommendations based on findings (see for example Saaty, 1958 and Rivett, 
1994, Chapter 2) 
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• participants and researchers co-generate knowledge through collaborative communicative processes in 
which all participants’ contributions are taken seriously, 
• the diversity of experience and capacities within the participants is regarded as an opportunity for 
enrichment of the research/ action process, 
• context-bound and addresses real-life problems, 
• the meanings constructed in the inquiry process lead to social action or these reflections on action lead to 
the construction of new meanings, 
• the outcomes of the research may be generalised into more widely applicable tools (methods, models, 
etc.) which can be shown to be grounded in the theory which supported and was developed through the 
action research, 
• the research proceeds in a systematic manner, re-examining the process and emerging theory at each 
small step, 
• the process of data collection must be replicable or at least able to be explained to others, 
• opportunities for triangulation8 are exploited, 
• history and context are taken as critical for interpretation, especially with respect to the range of validity 
of the results, 
 
1.4.1 Evolution of action research 
According to Fals Borda (2001, p27) the origins of participatory action research are found in the 1970s through 
simultaneous and independent attempts by social scientists to “… move on and take a more definite personal stand 
regarding the evolution of societies.”  He describes it as a response to the frustrations brought about by the 
inability of conventional science to address complex societal problems.   
 
Prior to 1990 participatory action research was largely associated with micro-scale interventions such as small, 
contained social groupings (co-operatives, NGOs, civic organisations, etc.).  However, Gaventa and Cornwall 
(2001) report that it has been increasingly used by large powerful organisations (e.g. the World Bank 
commissioned ‘Consultations with the Poor’ gathered material for the World Development Report of 2000/2001).  
Participation is increasingly becoming a condition of funding for research in and on poor countries and many 
governments are making participatory methods a compulsory means of generating knowledge. (e.g. Uganda: 
Participatory poverty assessment processes; Indonesia: participatory pest management programmes; India: 
participative action planning; USA and UK: citizens’ juries as an example of direct democracy).   
 
Action research is thus clearly not a new approach and the concepts have in fact been evolving for some decades.  
However, despite this, action research is still regarded as an ‘alternative’ paradigm.  Pasmore (2001, p46) notes 
that: “The majority of important organisational decisions continue to be made by ‘experts’, most jobs continue to 
be designed with too much specialisation, and the fate of most communities continues to be determined by elected 
officials rather than by the people whose interests politicians purport to represent. 
 
1.4.2 Action research: Pros, cons and cautions 
An impetus for the evolution and growing acceptability of action research has likely been the gap between 
‘action’ and ‘research’ that has been a feature of ‘hard science’.  Rosenhead (1989) talks about a growing concern 
over the lack of implementation of traditional research findings and moreover a lack of interest on the part of 
researchers over whether or not their research is in fact implementable.  Even those researchers who acknowledge 
the need to take the process a step further (and perhaps assist in implementation) do not easily accept that an 
explicit focus on implementation as part of the research focus might imply a total review of the research process 
itself.  Rosenhead (1989, p14) explains how choosing to rely on technical models alone to make decisions, and 
excluding ‘judgement’, results in “complex and opaque models” which reinforce the exclusion of lay participants.  
“The process of mutual exclusion of analysis and judgement is self-reinforcing.  Such techniques guarantee a 
denuded process of decision making… One can have a complex technology and a minimal social process; or one 
can have a rich social process of decision making and a correspondingly modest technology.” 
                                                        
8 Triangulation is a process of using several different research methods and/or sources of variation to explore an 
unknown feature of a system or organisation. 
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Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) discuss the issues around power and knowledge.  Critics of conventional research 
paradigms argue that action research challenges the power inequities created in organisations by monopolies of 
knowledge and biases that are introduced when so-called ‘independent’ experts speak on behalf of others.  In 
general all schools of action research critique the positivist research approach in that it distances the expert 
(researcher) from the subjects of the research who actually experience the reality being studied.  It also reinforces 
the notion of passive (and powerless) subjects who are objects of enquiry.  There is also the criticism that in 
regarding knowledge as the domain of experts only certain forms of knowledge acquisition are permitted, i.e. the 
voices of ‘other knowers’ are not heard.  Action research on the other hand acknowledges that knowledge is 
socially constructed and that it is important that the voices of all participants are heard.  Also acknowledged are 
the validity of feelings and action in the knowledge generation process. 
 
Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) sound a note of caution in assuming that participation per se implies that a more 
holistic and nuanced knowledge base will be generated.  The pressure for consensus in participation processes so 
as to support a claim on ‘the views of the community’ can mean that only the dominant views surface and that one 
dictatorship of knowledge is replaced with another.  The “illusion of inclusion” needs to be thoroughly 
investigated.  Who represents whom and who is missing? 
 
1.4.3 Action research within this project 
“In Action Research, the integrity and professional knowledge of the researchers is a key element, but only within 
the context of a broader set of local knowledge systems and norms in society at large… Action Research merges 
professional knowledge with local knowledge in a process of collaborative sense-making.” (Levin and 
Greenwood, 2001, p105).  The quote highlights that the aim of such a complex decision scenario as the allocation 
of fishing rights is not to find the optimal solution but rather to jointly and collaboratively ‘make some sense’ out 
of this conflicted, uncertain and contested territory.  This kind of research can only meaningfully be done through 
action research, i.e. within the context of real decisions. 
 
1.5 Structure of report 
The next chapter in the report gives background information on rights allocation internationally, introduces the 
rights allocation process in South Africa, the four fisheries relevant to the project and the three fishing 
communities with which we worked.  Chapters 3 and 5 describe the various community and MCM interactions.  
First, Section 3.2 discusses the pilot project investigating local knowledge and its potential use in resource 
management.  Section 3.3 describes interactions with the communities relating to skills and training needs in 
relation to the application for and utilisation of fishing rights.  The current allocation system is described in more 
detail in Chapter 4 (given the introduction in Chapter 1).  The interactions with the communities and with MCM 
which relate to the improvement of the rights allocation process are then described in Chapter 5.  The proposed 
adjustments to the allocation process are explained in Chapter 1 followed by a summary and recommendations in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 1 thus form the bulk and the focus of this project, given the background in Chapter 1. 
 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3 give some details of the Hawston, Kalk Bay and Ocean View MCDA workshops 
respectively.  Appendix 4 describes the workshop with MCM.  The local knowledge questionnaire and responses 
are given in full in Appendix 5. 
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2. Review of fishing rights allocation 
 
This chapter provides the background material for the remainder of the report.  First there is a brief outline of 
rights allocation processes internationally (Section 2.1) and a description of the evolution of the rights allocation 
process in South Africa (Section 2.2) including the most recent allocation system developed in 2001.  This is 
followed by an introduction the approach followed by MCM to decide on the TAC/TAE, to four of the fisheries 
relevant to this study (Section 2.3).  The particular criteria used in allocation of rights in each fishery and an 
analysis of the rights allocations since 2001 is postponed for discussion in Chapter 4.  The three communities who 
participated in this study (Section 2.4) are then briefly described.  Finally, in Section 2.5 these elements are 
summarised which shows the relevance of this study for future rights allocations. 
 
2.1 Rights allocation systems and processes internationally 
 
Up until the late 19th century all marine fisheries were essentially open-access and unregulated, with the only 
regulations being regarding foreign fleets’ rights to fish in sovereign waters (Scott 2000a,b).  Eventually, as stocks 
dwindled and competition became fiercer, the need for regulation became apparent to fishers and governments.  
Essentially the main approaches, more-or-less in order of application have been: 
• Regulations regarding the type and timing of effort such as gear control (mesh sizes, vessel types, etc.) 
and closed seasons 
• Regulations regarding the amount of effort such as controlling the overall size of the fishing fleet (the 
number of vessels) through, for example, “limited licensing” with licences being granted to those who 
had been previously being fishing, 
• Total TAC limits9 
• Total TAC and effort-type limits (number of hours of fishing, number of traps, vessel size etc.) 
• Limited licensing combined with total TAC limits 
• Zoning (in terms of territory or target species) in combinations with various of the above 
• Community quotas 
• Individual (or company or vessel) quotas which limit the catch per quota holder, which might be non-
transferable or transferable, permanent or fixed term, for a fixed catch or a percentage of the TAC. 
 
The range of approaches can be broadly grouped into those relying on the state, the market or communities to 
regulate the fishery (Hersoug and Holm 2000).  Many of the attempts at regulation had the effect of creating a race 
by vessels and operators to catch as much as possible in the limited time, or with the limited gear: the so-called 
“derby effect”.  Consequently, where TACs were set, these were sometimes caught in absurdly short periods, with 
consequent effects on safety, prices and hardships for fishers between seasons.  For example, because of its 
occurrence in tight aggregations, the degree to which the fishery is oversubscribed, and the regulation by total 
TAC only, the Pacific herring season has apparently sometimes been over in as little as 15 minutes! (University of 
Guelph, 2004).  Another example, for the north Pacific halibut fishery, says that within 3 days of the season 
opening one fisherman was dead and fifteen had to be rescued after the vessels encountered difficulties (Buck 
1995). 
 
The quota system, which has evolved since the late 1970s, was seen as a solution to the problem of the derby 
effect, of over-capitalisation, of ever-increasing effort and a way, thus, to reduce over-fishing.  Countries that 
                                                        
9 The setting of TACs is often based on the “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) of the stock.  The MSY which is based on 
the notion that fish populations will reproduce at different rates depending on the population size or density.  For 
example, they stocks will increase more rapidly when the stock is less than a particular fraction of the “carrying 
capacity”, but will increase more slower if the population size is above this fraction.  Thus, the aim is to keep the fish 
stock at approximately the particular fraction modelled for that species and thus to be able to extract the MSY.  Because 
of the extreme consequences of errors in the modelling of MSY other approaches are now being pursued. 
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started to use a quota system at this time include Iceland, New Zealand and Canada, while South Africa was also 
using company quotas (for hake) by 1979 the early 1980s for west coast rock lobster. 
 
There are many forms that quota systems can take and these are usually in combination with several of the other 
approaches mentioned above (e.g. gear and vessel effort restrictions).  Depending on the fishery or country, the 
quota (or right) has some of the characteristics of property (e.g. security, duration, transferability and divisibility 
of varying degrees) (Scott 2000a,b).  In systems with transferability and divisibility, the right holder may sell or 
rent part or all of his portion of the TAC (on the open market) for whatever period.  Along with deciding on the 
duration of the right and its transferability, implementation of the quota approach for any fishery faces the 
questions of (Scott 2000a,b): who should get the initial (and possible subsequent) quotas, how large should the 
quotas be, and what should they cost. 
 
In Iceland quotas were associated with individual vessels (Runolfsson and Arnason 2001) while in New Zealand 
and Canada the quota was associated with a company or enterprise (Connor 2001), which in New Zealand later 
became individual based, therefore an individual transferable quota or ITQ.  Since 1995 Canada has also been 
using ‘community quotas’ in some fisheries.  In Iceland and New Zealand the quotas began by being non-
transferable, but with time they have developed into permanent and transferable rights.  The Icelandic system did 
not charge for quotas (although there is talk now of charging) whereas in New Zealand, the raising of revenue 
(which would in part be used to buy back excess quota) was one of the aims.  Nevertheless, rights were initially 
allocated free of charge, based on catch history and investment (depending on the fishery) (Connor 2001) and 
were transferable by sale or lease to other operators.  All operators required a permit which was granted if they 
had a minimum amount of quota.  “Resource rentals” were paid on all quota held whether caught or not.  This was 
because initially, in New Zealand, quotas were as fixed tonnages and government therefore “entered the market” 
to buy back excess TAC from quota-holders when the total TAC held exceeded the appropriate TAC.  Later these 
were converted to percentages of the TAC. 
 
In general the system of quotas in some form (whether based on vessel / enterprise / individual and whether fully 
transferable or not) subject to an overall TAC (and perhaps other restrictions) appears to be the favoured approach 
internationally and offers many benefits over previous regulation systems.  Some feel that the ideal is to increase 
the property right nature of the quotas, i.e. to make them fully transferable, divisible and heritable and therefore 
they embrace the use of the ITQ system to its fullest extent.  The idea, of course, is that the market will most 
efficiently distribute the rights.  However, more in depth studies of the social and economic consequences of their 
introduction in different countries and societies is needed.  In general, as would be expected, the ITQ system has 
tended to concentrate quotas in the hands of a smaller number of larger operators who may be entrepreneurs not 
involved in actual fishing (Bradshaw 2004), although this may be more the case with deep sea (capital intensive) 
fisheries than inshore fisheries (Ford 2001) because larger concerns can more easily absorb the risk associated 
with fishing.  ITQs may lead to a situation where the value of the right or quota is out of reach of the average crew 
or fisher, and of more value than their fishing vessel (which may detached from the right) (Bradshaw 2004).  
Thus, the distributional and equity consequences of ITQs are questionable. 
 
In most countries where quotas have been introduced the primary concern has been with reducing effort, 
overcapitalisation and overfishing.  However, in South Africa, the need was to achieve these objectives (in most 
fisheries) as well as, generally, to increase access to the fishery (in terms of fishing rights) to those who had 
previously not been in a position to acquire them either because the apartheid system prevented them from 
acquiring sufficient capital or expertise to enter the market, or because they were directly prevented from 
acquiring rights.  The next sections outlines the development of the current allocation system in South Africa. 
 
2.2 The political and institutional context of the allocation of fishing rights in South 
Africa 
As in all other fishing nations various measures evolved in South Africa over the years to limit the total catch in 
order to safeguard future stocks and maintain some stability in the industry.  Restrictions on landed mass have 
been in existence for west coast rock lobster from 1981 and for hake from 1979.  After the Diemont Commission 
in 1986 the new Sea Fisheries Act (SFA) of 1988 made provision for a Quota Board, which was supposed to 
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remove quota allocation from the political arena and which was established in 1990 (Japp 2001).  According to 
the SFA of 1988, the quotas were allocated according to the Minister’s guidelines and quota transfers could be 
made with the chief director’s (of the then Sea Fisheries) approval (SFA, RSA 1988: Section 24, subsections 1-3).  
Transferability of quotas was therefore accepted, as was transferability of rights of exploitation (subject to the 
approval of the Minister) which had to be transferred with the associated quota or a portion of the quota (SFA 
1988: Section 25, subsection 3).  Rights for some fisheries were effectively granted for 10 years for old rights-
holders and 5 years for new entrants.  The board controlled quotas for hake, sole, pilchard, anchovy, west coast 
rock lobster, south coast rock lobster, abalone and horse mackerel (Hutton et al. 1999).  The Quota Board 
introduced many new entrants between 1990 and 1998 when the new Marine Living Resource Act (MLRA) (Act 
No. 18 of 1998) replaced the SFA (although democracy only arrived in 1994, the “opening up” of fisheries started 
before this). 
 
With the establishment of a democracy in South Africa in 1994, the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism initiated the development of a new fisheries policy by establishing the Fisheries Policy Development 
Committee (FPDC) in late 1994.  The FPDC had representatives from the fishing industry and labour (Hersoug 
and Holm 2000) but deliberately excluded fisheries managers and scientists (Harris et al. 2002).  One of its task 
teams was the Technical Task Team on Access Rights which recommended the ITQ system.  Recommendations 
were submitted to the minister in 1996 who nominated a panel to review the issue of access rights.  They 
supported the ITQ proposal but differed from the FPDC in that the review panel recommended a quick transition 
rather than a phased approach with no sudden removal of rights or quotas.  The recommendations could not be 
implemented under the old Sea Fisheries Act and as there was pressure to produce speedy results the 
recommendations were written into the White Paper and Bill more-or-less simultaneously (the normal process of 
waiting for responses to the White Paper was not followed (Hersoug and Holm 2000)).  The Bill was introduced 
to parliament in 1997 where it was assessed by the Portfolio Committee of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.  
They were wary of the idea of long-term and transferable rights, given the requirement for redistribution.  While 
the White Paper spoke of selling of rights and of rights in perpetuity, the Portfolio Committee finally opted for the 
renting of rights (not quotas) to persons and companies for a maximum of 15 years (Hersoug and Holm 2000) 
with transfer subject to the Minister’s approval.  The issue of “paper quotas” was of great concern during the 
policy development process and this was one of the reasons for the limits on transferability10.  The new Act was 
passed and the MLRA came into effect late in 1998.  Box 2.1 summarises some of the pertinent features of the 
MLRA. 
 
Box 2.1. Summary of the relevant features of the Marine Living Resources Act (RSA 1998). 
The “objectives and principles” of Chapter 1 of the MLRA can be summarised and grouped as follows: 
 
Economic objectives: • To achieve optimum utilisation, and  
 • To achieve economic growth 
  
Social and restructuring 
objectives: 
• To utilise marine resources to achieve human resource development, 
capacity building and to create employment, and 
 
• To restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to 
achieve equity within all branches of the industry. 
  
Ecological objectives: • To achieve ecologically sustainable development, 
 
• To conserve marine living resources for both present and future 
generations, 
 • To protect the ecosystem as a whole, including non-exploited species, 
 • To preserve marine biodiversity, and 
 • To minimise marine pollution 
  
International obligations • To honour international obligations and law. 
  
Approach • To apply precautionary management approaches, and 
                                                        
10 The term ‘paper quota’ was first used when ‘community quotas’ were allocated to ‘fishing communities’ in the early 
1990s, but in many cases established fishing companies caught the quota and paid monies to community trusts. 
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• To achieve broad and accountable participation in decision-making to the 
extent possible, 
 
In Section 18 (Part 2 of Chapter 3, Management of Marine Living Resources) of the MLRA an objective 
for the allocation of rights is specifically mentioned, namely that: 
 
“In granting any right … the Minister shall … have particular regard to the need to permit new entrants, 
particularly those from historically disadvantaged sectors of society” 
 
In addition the Minister may establish subsistence fishing zones, declare fishing communities and declare 
their inhabitants (or any other person) to be subsistence fishers (Section 19). 
 
Commercial fishing rights may be leased, divided or otherwise transferred, subject to limits or conditions 
established by the minister, and to approval on application to the minister.  Therefore a right is, although 
not named as such, a type of individual transferable quota (Section 21).  Rights are leased by the state 
(Section 22) and by the Fisheries Transformation Council (FTC) (Section 31) (but see below regarding 
the FTC). 
 
The minister is to determine the total allowable catch (TAC) or total applied effort (TAE) and the portions 
to be allocated to subsistence, recreational, local commercial and foreign fishers.  The minister is to 
establish the Consultative Advisory Forum (CAF) who advise on, among other things, the TAC / E. 
 
 
In contrast with the SFA of 1988, the MLRA of 1998 placed allocation back in the political arena (Mayekiso et al. 
2000) with the power to allocate being retained by the minister (Sauer et al. 2003b)11,12. 
 
Thus, in Hersoug and Holm’s (2000) separation into state, market and community approaches, the MLRA opted 
for the state approach to allocation and redistribution rather than that of the market.  They did not seriously 
consider the community option given the negative experiences of ‘community quotas’ of hake (in 1993-1995), 
pilchard (1994) and west coast rock lobster (starting in about 1987) (i.e. all starting before the transition to 
democracy) (Stuttaford 1996 and Hersoug and Holm 2000).  After a survey of the socio-economic conditions in 
fishing communities, conducted in 1992, 16 (mainly “coloured”) fishing communities were identified and 
Fishermen’s Community Trusts established to manage incoming funds.  The “quota” given to the communities 
was fished by established companies and the monies paid to the community who spent it on educational facilities, 
equipment, etc. (Martin undated).  These quotas therefore became known as “paper quotas”.  The term was later 
applied to situations where select individuals were benefited, for example, to people who either were fronts for 
established companies or who acquired quotas with no intention of personally using them, but rather sold them to 
established companies.  Unfortunately, the selection of beneficiaries of the trusts was fraught with difficulties and 
there was little guidance given to or control over the trusts and mistrust arose within the communities and the 
system was largely abandoned by 1996 (however certain community trusts appear to still exist from that time and 
new community organisations, similar to trusts, have been formed and receive rights).  However, at least one 
community trust (the Hermanus Community Trust) which was granted a 10 T abalone quota in 1993/94 continued 
to receive quotas until at least 1997/1998 (Sauer et al. 2003a), applied as a commercial applicant in 2001 but was 
unsuccessful (DEAT 2001b).  Between 1994 and 1998 with the establishment of the MLRA (and after as 
described next), there was much unhappiness in the fishing industry (about quotas granted or not, about the size of 
quotas, about the community trusts) and there were sit-ins, near riots, officials locked in their offices, “mass-
action” fishing in defiance of regulations, etc.  The situations only really began to calm down by about 1999/2000. 
 
                                                        
11 Cronies of the old government as well as of the new have apparently been enriched by either the “apolitical” quota 
board or the new system (Hersoug 2000). 
12 It is a matter of debate to what extent the minister may delegate responsibility for allocation decisions. Currently, the 
Minister appoints an Advisory Committee after a tender process.  The minister still has to be able to demonstrate that he 
has “applied his mind” and discretionary powers to all decisions (Sauer et al. 2003b) and the minister has lost some court 
cases on this basis (e.g. Cape High Court, 2003). 
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With the introduction of the MLRA, the Consultative Advisory Forum was established to advise the minister, and 
the Fisheries Transformation Council (FTC).  The FTC’s objective was “to facilitate the achievement of fair and 
equitable access” to rights (Section 31).  The minister allocated a portion of the TAC to the FTC, who, in turn, 
leased rights to “persons from historically disadvantaged sectors of society and to small and medium size 
enterprises”.  The FTC was also intended to “assist in the development and capacity building of persons from 
historically disadvantaged sectors of society and small and medium size enterprises”.  Other allocations were the 
responsibility of the Minister (or his delegated authority).  This introduced a period of some confusion as aspirant 
rights-holders could apply to the Minister or to the FTC.  After much controversy and some scandal, the FTC was 
discontinued in 2000. 
 
There was a call for applications under the new MLRA-based system in 1999 and thousands poured in.  Prior to 
1990 DEAT had processed about 300 allocations annually - with this first call for applications they had to process 
11 989 (Kleinschmidt et al. 2003).  They had not anticipated the administrative enormity of the task and this led to 
crisis management characterised by long delays in allocations, litigations, a loss of confidence in MCM and more 
widespread non-compliance in terms of poaching and non-reporting of catches especially in the abalone, rock 
lobster and hake fisheries (Kleinschmidt et al. 2003).  Eventually a hold-over of fishing rights was declared in 
2000 (for 2001 as the rights were still annual) while MCM prepared for the next season of allocations.  There 
were several issues with the application process: Applicants had to provide a substantial amount of information, 
10 copies and several annexures, the application forms were in English (S Lamberth pers. comm.) despite the fact 
that the majority of fishers (particularly previously disadvantaged) are Afrikaans speaking, there was one form for 
all sectors (Japp 2001), creating confusion as to which sections were relevant etc. and documentation had to be 
verified by a Commissioner of Oaths.  This has apparently led to a thriving business for lawyers or “consultants” 
who assisted people in filling in their forms, sometimes for a substantial fee and/or for a substantial portion of the 
right if the application were successful. 
 
In line with the recognition of subsistence fishers in the MLRA (see above) and in an attempt to alleviate 
economic hardship in coastal communities, subsistence permits were allocated in the west coast rock lobster and 
abalone fisheries in 1998/99, 1999/00 and 2000/01.  The permits allowed four lobster or abalone a day to be 
caught and sold.  The Subsistence Fisher Task Group was appointed by MCM in 1998 and visited communities 
and ran workshops in order to develop a new subsistence fishery management system (Harris et al. 2002).  The 
SFTG recommended in their report of 2000 that high value fisheries such as west coast rock lobster and abalone 
were not suitable for subsistence fishing (DEAT 2001a, Cockroft et al. 2002) but should rather be exploited by 
what came to be called “limited commercial” and “full commercial” fishers.  Despite this recommendation, the 
number of west coast rock lobster subsistence permits increased to 1870 for the 2000/01 season (Boyd and 
Adriaans 2002, see Section 2.3.3) (compared to a few hundred in 1999 and 2000) and subsistence abalone quotas 
were still being awarded in late 2002 in the Eastern Cape (DEAT press release, 14 October 2002).  Subsistence 
abalone quotas in the Western Cape were granted from 1998 to 2001 but were far fewer in number than those for 
west coast rock lobster (see Section 2.3.4). 
 
Some key events in fisheries policy and the rights allocation process are highlighted in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Important events in South African fisheries management. 
Year / 
Period 
Legislation, Policy, Event Sectors recognised 
1979 on Management by quotas begins in some fisheries  
1988 The Sea Fisheries Act Recreational, Commercial 
1990 The Quota Board takes over allocation  
1990-1994 ‘Community quotas’ for hake and lobster with Trusts established (aborted 
by 1996 
 
1994 First democratic government in South Africa. New quota board  
1998 Marine Living Resources Act. Quota Board abolished. Allocation by 
authority delegated by Minster. Fisheries Transformation Council & 
Consultative Advisory Forum established 
Recreational, Commercial, 
Subsistence 
1999 First allocations according to new act  
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Year / 
Period 
Legislation, Policy, Event Sectors recognised 
2000 Fisheries Transformation Council disbanded 
Subsistence Fisheries Task Group report 
Recreational, Full commercial, 
Limited commercial, Subsistence 
1999-2001 “Subsistence quotas” issued for lobster and abalone including in the area 
east of Cape Hangklip. 
Litigation, strikes and delays around allocations. 
 
2001 New allocation system implemented. “Limited commercial” and “full 
commercial” sectors established after recommendations that lobster and 
abalone not suitable for “subsistence” sector 
 
2002 Subsistence abalone quotas still being issued in Eastern Cape.  
2003 First limited commercial lobster allocations east of Cape Hangklip. 
First Turf-based, long-term (10 year) rights allocated to abalone divers and 
“legal entities”  
 
2004 A company disputes the hake quota which they received, but the 
Minister’s decision is upheld by the Constitutional Court. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 The 2001 rights allocation system 
As a response to all of this, a new system for allocating fishing rights was introduced in 2001 (Figure 2.1).  
Specific examples of the criteria and scores used in the allocations are given for hake, linefish, west coast rock 
lobster and abalone in Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4 of Chapter 4.  The general criteria to be used in assessing applicants 
according to this system were: 
 
1. Degree of transformation.  This was measured by the actual HDP status of the applicant and / or by the 
percentage of HDP ownership in the enterprise (“black economic empowerment”) and by the degree of HDPs 
in senior management positions (“employment equity”) and / or by a transformation plan. 
2. Degree of investment and involvement in the industry.  This was measured by the degree of ownership of or 
access to a vessel, in some cases by whether the applicant had previously held relevant rights, in some cases 
whether the applicant was involved in relevant processing (although this was sometimes regarded as a 
negative attribute) and / or by “investment in human resources”. 
3. Compliance with the MLRA, Customs and Excise and other relevant legislation. 
 
There were several important features to this new approach: 
 
• The application fee jumped from R100 to R6000 for ‘full commercial’ applications and to R500 for 
‘limited commercial’ applications.  This was ostensibly to ‘eliminate “chancers”’ and to pay for the 
adjudication and verification of the applications (DEAT 2002a).  The application fees were non-
refundable.  Not part of the allocation process, but relevant in terms of fishers’ and governments’ 
budgets, is that fishers pay a levy per ton of fish that they catch or land.  In 2003 the levies ranged, from 
R 13 / T for horse mackerel to R 6 062 / T for abalone.  Traditional linefish are levied per year (RSA 
2003. 
• The rights were to be allocated for more than a year (four to five years for the first series of allocations 
and then up to 15 years in accordance with the MLRA for the next allocation, due in 2005). 
• The general criteria (mentioned above) which would be used to evaluate the applicants were published 
with the rights application forms.  Specific criteria and weights and the way people were to be scored 
were only developed after all applications were received and were different for different fisheries and 
for new entrants and previous rights-holders. 
• A “Rights Verification Unit” was formed which was intended to verify that the information supplied by 
the applicants was accurate by cross-checking, visiting communities or whatever other means available. 
• Applicants have the right to appeal if their application is unsuccessful or if they want a larger quota. 
• An Advisory Committee of six members of the legal and accounting profession was appointed. 
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Minister calls for applications in the
Government Gazette and the rights
allocation process begins
Minister delegates the authority to allocate
fishing rights to one or two senior officials of the
Marine and Caostal Management branch
Application forms and policy guidelines
available from coastal offices
Applications submitted to Rights
Verification Unit (RVU) with application fee
Independent Advisiory Committee
assesses each application
RVU receives, files and stores applications and
verifies the information submitted by applicants
Each applications is assessed by at least two
people
Each application is scored according to pre-
determined criteria. Criteria vary between
fisheries
Legal advice is sought for “borderline cases” or
applications that warrant further investigation
Minister’s delegate decides whether or not
to allocate right and records his/her
decision
Quantum is allocated to each successful
applicant
The record of decisions is made available
at coastal offices
Rights-holders apply for fishing permits and
vessel licences
Unsuccessful applicants decide whether to
appeal against the Minister’s decision
Appeal process begins
 
Figure 2.1. The rights allocation process (from DEAT 2002a) 
 
 
MCM has still been subject to litigation subsequent to the introduction of this new system.  However, recently the 
allocation system survived a challenge in the Constitutional Court.  This was by a 1999 entrant into the hake deep 
sea trawl industry who felt that their 2002-2005 quota was too small (Weekend Argus, March 13, 2004) (they had 
previously won the case in the Cape High Court in 2002 and lost in the Supreme Court of Appeal before bringing 
the matter to the Constitutional Court). 
 
There were two main consequences of the increase in application fees.  The “full commercial” application fee was 
too high for many (who could nevertheless apply under the “limited commercial” sector).  Many of them, 
therefore, and on advice from MCM, formed Closed Corporations (CCs)1314 in order to be able to jointly afford 
the fee for a “full commercial” right.  The amount allocated to these CCs, however, was not based on the number 
of members and consequently their quotas were sometimes uneconomical.  Others borrowed the application and 
lawyers fees from “loan sharks” and consequently, if the application was unsuccessful, found themselves in a 
significantly worse financial position than before.  The same problem as before also arose in that consultants were 
gaining portions of people’s rights.  A quote from someone from Hawston (Appendix 1) captures the main issue 
regarding the application fees: “In 2001 the minister came with a strange request that everyone must make a financial 
contribution but not everyone will get quotas”. 
 
Throughout the entire period from the time of the old Quota Board (1990) until now, one of the major features of 
the allocation process has been (a) of new entrants being “fronts” for established companies (HDP persons 
marketing their status), or (b) of companies including HDPs in name only, who never received any benefit from 
their shares or (c) of new quota holders selling or renting their shares to established companies either because they 
were unviable or because that was the original intention (therefore (a)).  There are a considerable number of “joint 
venture” schemes some of which also boil down to (a), (b) or (c).  In addition, poverty stricken fishers have 
apparently been paid by Cape Flats gangs to apply for quotas which they then are obliged sell back to the gangs 
                                                        
13 CCs were formed because, for example, associations are not legally natural persons. 
14 CCs are now not allowed to apply for linefish as they hid fronts / paper quotas. 
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(Kinnes 2000).  Applicants who sold or leased their rights were known as “paper quotas” and certain types of joint 
ventures as “cardboard quotas”.  This is an issue of concern to MCM, because a person who personally holds and 
exercises a right and therefore invests in the industry should produce benefits to the community whereas the 
selling or renting of a right will largely benefit the individual (there are stories of lavish lifestyles resulting from 
quota sales (Hersoug and Holm 2000)).  The issue is obviously of concern to communities as potential local 
benefits accrue elsewhere.  Despite the general, strong antipathy towards the “paper quota” concept some “paper 
quota holders” have put theirs to good use by using the proceeds of the sale / rent of their quotas to invest in 
vessels (DEAT 2002a)15.  Of interest is the fact that the transferability of rights under the MLRA is only possible 
with the approval of the Minister, this provision being maintained precisely in order to limit the possibility of 
“paper quotas”.  Yet, despite being illegal these are apparently very widespread. 
 
A number of fisheries are currently administered under the new allocation system of 2001, including (fisheries 
discussed in more detail later are in bold): 
 
1. Abalone 9. Hake deep-sea trawl 
2. Hake and sole inshore 10. Hake longline 
3. Hake handline 11. Horse Mackerel 
4. Prawn 12. Pelagic fishery 
5. Shark longline 13. Squid 
6. South coast rock lobster 14. West coast rock lobster 
7. Tuna pole and longline 15. Gill net 
8. Beach seine 16. Traditional linefish 
 
2.2.2 Determining the TAC/TAE, the share of different sectors and allocation of the TAC/TAE 
In general, a scientific Working Group (appointed by the research director of MCM) make recommendations to 
CAF (appointed by the minister) who then advise the minister on the TAC (or TAE).  To minimise the time and 
haggling involved in setting the TACs, during the 1990s, the trend was to move to “operational management 
procedures” (OMPs) for the more commercially important species.  An OMP is a decision-making process based 
on a formula for transforming a pre-specified set of data into a TAC, where the formula is suitably tested for 
robustness under uncertainty (Johnston and Butterworth 2004).  By the mid-1990s OMPs were in use for the hake 
deep sea trawl fishery (Merlucius spp.), the purse seine fishery for sardine (Sardinops sagax) and anchovy 
(Engraulis capensis) and was introduced for west coast rock lobster in 1997. 
 
In the case of west coast rock lobster, three data sources are used: catch rates from industry, a fisheries 
independent monitoring survey and annual assessments of somatic growth rate (Johnston and Butterworth 2004).  
The OMP responds to trends in the above three measures with increases or decreases in TAC under constraints 
placed on interannual variability in TAC and with stock rebuilding objectives.  The chosen west coast rock lobster 
OMP was implemented in 1997 for the following three years and then re-evaluated in 2000 and in 2003.  One of 
the changes to the latter two evaluations was that the TAC included the recreational component.  The use of the 
OMP procedure has apparently resulted in a significant reduction in time spent on negotiations and arguments 
over the TAC recommendations (Johnston and Butterworth 2004).  For the abalone fishery, a working group of 
scientists, DEAT and industry assembles structured diving survey data, commercial fishery data, recreational and 
poaching data and analyses these to determine the TAC (Tarr undated). 
 
The total TAC/ TAE is then split into the various sectors (“full commercial”, “limited commercial”, recreational, 
deep sea trawl, inshore etc.).  This split is based on a combination of the previous catch history and the type and 
number of applications which came in during the 2001/02 season as well as on “the need to balance the 
sustainability of the industry while enhancing the capacity of historically disadvantaged communities to establish 
commercially viable businesses” (DEAT 2001a). 
 
                                                        
15 A quote from a spokesman for Humansdorp community factory workers in DEAT (2002a): ‘We were fortunate in that we 
acted as “paper quota” holders for a period and then utilised the proceeds from our permits to invest in a vessel.  Only once we had 
some assets did the bank want to lend us money’. 
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2.3 The resource management context: Notes on four South African fisheries 
Some background is given for four fishery sectors in the next sections: these are hake (specifically hake handline), 
traditional linefish, west coast rock lobster and abalone.  Of these, the fishery employing the most people is the 
traditional linefishery, followed by the west coast rock lobster fishery (Sauer et al. 2003b).  These fisheries were 
chosen because they are relevant to all three communities with which we worked, particularly as they are fisheries 
which are reasonably accessible to poorer fishers, as they do not require high capital equipment.  Another fishery 
of particular relevance to poor fisher communities is that of “small nets” (i.e. gill nets and beach seine nets).  
However, this fishery is of more importance on the west coast and is not a particularly important part of the three 
communities.  The hake handline industry is relatively new, and is described below in the context of the entire 
hake industry which is divided into four sectors.  Some of the main features of these four fisheries are summarised 
in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. Summary of hake, traditional linefish, west coast rock lobster and abalone for 2001 (data primarily from 
DEAT 2002a). 
Fish Hake - deep-
sea trawl 
Inshore: 
Hake & Sole 
Hake 
longline 
Hake 
handline 
Traditional 
linefish 
West Coast Rock 
Lobster Abalone 
Species Merluccius 
parodoxus 
M. capensis, 
Austroglossus 
pectoralis 
M. capensis M. capensis ~ 20 important 
species 
Jasus lalandii Haliotis 
midae 
Season      Oct-Apr/Nov-Jun/ 
Jul-Sep (depends 
on zone) 
Nov-Jul 
Employees  Sea-going 1 880 370 900 
 
~ 3450 1 300 400 
 Land-based 3 910 800 
   
3 000 450 
Income per fisher R 63 000 / 
sea-going 
R 35 000 / 
sea-going 
R 38 500 
  
R 26 500 R 18 000 - 
R 26 000 
Price (R / kg )      R 180/kg R 200/kg 
Industry value 
(annual R millions) 
R 1 400 R 100 R 130 
  
R 200 R 70 
Vessels engaged 61 30 56  ~ 450 290 100 
Vessel value 
(R millions) 
R 750 
 
R 750 
  
R 130 R 25 
Levies 
R/ton whole mass 
R 165 Hake: R 156 
Sole: R 251 
 
R 123 Paid annually: range 
from R118 if ≤ 2 T 
to R4 114 if > 30T 
R 3 409 R 6 062 
 
 
2.3.1 Hake 
Hake (Merluccius spp.) is South Africa’s most important fishery in terms of wholesale value (more than 80% of 
the total value of all fisheries) (Japp 2001).  The fishery is complex as it involves: 
• off-shore or deep sea trawling (targeting the deep-water hake M. paradoxus) operating since 1900, 
• inshore trawling which is associated with the sole fishery (i.e. hake and sole are caught from the same 
boats and rights are allocated together), 
• a relatively recently developed long-line fishery which was formally introduced in 1998 (after an aborted 
experimental kingklip longline fishery from 1988 to 1989 and an experimental hake longline fishery from 
1994 to 1997) and 
• a handline hake fishery which was previously part of the general linefish sector, but has more recently 
(2002) been handled separately after a crisis was declared in the linefish sector in 2000 because of severe 
depletion of stocks. 
 
The latter three sectors target M. capensis the shallow-water species (Japp 2001).  As responses to declines in 
catches, the minimum mesh size was increased in 1975 and a 200 mile fishing zone was established in 1977.  
From 1979, the fishery was managed by means of annual company allocated quotas (Mayekiso et al. 2000), a 
TAC, limitation on the total number of vessels and closed fishing areas.  The off-shore sector is the largest of the 
sectors and was dominated by a few large companies up until 1986 (Figure 2.2).  The Quota Board introduced 20 
new entrants by the time of the new political dispensation in 1994, and an additional 24 have since been included 
(Figure 2.2).  However, 60% of the total hake TAC still remains with the original four companies (from 1978) and 
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71% of the deep sea TAC.  Altogether there are currently 298 players with rights in the hake fishery (Table 2.3).  
New entrants receive quotas which are apparently not viable unless they pool resources.  Alternatively they sell 
their quotas (a 343 T quota in 1998 being worth about R652 000 if sold (Hutton et al. 1999). 
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Figure 2.2. TAC and the number of quota holders in the deep sea trawl hake industry (data from Japp (2001), except 
for 2002 (from DEAT 2002c). 
 
Table 2.3.  The number of quota holders in the various hake sectors in the last two allocations and the proportion of 
TAC allocated (from DEAT (2002b,c) for 2002-2005 and Japp (2001) for 2001). DST = Deep sea trawl 
2001 Sector TAC 
% of 
overall 
TAC 
# quota 
holders 
% of 
quota 
holders 
2002-2005 Sector TAC 
% of 
overall 
TAC 
# quota 
holders 
% of 
quota 
holders 
          
DeepSeaTrawl 138 495 89.94 56 15.2 DeepSeaTrawl 136 544 83.18 53 17.8 
Inshore 10 165 6.60 13 3.5 Inshore 10 165 6.19 17 5.7 
Longline  10 800 7.01 100* 27.1 Longline previous rights-holder 5 250 3.20 42 14.1 
     Longline new entrants 6 670 4.06 98 32.9 
Handline 5 500 3.57 200* 54.2 Handline 5 520 3.36 88 29.5 
          
OVERALL TAC 164 960  369   164 149  298  
          
Agreement with Mozambique 1 000         
          
Four biggest companies in DST 102 308 61.63   Four biggest companies in DST 97 777 59.6   
* Approximate numbers. 
 
 
2.3.2 Linefish 
Management of the linefish industry, which comprises about 20 important species16, was limited prior to 1985 
until which time it was a more or less open access fishery.  Management measures were limited to minimum size 
limits for some species introduced in the 1940s and closed seasons for two species.  In 1985, a more 
comprehensive approach was initiated which capped effort levels at 1984 levels, introduced closed seasons, bag 
and minimum size limits.  In addition, in an attempt to limit entry into the linefishing industry, A and B licences 
were introduced for commercial and small-scale commercial fishers respectively and this remained in place until 
after the passing of the MLRA (Table 2.4).  There were about 2310 handline (A and B) licensed boats in 1996 
(Stuttaford 1996).  Linefish permits were transferable and, because of relatively low returns, up to a third of 
permits (primarily those of new entrants trying to enter the fishery) changed hands each year from 1986 to 1997 
(Sauer et al. 2003a). 
 
                                                        
16 There are approximately 200 species of which 90 are regarded as important, but about 20 species make up the bulk of 
the catch. 
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The failure of the management approach as indicated by falling catches, led to the development of a new “Linefish 
Management Protocol” (LMP) in 1999 which included clearly defined goals and required more scientific stock 
assessments.  The LMP was introduced because it was impractical to develop OMPs for a divers and multispecies 
fishery.  A crisis was declared in the linefishery in December 2000, with the aim of, with the subsequent 
allocations, drastically reducing effort in the linefishery.  As part of the new approach, the linefishery has been 
split into three sectors: “traditional linefish”, tuna pole and line and hake handline.  The new allocation system 
was applied to hake handline and tuna in 2002 (with rights allocated through to 2005) and to the “traditional 
linefish” sector in 2003.  Until 2003 traditional linefishers continued to operate under “exemptions”.  The aim of 
the new approach was to reduce the effort from the reported 2 500 vessels active (Sauer et al. 2003a) in 2000/01 
to about 450 vessels and 3450 crew (MCM media release, July 2003), particularly given that the high turnover in 
permits indicated that about 30% of the fleet was latent effort, many B-licences belonged to “part-timers” and that 
a number of fishers had now acquired rights in the tuna pole and hake handline fisheries. 
 
In the 2003 traditional linefish allocation, there were, therefore, only 543 limited commercial applications and 198 
full commercial applications.  Of these, 250 limited commercial rights (with 1064 crew) were granted and 126 full 
commercial rights (with 1084 crew).  In the appeals a further 37 limited commercial rights were granted (with 155 
crew) (Table 2.4).  For the traditional linefishery, which is effort controlled rather than quota controlled, limited 
commercial is defined by the number of crew allowed on the vessel (a maximum of 5 including the skipper and/or 
rights-holder) while full commercial may have larger crews. 
 
In some fishing villages (e.g. Arniston, Struisbaai, Gansbaai) it was found that the rights allocation had adversely 
affected the communities, because only one or two people owned all the vessels, only one vessel was to be used 
per right, and because their crew had not applied independently for rights.  Therefore a decision was taken to grant 
exemptions to those bona fide fishers who had access to suitable vessels.  This exercise resulted in 965 fishers 
being granted exemptions.  This number, if regarded as crew rather than rights-holders, would bring the total crew 
(3348) up to the stated goal of 3450. 
 
A very important aspect of the new approach and the split of linefish into three sectors, is that holders of 
traditional linefish rights may not hold rights in other sectors, or put the other way, fishers with rights of access to 
other fisheries may not hold traditional linefish rights.  The intention is that traditional linefish rights should be 
reserved for those who are dependent on linefishing for more than 75% of their income.  However, in the past it 
was often the case that people with rights in other sectors such as west coast rock lobster and abalone would use 
the linefish permit so as to be active for the whole year.  MCM’s intention is, apparently, to encourage a situation 
where rights are distributed amongst a crew: e.g. one has a rock lobster right, one has a linefish right, etc.  In other 
words, someone with a linefish right might crew for someone with a west coast rock lobster right and vice versa. 
 
Table 2.4. Number of A and B licences issued to boats for various years (data from DEAT 1994 and 1998) and number 
of limited and full commercial rights-holders in the 2003 allocation (DEAT 2003a). 
Number of licences  1992/93 1993/94 1996/97 1997/98 Number of rights-holders 2003 
A-licences 502 470 388 410 Full commercial 126 (1084 crew) 
B-licences 2645 2544 2275 2275 Limited commercial 287 (1064 crew) 
     Exemptions 965 
 
 
2.3.3 West coast rock lobster 
West coast rock lobster (Jasus lalandii, known locally also as crayfish and in Afrikaans as kreef) has been 
commercially exploited since the late 1800s.  A minimum size limit of 89 mm carapace length was introduced in 
1933, a tail mass production quota in 1946.  A whole mass quota was introduced in 1980/81 together with 
management by zonal TACs (Pollock 1986) (which became defined as four fishing zones each divided into two 
fishing areas) and closed season and protection of berried females and soft-shelled lobsters were also introduced.  
After the dramatic declines in catches in the late 1960s the catch stabilised until 1989 when a reduction in somatic 
growth rates again reduced catches due to reduced recruitment into the legal size class.  The minimum size limit 
was reduced to 80 mm in 1991 and continues at this size to date (apart from a brief decrease to 75 mm in 1993-
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94).  In 1994, quota holders were for the first time allowed to export themselves rather than through the central 
marketing organisations.  In 1997 an operational management procedure was introduced for the west coast rock 
lobster sector (see Section 2.2.2 for a description of how this works for west coast rock lobster). 
 
In the late 1980s there were 39 quota holders harvesting about 4000 T (Sauer et al. 2003a) (although this 
translated into roughly 239 inboard vessels and 1000 dinghies Pollock 1986).  After the 2002-2005 allocation 
there were 720 quota holders harvesting about 2126 T in the traditional four zones (Figure 2.3 and Table 2.5).  In 
addition, since 2003/04, there have been an additional 274 rights-holders (before appeals) harvesting 230 T in the 
newly opened up Area 12 of Zone E (east of Cape Hangklip).  Thus the numbers of quota holders have increase 
dramatically over the last few years.  The east of Cape Hangklip sector was opened after an experimental fishery 
which was run with local fishers from 1999-2001. 
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Figure 2.3. TAC and numbers of west coast rock lobster rights-holders over the years. Numbers exclude subsistence 
permits for1999-2001 (see Table 2.5). 
 
 
In the 2002-2005 allocation, 88% of the TAC went to full commercial applicants and of that 33% went to eight 
quota holders and 8.6% to new entrants.  The west coast rock lobster industry considers three categories of quota 
holders (Sauer et al. 2003a) small (<10 T), medium (10-40 T) and large (>40 T).  In this categorisation there are 
currently (including 2002-2005 full and limited commercial and the east of Cape Hangklip allocation), 8 large 
quota holders (holding just over 23% of the TAC), 17 medium quota holders and 937 small quota holders (DEAT 
2001a and 2003b).  This can be compared to the situation in 2000/01 when there were 9 large quota holders (with 
40% of the TAC), 18 medium and 199 small (Sauer et al. 2003a). 
 
Subsistence permits were allocated for the years 1999/00 and 2000/01 (Sauer et al. 2003a).  Although, initially 
there were “only a couple of hundred” (Boyd and Adriaans 2002) permits granted, in 2001 there were 1870 and in 
fact prior to the completion of the allocation exercise, “exemptions” were granted to 3 600 fishers to harvest four 
lobster per day.  Catches from the subsistence sector were estimated to be only 7% of the total catch (Boyd et al. 
2000). 
 
The recreational take was estimated at 379 T in 1995/96 (Griffiths and Prochazka 1999) and 500 T in 1996/97 
(30% of the commercial catch) (Sauer et al. 2003a).  The recreational TAC was reduced to 174 T for 2000/01, 
with reduced seasons, and weekends-only fishing being the tool used to attempt to achieve this reduction.  
However, in 2004, due to an uproar from the recreational lobster sector and small businesses associated with 
fishing and tourism the season was reopened. 
 
There is significant poaching of west coast rock lobster by recreational fishers taking more than their bag limit of 
four a day, by commercial operators taking more than their quota and by other poachers.  For example, a group of 
fishers apparently harvested 732 T of west coast rock lobster when they were only entitled to 72 T and sold the 
catch by an existing arrangement to a large company (Focus 2002). 
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Table 2.5. Number of west coast rock lobster rights-holders over the years (data from Hersoug and Holm (2000), 
Pollock (1986), DEAT 2001a, 2003b, DEAT media releases, Wesgro 2001) 
 Number of participants 
 Full Commercial (FC) 
Year Total Entrants Exits 
Limited 
Commercial (LC) 
FC + LC 
TAC 
(T) 
East of 
Hangklip 
participants 
East of 
Hangklip 
TAC (T) 
Subsistence 
(includes East 
of Hangklip) 
Recreational 
TAC T Overall 
TAC (T) 
1970 34          
           
1986 38          
           
1990/91     3 790      
           
1992/93     2 400      
1993/94 93 +46 -2  2 200      
1994/95 99 +7 -2  2 000      
1995/96 104 +8 -3  1 500      
1996/97 145 +43 -2  1 680    500  
1997/98 173 +36 -8  1 920    340  
1998/99 192 +22 -3  1 780   Couple of 100 258 1920 
1999/00 187 +14 -19  1 613 25* 25* Couple of 100  2156 
2000/01 200    1614 23* 23* 1870 (230 T ) 174 2 018 
2001/02 +62 -28 1514 + 218 25*  0  2 126 
2002/03    
 
 2 333 
2003/04  230 
 
 2 915 
2004/05 
2341   4862 
 
2743 
    
 
New allocations    
* Experimental fishery for three years, TAC not included in Overall TAC. 
1. Including appeals 
2. Including appeals and Witsands applicants 
3. Excluding appeals 
 
 
Sauer et al. (2003a) estimated that the minimum viable quota for a deckboat (“chukkie”) or an outboard dinghy 
was between 1 and 1.5 T in 2000.  This was given that the boat were attached also to an A linefish licence, but 
fishers may no longer hold linefish rights if they have access to any other rights.  Sauer et al. (2003a) also note 
that the costs of fishing vary dramatically between zones (ranging from R50/kg in Zone A to R6/kg at Cape Point) 
and that a number of rights-holders might share a vessel, thus also reducing costs. 
 
2.3.4 Abalone 
Please note that there are further details regarding the abalone industry in Section 2.4.1. 
 
The commercial fishery for abalone (Haliotis midae, known locally as perlemoen) started in 1949 in Gansbaai.  A 
commercial production quota was introduced in 1968 which became a whole mass TAC in 1983 (Sauer et al. 
2003a).  The commercial harvest peaked in 1965 at 2 800 T.  Since 1986, the commercial TAC has been divided 
among seven fishing zones between Cape Columbine (south-west of St Helena Bay) and Quoin Point (about 30km 
west of Cape Agulhas).  The TAC has been progressively reduced over the last few years, from around 600 T in 
the early 1990s to 282 T for the 2004 season (Table 2.6).  There is a minimum size of 138 mm and 114 mm shell 
length and breadth respectively and the season runs from 1 November to 31 July.  Fishers go out in small boats 
and dinghies and divers work in <10m depths in calm waters only.  The crew is limited to five, regardless of 
vessel size and usually consists of four: the diver, boat operator and two boat assistants (one of whom may be an 
assistant diver).  Since 1968 restrictions have been placed on total production, and this was followed by 
restrictions on total catch, registration of divers and numbers of processors.  Prior to 1982 only the processing 
factories received abalone quotas or rights directly.  The Abalone Divers Association was formed around this 
time, and they were given the rights, confiscated by the authorities, of one of the processing companies (Sauer et 
al. 2003a).  Divers were granted their own rights from 1984 onwards but their harvest had to be delivered to 
specified factories (Sauer et al. 2003a) (this restriction remains in place for divers, but not, apparently, for “legal 
entities”).  Divers’ rights were transferable but first option to buy had to be given to the Abalone Divers 
Association.  In 1995 three of the abalone diver organisations combined to form the Overberg Commercial 
Abalone Divers Association (Overberg being the municipal area including Hawston and Hermanus). 
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A subsistence fishery was recognised and allocations made in 1998/99, 1999/00 and 2000/01, allowing fishers to 
catch and sell four abalone a day.  Based on the advice of the SFTG, the subsistence sector (in the Western Cape) 
was closed in 2001 (with 2000/01 being seen as a transitional allocation).  The following year the allocations were 
based on a split between “full commercial” and “limited commercial” sectors.  However, further subsistence 
permits were issued in the Eastern Cape in 2002 (DEAT press release, 14 October 2002). 
 
Table 2.6. Abalone TAC (in tons) over the years (Sources: Sauer et al. 2003a, DEAT 2001b, 2004a. Where sources 
disagree, the most recent DEAT reference was taken as the authoritative source). 
Year TAC Zone C (Hawston / Hermanus area) 
1965  2 800  
   
1983 660  
   
1986 640 160 
   
1990/91 595 170 
   
1994/95 615 130 
1995/96 615  130 
1996/97 550 65 
1997/98 530 30 
1998/99 515 15 
1999/00 500  5 
2000/01 496 0 
2001/02 475  
2002/03 431.5  
2003/04 282   
 
 
Recreational permits have been required since 1983 (Tarr undated).  The recreational catch peaked at an estimated 
548 T (89% of the commercial catch) in 1993/94.  A reduced recreational season length was only introduced in 
1997/98 and, with further reductions in season length and hours of catching, the recreational catch was reduced to 
an estimated 110 T by 2001/2002 (Tarr undated).  Recreational fishers were allowed a bag limit of five a day in 
1990/91 which was reduced to four a day in 1999/00 and to three a day in 2000/01.  Eventually, with the new 
abalone policy and the recent allocation in 2003, the recreational abalone sector was closed until further notice 
(DEAT 2003c). 
 
Poaching, particularly in Zone C (Hermanus and Hawston areas), has increased enormously in the last 15 years 
(see also Section 2.4.1).  It is estimated that more than 1000 T was poached in 2002 which was double the legal 
TAC of 430 T for that year (DEAT media release Aug 2003).  Besides the huge catch, poachers also often take 
undersize individuals thereby further threatening the resource (as the abalone do not get a chance to reproduce). 
 
Stocks have declined over the last 15 years due to increased poaching and recreational catches.  This has 
contributed to recruitment failure because of the sheer numbers caught, because up to 90% of poached abalone are 
undersized and because of the increased west coast rock lobster population east of Cape Hangklip (see Section 
2.3.3 and 3.2).  Zones A to D used to contribute about 90% of the TAC, but for the above reasons, Zone C had to 
be closed to the fishery for the 2000/01 season (Sauer et al. 2003a).  
 
As with other fisheries, DEAT has tried to “open up” and transform the fishery since 1994 while trying to 
maintain stability in the industry and reduce poaching.  For the years from 1998 to 2003 there were about 47 large 
companies (with about seven of those being processors) (Table 2.7).  From 1998 to 2001 just over 200 subsistence 
permits were also granted.  In the 2001 allocation, MCM allocated full commercial rights to 40 companies (DEAT 
2001b) and limited commercial rights to 239 individuals or small companies (66 of these on appeal).  The number 
of limited commercial rights therefore corresponds roughly to the number of subsistence quotas previously (Table 
2.7).  However, only about 150 of the limited commercial applicants were previous subsistence quota holders (or 
filled in the appropriate part of the application form), and of those, about 130 were granted rights (DEAT 2001b).  
Full and limited commercial rights were allocated for two years.  The amount allocated to full commercial 
applicants ranged from 55 T to 2.25 T, with only 10 companies being granted quotas greater than 5 T.  Limited 
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commercial applicants were all granted 430 kg quotas except for 16 of the appellants who were granted 200 kg.  
Ten of the 40 full commercial rights were allocated to processing companies (DEAT 2003d). 
 
In order to try to deal with declining stocks and ever-increasing poaching, a new management approach was 
adopted in 2003 according to which abalone rights are allocated to entities in specific secondary zones within the 
original seven primary zones (a so-called Turf basis) (DEAT 2003c).  Rights are now allocated to three categories: 
individual divers, “legal entities” and processing factories.  The first two were given 10 year rights, while 
processors were given three year rights, by the end of which time they are expected to have restructured so as to 
be viable independently of having their own quota.  As part of the new approach, the recreational abalone fishery 
was closed in 2003 in order to reduce the overall harvest and to help enforcement.  “Operation Neptune” - a joint 
law enforcement operation between DEAT, the South African Police Services, the National Defence Force and 
some non-governmental organisations, which has had a chequered stop-start history - was restarted in August 
2000 and there have been many and significant arrests.  In addition, a dedicated environmental court was opened 
in Hermanus in February2003 (another opened in Port Elizabeth a year later, and a third is being mooted).  The 
Hermanus court deals with poaching related cases and has brought the conviction rate up from 10% to 70% and 
improved the speed at which cases are dealt with.  However, poaching seems to continue unabated.  For example, 
at least R24 mill worth of abalone was confiscated between May and August 2003 (Cape Times August 2003). 
 
 
Table 2.7. Events and numbers of abalone quota holders (from Sauer et al. 2003a, DEAT 2001b, 2003c,d, 2004a, 
Stuttaford 1996). 
 Abalone processors % TAC Diver history and numbers Vessels 
1949 Start of commercial fishery    
     
1964   104 
1965 14  112 
     
1968 6   
     
1970   68 
     
1982 1 factory’s rights given to the Abalone Divers Association 
     
1984 Divers granted fixed % of TAC, to deliver to factories. 
     
1989/90 4  47 
     
1991/92 ~ 6  About 50. Divers allowed to employ assistants 
1992/93   5 new divers, 11 rights-holders employing assistants 
1993/94 6  10 T community quota granted for first time 
1994/95 6  55 
1995/96 16  58 divers. 10 new rights-holders. 3 divers groups join to form 
Overberg Commercial Abalone Divers Association 
1996/97   6 new rights-holders. 62 rights-holders, 26 employ assistants 
     
    
 FIRST MLRA-BASED ALLOCATION  
   
 Companies   Subsistence 
 Processors Other    
1998/99 7 40   236  
1999/00 7 40   208  
2000/01 7 40  (76 divers+46 assistant divers) 208 ~100 
    
    
 NEW ALLOCATION SYSTEM 2001 
  
 Full commercial rights-holders  Limited Commercial rights-holders 
 Processors % TAC Other % TAC % TAC  % TAC 
2001/02 10  30  77.6% 239 22.4%  
2002/03 10  30  77.6% 239 22.4% 
        
        
 NEW ABALONE POLICY 2003 
  
 Processors % TAC   “Legal Entities” % TAC Divers % TAC 
2003/04 5 * 34.6%   24 * 6.8% 200 * 37.9% 
 3 year rights, to be discontinued 10 year rights  10 year rights  
* before appeals 
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Figure 2.4. Number of abalone quota holders and TAC.  Numbers for 1998-2001 include subsistence permit holders.  
Numbers for 2003/04 exclude appeals. 
 
 
The new policy for the 2004 allocation resulted in only five processors being granted quotas.  These are valid for 
three years by which time they will have to be viable independent of having their own quota.  Twenty-four legal 
entities and 200 individual divers were granted rights for 10 years.  (The number of successful appeals was not 
available at the time of writing).  The processors were granted a total of 97.5 T, legal entities 19 T and divers 
107 T (the remainder of the 282 T TAC being kept aside for possible successful appeals).  Individual divers were 
granted either 400 kg or 600 kg depending on whether they had access to a west coast rock lobster right (in which 
case they got the lesser amount).  Legal entities were granted between 400 kg and 3930 kg depending on access to 
other rights and their previous allocation. 
 
In 2001, the full commercial rights-holders (including processors) got 77.6% of the total TAC, while the limited 
commercial rights-holders, roughly corresponding to the previous “subsistence” permit holders got 22.4%.  There 
were apparently 10 processors at this time, but for comparative purposes, we just look at the five processors who 
were subsequently also given rights in 2004 (Table 2.10): they received 47% of the TAC in 2001 and 34.6% in 
2004 (the latter before appeals).  Of the small TAC of 282 T for 2004, therefore, the processing factories received 
34.6%, the divers 37.9% and the “legal entities” only 6.8%.  These percentages are before the 20% of TAC 
reserved for appeals has been distributed.  It is not clear what will happen to the processor’s quota when their 
rights fall away in three years’ time. 
 
For the 2003/04 abalone allocation, one of the essential requirements was listed as being that the applicant did not 
hold rights for any other sector apart from west coast rock lobster.  However, it is not clear whether this ruling 
was actually applied (apart from for linefish).  For example, one successful legal entity applicant apparently also 
held a hake handline right.  Most vessels involved in abalone used to also have a linefish B licence, so as to be 
able to continue with other fishing when the abalone season closed (Sauer et al. 2003a).  This essential 
requirement therefore means that applicants have to choose between a high-valued sector which has a short season 
and a year-around, relatively low-value sector. 
 
Sauer et al. (2003a) found that there had been a 30% increase in the number of vessels involved in the abalone 
fishery over the five years preceding their report (i.e. between about 1997-2001) and that, therefore, the industry 
was overcapitalised.  The trend was in part as result of new entrants being pressured to obtain vessels so as not to 
be seen as paper quota holders.  The boats being introduced also tend to be larger than they used to be.  In fact, 
while Sauer et al. (2003a) report that the average boat involved in abalone fishing is 4-6 m in size, the new 
abalone policy stipulates a minimum size of 8 m, further exacerbating this trend.  Abalone boats were also often 
used in other sectors (e.g. west coast rock lobster, linefish) (Sauer et al. 2003a) but abalone rights-holder may no 
longer also hold linefish rights, thus there is a chance that boats will no longer be fully utilised. 
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Levies (payments per landed ton) and application fees have increased enormously over the last 10 years (Table 
2.8).  The estimated minimum viable quota (i.e. to break even) for a typical abalone-harvesting vessel in 2000 was 
about 1 446 kg (Sauer et al. 2003a).  With the R1 200/T increase in levies since then the minimum viable vessel 
quota must now be substantially higher.  The average yearly income per fisher was estimated at between R18 000 
and R30 000 (earned in the nine month season) in 2000/01 (Sauer et al. 2003a).  Exporters were getting about 
R200 / kg at that time.  Earnings per kilogram for divers and assistants are discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
 
Table 2.8. Levies and application fees for abalone. 
 1997  1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02  2003 
Application fee ?  ? R     100 R 6 000 (full commercial) R   500 (limited commercial) 
 R 6 700  
 
Levies per ton R170  R 1 305 R 4 800   R 6 062 
 
 
2.4 The social context of South African fisheries: Notes on three communities 
Three communities, two within the Cape Town municipal area (Kalk Bay and Ocean View) and one 120 km away 
(Hawston) participated in the workshops described in Chapter 5.  The south coast of the Western Cape Province, 
west of Cape Hangklip as well as fishing communities in the rest of the province are predominantly Afrikaans 
speaking with 66 percent of the population having Afrikaans as their home language.  The economy consists 
mainly of retail, agriculture and manufacturing.  There are high levels of unemployment in these communities, 
although generally unemployment levels in the Western Cape are low (16.917% Stats SA, March 2004) compared 
to the average for the whole country (around 27.8% Stats SA, March 2004).  In general, education levels are not 
very high and due to unemployment, poverty and the social consequences of apartheid, problems such as 
substance abuse are common.  People in fishing communities have few job opportunities in the formal sector and 
the fishing industry is one of the larger employers.  The Human Science Research Council found that there were 
three communities in the Western Cape which were more than 50% dependent on fishing.  Changes in the 
allocation system and its consequences are therefore keenly felt in these vulnerable communities. 
 
As a response to the changing approaches to allocations, fishers and fisher communities have tried to organise 
themselves correspondingly.  During the FPDC process and the short period when subsistence quotas were 
allocated, Fishing Fora were established (now defunct), and with the new allocation system, fishers have applied 
as individuals or as members of CCs, company or sometimes as part of a ‘joint venture’ with an established 
company.  For example, in the City of Cape Town region, the Western Cape Fishermen’s Association was formed 
(about 460 members) in 2001, with subgroups in the various areas.  For example, Ocean View had 45 members 
split into 9 groups.  The senior partner (usually a vessel owner) applied for the right and gained 40% of the 
income while the remaining four members shared the remaining 60% (noting that the vessel owner is responsible 
for the significant fuel and vessel maintenance costs).  Members had to meet certain requirements: for example, 
they had to have 10-15 years of experience and no record of poaching (Isaacs 2004).  Thus in this case, the 
communities themselves ensured that members were ‘bona fide fishers’. 
 
However, despite the attempts at self-organisation the communities generally remain poor and bitter divisions 
seem to have developed.  The previous section showed that in the fisheries of concern access has broadened and 
many more have formal fishing rights than they did in the past.  However, in some cases, such as linefishing 
numbers have been reduced and the traditional link between linefishing and either abalone and west coast rock 
lobster has been lost.  In addition, the TAC in abalone has been drastically reduced with corresponding necessary 
reductions in the individual quotas.  Inevitably, because of the increase in numbers of rights-holders in both 
abalone and west coast rock lobster, the individual “slice of the pie” has become smaller (although the TAC for 
west coast rock lobster has gradually been increasing, and so this effect is less extreme in this case).  Some further 
details of Hawston, Kalk Bay and Ocean View communities and their access to fishing rights are described below. 
 
                                                        
17 According to the “strict” definition of unemployment. According to the “expanded” definition which does not require 
active job seeking by the unemployed the figure is 41.2%. 
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2.4.1 Hawston town and fisher community 
By the 1850s Hawston (named after Mr Haw from Caledon) was in existence as a fishing village at Herriesbaai 
(next to which the current harbour was built) near Mudge Point.  It is thus included in the area called “east of 
Cape Hangklip” for the purposes of the recent west coast rock lobster allocation and is part of the Overberg 
district council area and the Overstrand municipality.  It is an entirely “coloured” and mostly Afrikaans speaking 
community of about 5700 people.  Most of the employed work in the fishing, service and construction industry.  
There are very low levels of employment (about 10%) and low levels of formal education.  There are 1000 
learners in the primary school and 770 learners in the secondary school.  There is one primary health clinic, 
several NGOs and welfare organisations and eight religious groupings.  Violence, gangsterism and substance 
abuse have increased over the last decade and have become synonymous with the area once known as “koskas” 
for its vegetable gardens and famous recipes and well remembered for Sonesta the holiday resort which fell into 
disrepair in the 1990s. 
 
Hermanus (situated at Walker Bay, 10 km south-east of Hawston) is an affluent holiday / tourist town famous for 
whale-watching etc.  Hermanus and Hawston have had a close connection to the fishing industry for many years.  
There were perlemoen and seaweed processing factories in Hermanus from the early 1950s (Jakobus Swart, 
Hawston fisher, pers comm.).  Many of the older Hawston residents have been involved with fishing (as fishers in 
various capacities, or as fish processors in factories) for 40 years or more.  Many residents were involved with 
several sectors of the fishing industry, sometimes on a seasonal basis, and with linefishing to supply food for the 
table and to make a living between the seasons of other sectors. 
 
Since 1994, the changes in policy and changes in who were successful in their rights applications have led to 
suspicion, jealousy and mistrust in the community.  In conjunction with this, the high levels of abalone poaching 
in this area have resulted in the town attracting a very bad reputation which is shared by innocent and guilty alike 
and even though some of the “kingpins” come from other villages (e.g. Gansbaai).  Poaching started in the 1980s 
but was “completely out of hand” (P Stacey pers comm) by 1995.  The poaching “industry” apparently now has 
connections, locally, to notorious Cape Flats gangs (such the “The Firm” (Kinnes 2000)) and, internationally, to 
Chinese triads (Hauck and Sweijd 1998).  This has resulted in shoot-outs in the streets between rivals with 
consequent deaths, violent confrontation between poachers and police and a feeling in the community that they 
are unfairly targeted by the police. 
 
 
Hawston harbour showing a Caspir (troop carrier) as part of Operation Neptune. (photo: Ron Janssen). 
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In 1993/4 there were 113 vessels registered in the Hawston/Hermanus area and this number increased to 128 by 
1997/98 (Table 2.9) (DEAT 1994 and 1998).  In the 2003 linefish allocations there were 13 limited commercial 
linefishing rights granted to applicants from the Hermanus/Hawston area plus 14 exemptions (9 from Hawston).  
In the east of Cape Hangklip west coast rock lobster allocation in 2003 there were 164 rights granted in the 
Hermanus/Hawston area (for 500 kg each), 84% of whom were to HDPs.  In 2003/04 at least 77 divers from 
Hawston were granted rights for abalone (55% for quotas of 600kg) and 12 legal entities from Hawston/Hermanus 
(with quotas ranging from 400 to 1040 kg), at least 5 of these being from Hawston (DEAT 2004a) (Table 2.9). 
 
 
Table 2.9. Licences and rights-holders over recent years in Hawston/Hermanus areas. WCRL=west coast rock lobster. 
 Licenced boats  Rights holders since 2001 
 1993/1994 1997/1998  Years Number 
 
  
 
  
Linefish A licence 2 1 Linefish full commercial 2003/04 ? 
Linefish B licence 100 81 Linefish limited commercial 2003/04 13 
   Linefish exemptions 2003/04 14 
Pelagic 1 1    
Other 10 45    
      
   WCRL full commerical 2002-2005 n/a 
   WCRL limited commercial 2002-2005 164 
      
   Abalone legal entities 2003/04 12 
   Abalone divers 2003/04 121 
      
   Other rights (hake, pelagic, etc.)   
      
      
Total boats in harbour 113 128    
 
 
Other than linefishing, which is a “staple” of many coastal communities, the most important factor in the Hawston 
community is abalone because of the length of the association with the abalone industry and the extent to which 
events in the last decade have shaped and scarred the small community.  Therefore, the notes on abalone in 
Section 2.3.4 are particularly relevant to the Hawston community and further details are added here, together with 
some mention of other fishing sectors. 
 
One may consider there to be four relevant “abalone groups” in Hawston/Hermanus: the abalone processing 
factories, the commercial divers, the boat assistants and the poachers.  Historically, there were three important 
abalone processing factories in Hermanus, namely Tuna Marine, Walker Bay Canners and Sea Plant Products 
(Table 2.10).  In the past, the abalone processing factories were granted the quotas and contracted divers, 
primarily from Hermanus and Hawston to fill the quotas.  Later, divers were allowed to receive their own quotas 
and made arrangements with particular factories.  The five processors granted rights for 2004-2007 are all in the 
Hermanus / Hawston area (Table 2.10). 
 
Various grievances over a number of issues have arisen in Hawston during the last ten years.  The perceptions 
exist that: 
• processing companies have employed assistant divers rather than commercial divers as they were able 
to pay them a reduced rate, 
• the amount paid per kilogram to the divers by the processors has not kept pace with increased export 
prices, 
• processors paid white divers a higher price for their catches than what they paid coloured divers, and 
• white divers were exempt from certain restrictions (e.g. the amount they could harvest for personal use). 
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Table 2.10 Abalone processors since 2000/01.  WCRL=west coast rock lobster 
 2000/01 2001-2003 2004-2007 2004-2014 2002-2005 
 Processors Rights- Processors Full Limited Processors Legal WCRL 
 Total=7 holder Total = 10 Commercial Total = 5 Entity  
Combined Abalone Processors (Bato Star: 
holding company: SACTWU), Hermanus Y
1
 
 Y2 Y3  Y5  6402 
Sea Plant Products (Marine Products: holding 
company Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd.), Hermanus Y
1
 
 Y2 Y3  Y5  52223 
Tuna Marine (Oceana), Hermanus Y1  Y2 Y3  Y5   
Walker Bay Canners (Irvin and Johnson), 
Hermanus Y
1
 
 Y2 Y3  Y5   
Ichtus Fisheries, Gansbaai Y1   N9 N9  N8  
Zwemini Fishing (Pty) Ltd Y1   Y3   N8, 9 and *  
Komicx Products (Pty) Ltd, Kommetjie Y1  Y2 Y3   N8 5225 
Overberg Commercial Abalone Divers 
Association, Hermanus  Y
1
 
N3Y2 4 Y3  Y5   
Cape Fish Processors (Pty) Ltd  Y1 Y2 Y3   N8  
Blue Continent Products Ltd (Blue Continent 
Group: Oceana), Cape Town N
6
 N6 Y2 N7 N7  N8  
Dried Ocean Products CC, Port Elizabeth N6 N6 Y2 N7 N7  N8  
Scenematic 16 (Pty) Ltd N6 N6 Y2 N7 N7  N*  
Total 7  10   5   
Notes for Table 2.10. 
1. Source: Sauer et al. 2003a. 
2. Source: DEAT 2003d. This  document mentions these 10 processors although 5 of them are not listed in Sauer et al.’s 2003a list of 
2000/01 processors and three that are in this list are not given in the Draft Abalone Policy. 
3. Source: DEAT 2001b. 
4. At the time of the 2001 allocation, OCAD was not a processor, its catches were delivered to Walker Bay Canners. Therefore, 
between 2001 and 2003 OCAD was granted processor rights. 
5. Source: DEAT 2003e. It is not known whether previous processors can appeal. 
6. Not mentioned as a rights-holder or processor in Sauer et al. 2003a. Perhaps operating under different names. 
7. Not found as applicant in DEAT 2001b. Perhaps operating under different names. 
8. Not found as applicant in DEAT 2004a. Perhaps operating under different names. 
9 Not mentioned as an applicant in DEAT 2001b but mentioned as the company which would do processing, marketing in the 
application of Hentiq 1676 (a new full commercial applicant) and of Microzone Trading 529 CC (a new limited commercial 
applicant).  Neither of these two companies were granted rights in 2001. 
* Not found in DEAT 2004a, however, Hentiq 1676 which “holds 40% in Scenematic 16” was given a legal entity right. Hentiq 1676 
applied for but was not granted a right in 2001 (as a new entrant) and therefore should not have been eligible for a legal entity 
allocation in 2004. 
 
 
More serious than all of these perceptions is the perception that recent quota cuts within the Hawston community 
have been because factories have received increased quotas, rather than because of the depleted state of the 
resource (Table 2.11 and Figure 2.5 show that this is not true). 
 
While these grievances have been developing, the various divers’ organisations have disagreed among themselves 
on policies relating to commercial divers, assistant divers, boat assistants, approaches to marketing and whether or 
not to embrace former or current poachers. 
 
In the 2003/04 abalone allocation, 77 commercial divers resident in Hawston received rights with 55% of these 
receiving 600kg and the rest 400 kg.  All divers are (since 1984, Sauer et al. 2003a) legally obliged to sell their 
catch to one of the specified processing factories.  The Overberg Commercial Abalone Divers Association 
(OCAD) was formed in 1995 when three divers associations joined (Sauer et al. 2003a) and it has received quotas 
since then.  By the time of the 2001/02 allocation this organisation, now a company, received 13.5% of the TAC 
(DEAT 2001b) and consisted of approximately 47 HDP and 12 white divers.  At that time, OCAD contracted the 
shareholders as divers and then the catch was delivered to Walker Bay Canners (DEAT 2001b).  Since then, 
OCAD has become a processor and is therefore able to export directly.  In the 2003/04 allocation they were one of 
only five processors given their own quota (Table 2.10).  Processors other than these five must now rely on 
buying the catch of “legal entities” and divers, as will OCAD when their harvesting rights expire in three years 
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time.  Assuming that the total processor TAC was distributed between the five 2004 processors in the same 
proportions as in the 2001 allocation, OCAD would have received only 6.8% of the total 2004 TAC as compared 
to 13.5% in 2001.  OCAD was also granted a 2000 kg full commercial west coast rock lobster quota for the 2002-
2005 allocation (it is not clear where this was to be harvested as, at that time, there was no commercial fishery 
east of Cape Hangklip, but full commercial entities were entitled to harvest west coast rock lobster at any 
location). 
 
Boat assistants (who assist on the boat with diving equipment, compressors, nets, pipes etc.), of whom there are 
about 130, were badly paid and as a result of intense lobbying were granted a small quota each (about 85kg) in 
1996 to be dived by the commercial divers.  The Southern Boat Assistants Company, formed at this time, has 
received quotas since 1996 including the 2004 allocation.  Unfortunately, tensions have arisen between “new” and 
“old” boat assistants and between registered and non-registered boat assistants.  Apparently, OCAD is going to 
export the Southern Boat Assistants Company’s quota.  The Southern Boat Assistants Company does not appear 
to hold west coast rock lobster rights, although individual members may have applied and been granted rights.  
Also, apparently because of tensions with OCAD, the Hawston Abalone Divers Association was formed.  This 
has, like OCAD, been receiving quota since 1995/96 and received a quota as a “legal entity” in the 2004 
allocation (Table 2.11).  The Hawston Abalone Divers Association was granted a 2000 kg west coast rock lobster 
right in 2002 and individual members may have applied and been granted rights in the 2004 east of Cape 
Hangklip allocation.  Another important organisation in Hawston is the Hawston Fishing Company (Hawston 
Vissersmaatskappy) which was formed by previous poachers.  Currently, 184 families, 22 divers, 54 skippers 
and 19 drivers are involved and they spend money on bursaries and job creation and have launched a boat-based 
whale watching initiative (HFC website).  They have also received quotas since 1995/96 (Table 2.11), but were 
not granted rights in 2004 (although individual divers may have applied for and received rights).  They received a 
2000 kg west coast rock lobster right in 2002 and individual members may have applied for and been granted 
rights in the 2004 east of Cape Hangklip allocation.  There are several other companies associated with fishing 
(including abalone and west coast rock lobster) in Hawston some of which are mentioned in Table 2.11. 
 
 
Table 2.11. Some abalone quota holder organisations in the Hawston / Hermanus area and their quotas (in kg) since 
1996 (sources Sauer et al. 2003a and DEAT 2001b, 2004a).  The 2001/02 full commercial west coast rock lobster 
quotas to these organisations are also shown.  LE=legal entity, P=Processor, WCRL=west coast rock lobster. 
 1996/97  1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2001/02 
WCRL 
2003/04 
Arrowline Fourteen CC ?  2 000 1 484 2 250 2000 01 
Hawston Abalone Divers Association 2 632  4 000 2 968 2 964 2000 600 (LE) 
Hawston Fishers Co. / Hawston Vissersmaatskappy 13 158  9 614 7 134 6 320 2000 
-
3
 
Hermanus Community Trust 12 500  3 000 2 2226 0 - 0 
Mudge Point Fishing CC ?  3 000 2 226 2 250 2000 600 (LE) 
Raaff Fisheries -  - - 4302 2000 400 (LE) 
Southern Boat Assistants Company 6 579  13 086 9 708 8 498 - 3930 (LE) 
        
Overberg Commercial Abalone Divers Association ?  87 290 64 770 55 037 2000 ~27 600 (P)* 
Sea Plant Products (Marine Products: Foodcorp) 140 942(P)  75 678(P) 56 154(P) 47 972(P) 52 2235 ~24 000(P)* 
Tuna Marine (Oceana) 137 347(P)  73 752(P) 54 724(P) 46 874(P) 
-
4
 
~23 500(P)* 
Walker Bay Canners (Irvin and Johnson) 104 461(P)  55 857(P) 41 446(P) 35 130(P) 
-
4
 
~17 600(P)* 
*assuming processor TAC apportioned as in 2001 
? unknown 
1. Legal entity application rejected because “improperly lodged” (no deposit slip) and because “no investment in a suitable vessel” 
2. New limited commercial entrant 
3. Does not appear in DEAT 2004a as legal entity applicant.  Individual members may have applied as divers. 
4. Buying WCRL for processing from various sources and joint ventures. 
5. Granted to Foodcorp, not Sea Plant in Hermanus. 
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It is clear from Table 2.11 and Figure 2.5 that, even if: 
(a) DEAT’s approach had not changed several times over the last decade (e.g. encouraging the formation of large 
CCs then small CCs and then, in 2004, granting the bulk of the TAC to individual divers), 
(b) there was clarity at DEAT and within the community about what constituted a “new entrant”: i.e. is it 
someone who had never previously had a right or who had never previously been involved in fishing, 
(c) the allocation decisions made were completely consistent with the published policies (which, on perusal of the 
various spreadsheets, they were not),  
the Hawston community would still be facing severe financial difficulties at this time.  As shown in Figure 2.5 the 
total amount of abalone legally harvested in the area (as shown by the TAC and the quotas) has plummeted since 
1996.  As a result of points (a) to (c) and of the cuts in quota, the “lucky few” who retain rights in the abalone 
fishery are viewed with suspicion by the rest of the community and accusations of corruption abound. 
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Figure 2.5. Abalone TAC and quotas held by some (a) processors and (b) limited commercial, full commercial (2001), 
legal entity (2004) in the Hermanus / Hawston area since 1996.  Quota for processors for 2003/04 are estimates (see 
Table 2.11) and the quota given to OCAD in 1996 was unavailable. 
 
 
During 2000-2001, divers received R12 to R20/kg of abalone, depending to which rights-holder s/he was 
contracted (Sauer et al. 2003a).  For example, the divers associated with OCAD or SA Commercial Fisherman 
Corp. (Pty) Ltd (SACFC), received R20/kg when diving the quota for their association, but only R13 to R17/kg 
when fishing the quota for a processing rights-holder.  However, for every 1kg a SACFC diver delivered to Tuna 
Marine, s/he was contracted to fish 1.5 kg of Tuna Marine’s quota.  In contrast, OCAD divers contracted to fish 
for Walker Bay Canners (at R17/kg) were granted an extra 60-65% of the delivery weight to catch for Walker Bay 
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Canners.  As a further complication, some rights-holders, not part of OCAD or SACFC, had similar agreements 
with the processors (but with the ratio increased to 1:2) (Sauer et al. 2003a).  In 2001, divers were being paid 
R20/kg by OCAD (DEAT 2004a), whereas Sauer et al. (2003a) claim that OCAD divers received R30/kg in the 
mid-1990s.  The drop in price by 2000 (in Sauer et al. 2003a) and 2003 (in DEAT 2004a) is not explained.  Paul 
(2000) suggests that the changes in diver organisations and allocation policies over the last few years have had a 
detrimental effect on divers as they have “lost their collective bargaining power”, and this may explain the 
reduction in price.  Sauer et al. (2003a) found that the price per kg received by the diver was divided between the 
diver (~R8/kg), the skipper (~R3/kg) and two boat assistants (R2/kg each).  The diver’s ~R8/kg covers his time, 
running and maintenance costs of the vessel, and the purchase of diving equipment such as wetsuits and 
compressors (Sauer et al. 2003a). 
 
2.4.2 Kalk Bay village and fisher community 
Kalk Bay was established in the 17th century when lime (kalk) was extracted using kilns from seashells in the area.  
A military base was established in the late 18th century and in the 19th century it developed as a fishing village and 
whaling station.  A vessel from the Philippines was shipwrecked in the 1840s and many of the sailors settled in 
Kalk Bay.  These were joined by deserters from other ships, freed East Indian slaves and Malaysian settlers.  
People from the other side of the peninsula (Wynberg, Cape Town) established holiday or weekend houses in 
Kalk Bay and with the coming of the railway (in 1883) (Walker 1999), many more people settled.  In 1913 when 
the breakwater and harbour construction began there were 47 fishing boats (rowing sailing combination boats) 
which gave employment to 236 men.  When construction ended (1919), 16 motor boats were registered for fishing 
and six of the others were converted to motor.  Kalk Bay - Muizenberg municipality was joined with others to 
form the City of Greater Cape Town in 1913 (Walker 1999). 
 
 
 
Kalk Bay harbour. (Photo: Ron Janssen). 
 
Kalk Bay has always been a fishing village.  With the change of government and the attempts at new allocation 
systems to broaden access to fishing, divisions have become more evident between the wealthier boat-owners and 
rights-holders on the one hand and their crews on the other.  Divisions have always been there to some extent, 
with the wealthier skippers and boat-owners generally living in the “village” and the poorer fisherfolk on “die 
land” (Walker 1999) where the fishermen’s flats were later built.  However, the divisions now relate to people’s 
views about allocation policy and how they have been affected by them.  To this have been added the elements of 
suspicion and mistrust.  Some of the wealthier boat-owners and skippers are referred to as “gatekeepers” and the 
perception is that they block the free flow of information between fishers and MCM, that they unfairly in some 
way have rights while the ordinary fishers remain poor, working hard for a pittance with no chance of getting their 
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own rights.  Boat-owners on the other hand feel that they are now expected to “sign over” portions of their hard-
earned assets (in the form of rights and boats) to their crew (rather than passing them on to their children) in order 
to retain their rights. 
 
In 1993/94 there were 69 boats registered in Kalk Bay harbour with a combination of west coast rock lobster, 
hake, linefish and other rights (see Table 2.12).  By 1997/98 this had increased to 76 (DEAT 1994 and 1998).  In 
2003, with the first linefish allocation since the new ruling that holders of other rights may not also have 
traditional linefish rights, at least two full commercial rights, six limited commercial rights and 19 exemptions 
were granted to Kalk Bay harbour users.  In addition, 31 limited commercial west coast rock lobster rights-holders 
were allocated in the 2002-2005 allocation to fishers using Kalk Bay as their landing site (although only about 
seven boats appear to be involved), and at least five full commercial west coast rock lobster rights-holders are 
Kalk Bay based companies (Table 2.12). 
 
Table 2.12. Boat licences and rights-holders over the recent years in Kalk Bay.  WCRL=west coast rock lobster. 
 Licensed boats  Rights holders since 2001 
 1993/1994 1997/1998  Years Number 
 
  
 
  
Linefish A licence 41 33 Linefish full commercial 2003/04 At least 2 
Linefish B licence 23 24 Linefish limited commercial 2003/04 6 
   Linefish exemptions 2003/04 19 
Pelagic 1 11    
Other 4 8    
      
   WCRL full commercial 2002-2005 At least 5 
   WCRL limited commercial 2002-2005 31 
      
   Other rights (hake, pelagic, etc.)  unknown 
      
      
Total boats in harbour 69 76    
 
 
2.4.3 Ocean View village and fisher community 
“Coloured” residents of Simonstown (a long established village similar to Kalk Bay, a further 10 km south, which 
now houses the South African naval base) were forcibly removed in 1968 and settled in Ocean View.  Many of 
Simonstown residents had been fishers and were now living in a settlement which was not adjacent to the sea 
(despite its name).  Some of these fishers had links to the Kalk Bay fishing community and their access to the 
fishing industry continued via this route, while others used Witsands slipway to launch their boats (about 170 
fishers operate from this slipway (Echo October 7 2004).  Similar to other communities established during the 
apartheid era when people were forcibly moved to ghetto-like facilities elsewhere, the Ocean View community 
(population about 35 000 (Isaacs 2004)) has had its share of social problems since then.  In general, there are high 
levels of unemployment (about 46% (Isaacs 2004)) and substance abuse and relatively low education levels.  
Fishing has played an important role in the livelihoods of the Ocean View community, with many using 
recreational permits to supplement their income (although recreational catches are not supposed to be sold), while 
others have access to commercial rights of various kinds.  Between seasons or as another source of income, many 
work in the building industry (Isaacs 1998). 
 
West coast rock lobster is one of the more important fishing sectors to the community of Ocean View as it 
requires very little equipment or skill.  About 60% of fishers sell their catch locally, and in 1998 80% were 
earning less than R80 a day, and for 70% of them this amounted to more than 50% of the family income (Isaacs 
1998).  In the 2002-2005 west coast rock lobster at least 80 tons was allocated to the Witsand area (which includes 
Ocean View) as limited commercial rights (Table 2.13) and additional to full commercial rights-holders.  There 
are also linefish rights-holders, linefish exemption-holders and abalone rights-holders in the area (Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.13. Rights-holders since 2001 in Ocean View (or area). Witsand is the launching site often used by Ocean View 
fishers. WCRL=west coast rock lobster. 
 Rights holders since 2001 
 Years Number 
 
  
Linefish full commercial 2003/04 ? 
Linefish limited commercial 2003/04 12 (Witsand) 
Linefish exemptions 2003/04 52 (Witsand) 
   
WCRL full commercial 2002-2005 ? (at least 3) 
WCRL limited commercial 2002-2005 99 (Witsand) (+12 appeals) 
   
Abalone legal entities 2003/04 ? (7 in Zone G) 
Abalone divers 2003/04 6 (600 kg each) 
   
Other rights (hake, pelagic, etc.)  ? 
   
 
 
Witsand near Ocean View. (Photo: Ron Janssen). 
 
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
While facing all the usual problems of fisheries management throughout the world (increasing effort and 
dwindling stocks), the South African government of 1994 also faced the task of “redressing the imbalances of the 
past” when lack of access to capital and other rights limited the extent to which HDPs could become involved in 
fishing.  The actual method used to try to meet transformation and other goals and the allocations resulting (since 
2001) are assessed in Chapter 5, while some of the implications for the fisheries and communities of concern were 
discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  Although in the Western Cape many ‘coloured’ people, had been involved with 
fishing for generations, few were involved in the more lucrative fisheries.  Most were either involved in ‘informal 
fishing’ as owners of relatively small vessels or as crew, caught other peoples quota, were paid as skippers or 
labour, rather than catching their own.  As quotas were progressively introduced since the late 1970s, fishers 
became marginalised as they often could not gain legal access and so fished informally or illegally.  The efforts of 
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DEAT since 1994 have not been particularly successful in achieving either the protection of stocks or meeting the 
aspirations of the previously disadvantaged even though the number of quota holders has increased dramatically 
since 1990 (with the introduction of the Quota Board) and since 1994 with the new political dispensation (see for 
example, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3).  While the opening up of the industry gave many HDPs rights in various 
fisheries, many still feel unhappy and dispossessed.  This is due in part to the ad hoc manner in which the process 
of transformation was undertaken.  For example: 
 
• In the early 1990s there was a limited and unsuccessful introduction of ‘community quotas’ which left much 
disillusionment. 
• There were recommendations from MCM to form CCs or co-operative which, however, did not get quotas 
which related to the size of the group.  Some groups were advised to apply for full commercial rights but the 
limited commercial sector would have been more appropriate for them.  This left communities with a feeling 
that they were being misinformed. 
• For three years “subsistence quotas” were granted for west coast rock lobster and abalone.  Subsistence rights 
in west coast rock lobster were discontinued in 2001 in accordance with the recommendations of the SFTG 
and instead people could apply for “limited commercial” rights.  However the number of rights-holder who 
were accommodated dropped (necessarily) from 1870 “subsistence” quota holders in 2000/2001 to 486 
limited commercial quota holders in 2002/2005.  The initial allocation of subsistence rights gave people a 
feeling of entitlement which was already a feature of many of South African administrative headaches at the 
time, and left them feeling dispossessed when the rights were changed and many applicants were inevitably 
unsuccessful. 
• The FTC responsible for allocations to the formerly disadvantaged was formed and then disbanded leading to 
further confusion. 
• With the initial “opening up” of the industry the view was taken that all South Africans had the right to 
participate in the fishery and this meant that traditional fishers could lose their rights to an entrepreneur who 
had not previously been involved in fishing.  With the new system of 2001, points were allocated for previous 
involvement in the industry and, for some fisheries, dependence on the resource and proof of being a “bona 
fide fisher” were required conditions.  However, despite the formation of the Rights Verification Unit, in 
every community there are complaints that “retired teachers” and “weekend fishers” had obtained rights, 
while real fishers had not.  The “hotline” established in order for people to report such cases was felt to be 
ineffective. 
• The larger commercial companies argued that their rights should be minimally reduced in order to keep the 
industry stable and some litigated to avoid quota cuts, while some new companies litigated as they felt their 
quotas were not big enough. 
• The linefishery was split in 2000 into various sectors, including hake handline and ‘traditional linefishing’.  
Access to the latter sector, a mainstay of many fishers in poorer communities, become conditional in 2003 on 
having access to no other sectors, meaning that the traditional combination of handlining and west coast rock 
lobster or abalone was no longer allowed. 
• Misinformation by MCM to fishers or misunderstanding by fishers occurred, such as that a particular group 
should apply for full rather than limited commercial rights, or that a fishers should apply only for a right to 
one fishery as they might jeopardise their chances if they applied for more than one. 
 
The “chopping and changing” of the rules since 1994, although meant with good intention, has meant that the 
average fisher has had to jump through several different hoops to try to comply and then may still find that the 
approach has changed after he has submitted his application.  The system seems to have stabilised somewhat in 
2003, although interpretations and scoring systems remain rather fluid.  For example, the actual scores allocated to 
different criteria, as a matter of policy, are not known until after the applications have all been received and the 
profile of applicants analysed.  However, the new minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism promised in 
August 2004 that the actual scores would be made known beforehand in the next allocation. 
 
However, the damage has essentially been done in terms of the social disruptions and the unhappiness of the 
traditional fishers.  Those who may have “wrongly” been granted rights in 2001/2002, have now established the 
credentials necessary for the next application (in 2005).  They have four or five years of experience and are 
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previous rights-holders and may have invested in gear, vessels and human resources.  Those who were not granted 
a right have perhaps only an additional few years as a crew member to add to their application form. 
 
On the other hand, it also seems clear that the general approach adopted (of limited entry quotas) was the only 
justifiable approach to take in order to both maintain stability and sustainability of the industry while 
redistributing rights in order to increase equity (Hersoug and Holm 2000).  A TAC and quota controlled access 
system, seems the only approach possible, in this context18, for attempting to limit overfishing and so ensuring 
environmental and economic sustainability.  There are numerous criticisms of the economic, social and environ-
mental consequences of ITQs as a particular form of limited entry, but a full review or critique of the ITQ system 
is beyond the scope of this project.  Even so, there are fishers who regard the whole idea of “a quota system” and 
of ITQs as immoral and feel that they have a natural right to catch fish and should not have “to go as beggars” to 
MCM to apply for a fishing right (Andy Johnston pers. comm. Fishing Imbizo, 17 Aug 2004).  At the same time, 
the “co-management” concept is often mooted, in South Africa and elsewhere, as a more appropriate management 
approach, and indeed, the Turf based system now adopted for abalone management in South Africa, is attempting 
to instil a feeling of ownership of the resource in order to improve the possibility of co-management of the 
resource.  However, attempts at instituting co-management arrangements in other fisheries in South Africa have, 
for the most part, not been particularly successful (see e.g. Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
 
It would appear that the next allocation in 2005 cannot redress these issues without creating similar problems of 
entitlement and dispossession.  It is also abundantly clear from experience around the world that no system for the 
allocation of limited resources can possibly satisfy everybody.  It is therefore of paramount importance that in 
preparation for the 2005 allocations MCM should undertake an in depth assessment and evaluation of the effects 
of the first medium term allocation on fishing communities and in terms of MCM’s goals of transformation, 
stability and sustainability. 
 
With this information they then need to carefully develop goals or objectives for the new allocation, bearing in 
mind that these are intended to be longer term and bearing in mind subsequent allocations.  This needs to be 
followed by a careful selection of criteria (measures) which can be used to evaluate the applicants’ contribution to 
those goals.  A methodical, systematic and transparent process of then evaluating or scoring applicants is also 
needed.  These steps are essentially what the methods of MCDA are intended to support.  DEAT and MCM are 
currently developing their policies for the new round of allocations in 2005. 
 
The following chapter discusses a pilot local knowledge survey and the implications of the better use of local 
knowledge for both fisher empowerment and co-management.  It also describes interactions Hawston community 
members to better understand skills and training needs.  The theme of allocations is returned to in Chapter 5 where 
the recent allocations are analysed and critiqued and in Chapter 1 where MCDA-based interactions with the three 
communities and with MCM were used to try to improve the approach to allocation. 
                                                        
18 In the Western Cape for the fisheries and communities described in this report. 
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3. Interaction with fishers: Local knowledge and training as 
tools for empowerment and fisheries management 
 
The aim of both fishery managers (MCM in this case) and fishers should ideally coincide in that both groups 
would want to have a sustainable fishery (i.e. a fishery that would provide a long-term income, while maintaining 
ecosystem integrity).  However, political expediency and general mismanagement on the one hand, and short-
sightedness and greed on the other hand would tend to limit the extent to which this happy coincidence would 
arise.  In fact, most of these factors would tend to lead to over-exploitation as the relevant minister could gain 
short-term popularity by granting more and/or larger quotas, while fishers can gain short-term profits by over-
fishing (through catching more than their quota or poaching).  The long-term consequences are, of course, that the 
stocks may not recover from overfishing and, on a broader scale, ecosystems become more ‘brittle’, inevitably 
leading to reduced quotas and profits and consequently poorer and/or fewer fishers. 
 
Given the ideal of sustainability, which may be portrayed as the joint achievement of three goals: maximising 
environmental quality, maximising economic benefit and maximising social benefit, the question is: what can be 
done to improve the chances of achieving it.  The aim of this chapter is to identify issues, associated with these 
three objectives, which need to be addressed to improve sustainability, and to suggest some ways of addressing 
them.  As will be seen, the distinctions among these three goals are not always very clear. 
 
Some aspects of sustainability as it relates to fisheries are highlighted in the next section.  Then in Section 3.2 an 
investigation into local knowledge and its potential contributions to sustainability is described followed, by an 
investigation into the skills and training needs of fishing communities in Section 3.3.  Conclusions are given in 
Section 3.4. 
 
3.1 Aspects of sustainability 
Sustainable development is portrayed in terms of three components (environment, economy and society) and may 
be operationalised as the simultaneous achievement of three goals: maximising environmental quality, 
maximising economic benefit and maximising social benefit.  To illustrate, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity aims for conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits from the use of genetic resources.  This section provides an overview of the 
literature regarding fisheries management from the point of view of sustainable development. It is argued that 
sustainable fisheries management would comprise: viable and sustainable resource stocks subject to sustainable 
use by sustainable fishing communities.  The notion of sustainability originates, to some degree, from fisheries 
management and its attempts to identify a maximum sustainable yield – the largest catch which could be taken 
from a fish stock year after year without compromising either the stock or future catches19.  Early theory on 
population dynamics was combined with relatively simple economics to produce “bioeconomic” models.  These 
models still form the basis, although often much elaborated, for present-day fisheries management.  
 
3.1.1 Environment – sustainable resource stocks 
The environmental perspective for sustainable fisheries is largely focused on disentangling the interrelationships 
among fishing pressure, environmental variability and breeding success.  These interrelationships are still poorly 
understood (Schiermeier 2002).  The drive for this understanding comes from stock collapses that have profound 
consequences, obviously for the stocks, but also for fishers, regional and national economies, other species and 
industries dependent on these other species.  Scientists have argued that too heavy fishing pressure – overfishing – 
poses a threat to many fished stocks.  Overfishing stems primarily from the desire of fishers to maximise their 
profits, usually equated with maximising catch.  It also stems from the open access nature of marine resources, as 
well as improved technology and fishing efficiency.  Attention has more recently come to focus on the damage 
that fishing gear can cause to ecosystems and to the effects of fishing on non-target species.  Fisheries scientists 
                                                        
19 Because of the extreme consequences of errors in the modelling of MSY other approaches are now being pursued. 
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have argued for three basic components to management (Schiermeier 2002): setting lower catch quotas, reducing 
the size of fishing fleets, and using less harmful gear.  
 
Because the ‘burden of proof’ that overfishing is occurring, or that it is the cause of stock declines, lies with 
fisheries scientists, management actions have tended to be taken after, instead of before, stock declines (Repetto 
2001; Schiermeier 2002; Pauly et al. 2002).  Reducing fishing capacity is difficult to achieve when many 
subsidies exist to support either modernisation of fleets or expansion of their activities (Pauly et al. 2002, 2003).  
Even decommissioning subsidies can have contrary effects, with the eventual subsidies serving as collateral for 
loans to modernise vessels, or facilitating a switch in pressure to species for which quotas have not yet been set 
(Pauly et al. 2002).  Constraints on gear have been implemented, particularly where it was shown to have adverse 
impacts on other species (e.g. marlin and dolphins as by-catch of tuna long-line fishing – Pikitch et al. 2004) or on 
benthic ecosystems (e.g. benthic trawls which may be likened to clear-felling of marine ‘forests’ – Schiermeier, 
2002).  However, again, constraints tend to be imposed only once the damage has been done.  Also, technological 
advances in locating and catching fish vastly surpass constraints in the use of fishing gear (Pauly et al. 2002). 
 
Currently there is growing interest in a more ecosystems approach to fisheries management, as fisheries biologists 
explore the wider ramifications of fishing and overfishing (e.g. Jackson et al. 2001; Pauly et al. 2002 & 2003).  
For example, Pauly et al. (1998) showed that the average trophic level of the global catch is declining – termed 
‘fishing down the food web’. The mechanisms by which top predators influence lower trophic levels, and may 
even promote populations of their prey, are being lost.  This has raised concerns that fishing is breaking down the 
web of interactions among components of marine ecosystems.  Shortening and simplification of food webs could 
explain the vulnerability of stocks to environmental variability (Pauly et al. 2002). 
 
Three new suggestions for improved fisheries management have emerged from the environmental ‘third’ of the 
sustainability triangle.  The first is to replace current single species stock assessment with Ecosystem-Based 
Fisheries Management (EBFM - Pikitch et al. 2004).  EBFM aims to sustain healthy marine ecosystems by 
avoiding ecosystem degradation, reducing the risk of irreversible change to natural assemblages of species and 
ecosystem processes, obtaining and maintaining long term socio-economic benefits, and generating knowledge of 
ecosystem processes to understand the likely consequences of human activities.   
 
The second argues for the use of networks of marine reserves to protect populations of commercial species, the 
idea being that the offspring of these protected populations will recruit to commercial stocks.  The offspring of 
protected populations are expected to recruit to commercial stocks.  Reserves have been proposed to provide 
greater fishery yields when effort is high (Quinn et al. 1994; Holland and Brazee 1996; Sladek-Nowlis and 
Roberts 1999), to prevent overfishing in the presence of parameter uncertainty (Botsford et al. 1997; Lauck et al. 
1998), and to reduce variability in catch (Sladek-Nowlis and Roberts 1999).  However, the implementation of 
reserves has been slowed by concerns that they will reduce fishery yields.  Theoretical studies have shown that 
management of fisheries through reserves versus effort control could produce identical yields under a reasonable 
set of simplifying assumptions corresponding to a broad range of biological conditions (Hastings and Botsford 
1999).  These authors argue further that marine reserves should be the preferred management approach for 
populations with sedentary adults (invertebrates and reef fishes). 
 
The third overlaps with the social component of the sustainability triangle.  Scientists need to involve fishers in 
their work, and to break down the ‘us-and-them’ attitude that helps to foster the current gulf between science and 
policy (Schiermeier 2002).  Various partnership and co-management20 arrangements are being set up to involve 
fishers more in the management of their fish stocks while at the same time helping scientists obtain crucial data on 
where and when fish are found.  For example, the Study Fleet Project is a pilot project that partners commercial 
fishermen with NOAA Fisheries personnel to develop and implement state-of-the-art electronic data reporting 
devices and software for use aboard groundfish fishing vessels in the north-eastern USA.  Fishermen are assisting 
in the design of these data collection systems.  These collaborative efforts will result in information that could be 
used by both fishermen and managers (Anon. 2003).   
 
                                                        
20 Co-management in this document does not refer to community management, but rather to joint management by a 
national or regional responsible authority and fishers. 
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3.1.2 Economics – sustainable resource use 
There have been various contributions from economics to current fisheries management.  Users of a common 
resource with no constraints on use may be caught in an inevitable process that leads to its destruction (e.g. 
Hardin's (1968, 1994) notion of the "tragedy of the commons").  Hardin's proposed solution was "either socialism 
or the privatism of free enterprise", and led western economists to address the issue of property rights.  In 
fisheries, where fishers extract from a common unbound resource pool, no-one had property rights.  This situation 
has changed for many fisheries.  ITQs, which increase the property rights nature of fisheries access, were one of 
the solutions proposed to the problems of oversubscribed fisheries (see also Section 2.1).  Despite this, in all but a 
few cases, the economic costs of overfishing are not internalised in fisher (or government) transactions (an 
exception being the “buy-back” of quota in New Zealand during the initial introduction of ITQs).  Together with 
other market failures (e.g. subsidies) and the unbounded nature of the resource, the consequence is that there are 
few or no economic constraints to overfishing. 
 
Reducing or containing vessel numbers to the minimum necessary to maximise the economic rent from a fishery 
is a key objective of individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems (Moloney and Pearse 1979).  ITQs involve the 
allocation of rights to portions of the Total Allowable Catch or TAC to eligible participants in a fishery.  
Individual quotas are transferable among license holders by sale or lease.  Proponents of such systems argue that 
they promote conservative harvesting by assuring quota holders of a share of any increase in future harvests 
achieved through stock rebuilding.  Such systems promote efficiency by allowing quota holders flexibility in the 
timing and manner of harvesting their share to reduce costs or to increase product value.  Proponents also contend 
that ITQ systems reduce excessive effort by providing a compensated exit strategy for license holders in 
overcrowded fisheries, and stimulate technological progress by increasing the returns to license holders of 
investments in research or improved fishing technology.  The comparison by Repetto (2001) of management of 
the sea scallop fishery by Canada (using ITQs) and USA generally supported these arguments. 
 
However ITQ also has its opponents, who argue that such systems lead to monopolization of the resource through 
consolidation, force out small operators, encourage discard of by-catch and high-grading of the resource to 
maximize the value of quota, and exacerbate problems of enforcement (e.g. Jennings 1999; Bradshaw 2004b).  
Opinion on the merits of rights-based management regimes in general, and ITQs in particular, is divided among 
fishermen, fisheries managers, politicians, academics, and environmentalists.  Economists generally favour the 
adoption of such systems for their promise of greater efficiency and stronger conservation incentives but other 
social scientists decry the potential disruption of fishing communities by market processes and the attrition of 
fishing jobs and livelihoods (Repetto, 2001). 
 
The second prong in the management of common property resources is to create incentives for users to invest in 
the resource instead of overexploiting it.  The prediction that resource users are led inevitably to destroy a 
common resource is based on a model that assumes that all individuals are selfish maximisers of short-term 
results.  This model is strongly supported by empirical data from open, competitive markets in industrial societies 
(e.g. Plott 1986; McCabe et al. 1990), but not all fisheries operate this way.  Predictions based on this model are 
not supported by field research or in laboratory experiments in which individuals face a public good problem and 
are able to communicate, sanction one another, or make new rules (e.g. Orbell et al. 1988; Ostrom 1998; Kagel 
and Roth 1995).  Social scientists claim that fishers are not simply strategic, atomistic players.  They are born, 
raised and live in local communities; are enmeshed in cultural and social systems that give meaning to their lives 
and directions for their behaviour.  Their fishing practices are guided by values, norms and knowledge that are 
shared within their community.  The Tragedy of the Commons may be a consequence of normative confusion 
which occurs when social ties are weak and moral standards unclear (McCay and Jentoft 1998; Jentoft 2000).  
Overfishing may be more a symptom of community failure, than market failure. 
 
3.1.3 Society – sustainable users 
Many fisheries biologists and economists recognise the need to include fishers and fisher communities in fisheries 
management.  As argued by Jentoft (2000), viable fisheries need viable fishing communities as well as viable 
stocks.  This section examines the relatively recent notion of co-management which is expected to improve the 
efficacy of fisheries management, because the acceptance of management measures is assumed to be higher when 
users have been involved in the decision-making process (Raakjær-Nielsen et al., 2004).  It is often mooted as 
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“the” approach to ensuring sustainable use of a resource.  Numerous cases are cited in the literature, but not all of 
these are successful (e.g. Hauck and Sowman 2003).  There is therefore a need to identify the conditions under 
which particular kinds or components of co-management arrangements would work. 
 
Co-management can broadly be defined as an arrangement where management responsibility is shared between 
the government and fishers.  It can be viewed as a set of institutional and organisational arrangements (rights and 
rules), which define the cooperation among the fisheries administration and relevant fishing communities 
(Raakjær-Nielsen and Vedsmand 1999; Raakjær-Nielsen et al. 2004).  Raakjær-Nielsen et al. (2004) argue that 
the governance of fisheries comprises three elements: “(1) setting management objectives; (2) defining and 
providing the knowledge base for management; and (3) ensuring implementation of management decisions”.  
Figure 3.1 compares the current usual model of fisheries management (a) with two forms of co-management. 
 
Government
Fishing 
communities
Government
Fishing 
communities
1 Setting objectives
2 Knowledge base
3 Implementing decisions
Government
Fishing 
communities
a) b) c)
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
 
Figure 3.1. A comparison of (a) modern, centralised fisheries management; (b) institutional co-management; and (c) 
empowering co-management (Raakjær-Nielsen et al., 2004). 
 
Many attempts to implement co-management have been limited to creating a two-way interaction for the 
implementation of decisions, termed institutional co-management by Raakjær-Nielsen et al. (2004) These authors 
argue that institutional co-management differs little from modern management, and that its efficacy has, in most 
cases, not been much better.  The incentives for co-operation are primarily on the side of government, with fishers 
realising that they continue to be recipients of instructions (Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen 2003).  Expectations of 
genuine participation and empowerment led to considerable disappointment and frustration among fishers, as well 
as poor achievement of management objectives. 
 
The empowering co-management approach involves a learning process for all parties and takes an adaptive 
approach to management.  Raakjær-Nielsen et al. (2004) argue that it will require: a rethink of the logic for 
management and subsequently a change in the knowledge base for management; a major restructuring of the 
institutional and organisational arrangements supporting management; a substantial change in attitudes from both 
governments and fishing communities towards their role in such arrangements; aspiration from fishing 
communities and government to proceed along this avenue; and, capacity building at several levels both within 
government and fishing communities. 
 
There are two other aspects to the society “third” of the sustainability triangle that work in the opposite direction 
to that of co-management above, and are relevant to this study.  The one is the effect on fishers and their 
communities of fisheries management decisions.  Whereas a fishing community made up of second, third and 
fourth generation fishers is likely to have established some system of shared values, a community where the 
designated fishers change from year to year (or allocation to allocation) and/or where the numbers are reduced 
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over time is likely to become less and less cohesive and functional (Jentoft 2000).  The other is the effect of 
environmental degradation (e.g. a decrease in fish stocks) on communities which inevitably leads to poverty. 
 
The “ideal” situation for co-management occurs where all three arrows in Figure 3.1 have bi-directional flows.  In 
other words where communities are involved in setting objectives, in defining the knowledge base and in 
implementation.  Achieving this ideal could mean that fisheries are better and sustainably managed – in terms of 
resource stock, resource use and the continuity and cohesiveness of fishing communities. 
 
3.2 Interaction with fishers: The value of local knowledge (west coast rock lobster) 
in management and empowerment 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section of the project, therefore, deals with exploring the potential value and contribution of local ecological 
knowledge to the second arrow of Raakjær-Nielsen et al. (2004): defining the knowledge base (see Figure 3.1).  
Local ecological knowledge (hereafter referred to as local knowledge) is often relatively site specific and may be a 
mixture of “lore”, practical and scientific knowledge (Scholz et al. 2004).  There are a number of different 
avenues in which local knowledge can contribute to management of fisheries.  These include, for example 
(Johannes 1992): 
• Knowledge about the timing and location of fishes’ movements.  This information can be useful for 
stock assessments for certain types of fish where visual surveys might augment other data.  
Knowledge about such movements, which may be associated with breeding, may also contribute to 
the regulation of fishing pressure at certain times of the year or to the identification of appropriate 
fishing zones.  This information may also be useful for identifying appropriate sites for marine 
protected areas. 
• Knowledge about local vulnerable species and habitats (in space and time).  This information can be 
for identifying appropriate fishing zones and seasons and for identifying appropriate sites for marine 
protected areas. 
 
This part of the project was approached as a pilot study both in terms of the number of interviews that could be 
undertaken and in terms of the depth and breadth of subject matter that could be investigated.  We limited 
ourselves to interviewing fisher representatives regarding certain aspects of west coast rock lobster biology and 
management.  Below, the management and status of the west coast rock lobster resource is briefly recapped.  This 
is followed be a review of west coast rock lobster biology.  The methods are then described followed by an 
assessment of the results. 
 
3.2.2 Management and history of the west coast rock lobster fishery 
Various details regarding current management of the west coast rock lobster fishery were outlined in previous 
sections and are not repeated here.  Section 2.2.2 described the operational management plan (OMP) for setting 
the TAC which is disaggregated on a zonal basis.  Section 2.3.3 gave a brief history of the fishery and recent 
rights allocations and showed the decline in catches over the last decade (Figure 2.3).  This is augmented by the 
longer time-series of catch data in Figure 3.2.  This brings into perspective the recent ‘gains’ in west coast rock 
lobster management!  In essence, while the TAC has stabilised since the late 1980s ‘crash’, caused in part by a 
reduced somatic growth rate, the very slight increase in the last two years is hardly noticeable in comparison to 
historic peaks in the 1950s. 
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Figure 3.2. Catch data for the west coast rock lobster since 1900. 
 
Rights-holders fall into two categories: full commercial and limited commercial.  These are partially distinguished 
in terms of their gear (full commercials tend to have larger boats and to use traps rather than ringnets) and in terms 
of where they can fish (full commercials tend to fish further out to sea or in deeper water).  In addition, 
recreational fishers may purchase a permit to collect four lobsters a day during the recreational fishing season 
(they tend to operate very close to the shore).  The catches of all three of these sectors are now included in the 
TAC determined by the OMP (but not in Figure 3.2). 
 
Rights are granted to individuals or companies, and were previously granted on an annual basis.  In the 2001 
allocation they were granted until 2005.  In the 2005 allocation rights may be granted for up to 15 years, but the 
decision on the length of future rights has not yet been taken.  The rights are only transferable with the permission 
of the Minister (but rights are currently sold or leased illegally in the form of paper quotas). 
 
The criteria used in the 2001 (general) and 2003 (east of Cape Hangklip) allocations could be grouped under three 
objectives: 
1. transformation of sector (through greater representation by HDPs and broader access); 
2. increasing economic growth (through maintaining stability in the industry by rewarding investment or 
history in the industry); 
3. improving management (through rewarding compliance with relevant laws, e.g. MLRA, Customs and 
Excise, Internal Revenue) 
 
Details and problems associated with the recent allocations are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  Of particular note 
for the west coast rock lobster fishery is that lobster rights exclude fishers from holding linefishing rights, and that 
access to another right (e.g. abalone) may reduce the likelihood of being granted a west coast rock lobster right or 
the size of the quota. 
 
3.2.3 West coast rock lobster biology 
The following information has been collated from a number of sources which all relate to the lobster population 
west of Cape Hangklip.  Results of the experimental fishery east of Cape Hangklip are referred to, where relevant 
in the discussion of the survey results (Section 3.2.6). 
 
Usually the puerulus larvae (size about 8 to 10 mm carapace length (CL) (Grobler and Njaula, 2001)) settle in 
depths of less than 10 m during December to April after several larval stages at sea over a period of probably 
more than a year (Pollock 1986).  Juveniles moult several times during a year and grow to about 60 mm CL size 
about four years after settling (Pollock 1986).  Adults moult only once a year.  Females reach maturity at about 66 
mm CL about five years after settling (Pollock 1986).  Males reach 89 mm CL (the pre-1992 legal size limit) after 
about seven to 11 years and females after more than about 20 years. 
 
The male moulting season in the south-western Cape is from October to December and the female moulting 
season from April to June (Pollock 1989).  It is earlier the further west and north one goes (Pollock 1986).  
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Copulation takes place soon after the female moult while the female is still soft.  During moult, individuals prefer 
less crowded conditions and the population in a fishing area may spread out more (Heydorn 1969).  Lobsters do 
not feed when moulting as the mouthparts are also soft (Heydorn 1969) and so they are not usually caught in traps 
during this time.  Inshore - offshore movements are associated with moult and breeding and oxygen levels in 
certain areas (Pollock 1986).  Males seem to be generally deeper offshore, but may migrate inshore during / just 
after moult for protection from bottom swell and /or for breeding and, in the western-northern, areas to avoid 
water low in oxygen.  In the western / northern distribution this may also be related to the higher oxygen levels 
needed during the berry phase.  The female is in berry (carrying eggs) for five to six months, from around 
May/June until about October / November (Heydorn 1969 - working at Robben Island).  Peak hatching (October, 
November) may coincide with the onset of upwelling.  The larva from west- and south-western shores are carried 
into the south Atlantic gyre, possibly circulating to South America and back.  It is not yet known what the fate is 
of the larvae from the eastern end of the distribution.  Although egg-production continues to increase with age, 
94% of egg production is by females of less than 90 mm CL because there are so few large females.  The 
incidence of male moulting during the moulting season will apparently decrease with decreases in water 
temperature and increase with increases in temperature (Heydorn 1969). 
 
Lobsters live in rocky areas that provide them with shelter from waves and predators, and they are often 
associated with kelp and mussel beds (mussels being their preferred food).  Juveniles tend to occupy shallower 
areas closer in shore while adults occupy deeper areas further offshore (generally <70m, but they have been found 
at greater depths at certain deep water fishing grounds (e.g. in Hout Bay and off Cape Hangklip), with little 
overlap in their distributions.  A well researched comparison is that of the Cape Town harbour wall, which has a 
largely juvenile population with smaller individuals higher up the wall and larger individuals deeper on the wall as 
well as on nearby natural habitat (e.g. Hazell et al. 2002).  Where studied (e.g. Robben Island) lobster seem to 
choose areas sheltered from NW, W and SW swells / wind (Heydorn 1969).  During bottom swell periods the 
lobsters seek shelter by crowding into crevices.  In underwater crevices or caves the larger individuals stay at the 
back of the shelter with smaller ones in the front (Heydorn 1969).  In favourable conditions they spread out and 
may be found on sandy or muddy patches (Heydorn 1969).  Although certain authors refute the possibility of 
“mass migrations” because of lobsters’ rapid tiring during swimming, this phenomenon has been reported for 
other lobster species and the inshore - offshore movement would suggest that fairly big scale movements are 
possible (they may walk on the bottom rather than swimming).  Adults have few natural predators and these 
include the cape fur seal, octopus, dogsharks, hagfish, red roman and musselcracker, but these would normally 
prey on small juveniles (Pollock 1989).  Larvae are preyed on by Longfin Tuna (Heydorn 1969). 
 
Lobsters’ preferred food is mussel but they also eat sea urchins, starfish, gastropods and occasionally kelp.  They 
also eat juvenile abalone.  An important indirect effect on abalone is through predation on sea urchin, which 
normally provide shelter for juvenile abalone.  The increase in lobster population east of Cape Hangklip has 
decreased the sea urchin densities and consequently decreased abalone populations because of lack of suitably 
protected habitat for settling (e.g. Mayfield and Branch 2000).  The composition of lobster diet depends on 
availability but reduced somatic growth rates since the late 1980s may be associated with lower mussel biomass 
(Pollock 1989). 
 
Lobsters are regarded as a cold water species, occurring in temperatures ranging from 9oC to 16oC (Pollock 1989).  
Decreases in catch (due to changes in catchability not availability) have been associated with cooler waters and 
increases in equator-ward wind stress (Pollock and Shannon 1987).  On the other hand, increased moult mortality 
is associated with higher temperature, but particularly with reduced oxygen levels (Hazell et al. 2002).  Their 
north-western distribution seems to be strongly limited by oxygen levels (Pollock 1989). 
 
Two important (and as yet unexplained) factors in recent west coast rock lobster biology are: 
• There was a large decline in somatic growth rate in the late 1980s which had consequences for 
recruitment to the exploitable population and resulted in successive reductions in TAC and a reduced 
size limit (from 89 mm to 75 mm CL) 
• There has been an increase in the population east of Cape Hangklip, which always had west coast rock 
lobster present,but in low numbers.  This has meant that in 2003 for the first time a commercial fishery 
was opened up in this area. 
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3.2.4 Good news and bad news for fishers and west coast rock lobster  
There are two clear positive features in the current management and biology of west coast rock lobster: the slight 
recovery in stocks as reflected by the recent increases in TAC, and the expansion of the population into the area 
east of Cape Hangklip.  This has allowed a commercial fishery to operate since 2003, after an experimental 
fishery was conducted jointly by MCM and fishers in the area for three years.  However, the latter point has an 
associated negative effect.  This area formerly supported a lucrative abalone fishery.  Poaching, coordinated by 
highly-organised crime syndicates, is estimated to exceed the legal TAC (possibly by orders of magnitude).  The 
population of abalone has decreased dramatically in recent years, resulting in dramatically reduced TACs.  The 
link between overfishing and the abalone decline is complicated by the west coast rock lobster.  The lobsters feed 
on sea urchins, and sea urchins provide shelter and protection for small abalone.  Lobsters have severely reduced 
the sea urchin population and through the interaction with abalone, their increase in numbers is adding pressure to 
an already depleted abalone stock. 
 
There are a number of other negative features relating to west coast rock lobster management: 
• There are deteriorating relations between fishers and MCM. 
• There are concerns from the community regarding the sustainability of fishing communities because: 
◦ The size of the quotas allocated does not provide a viable income to the rights-holder and his crew 
and because restriction to a seasonal sector (given the lack of access to linefishing) does not allow 
year-round activity and employment.  This also impacts on gear, with boats lying in harbours for 
extended periods.  Of course, rights-holders in one fishery can crew for rights-holders in another 
fishery, thus extending their period of activity; 
◦ It appears that non-fishers are sometimes allocated rights while “bona fide fishers” lose their 
traditional way of life and source of income; 
 
3.2.5 Survey method 
Two rounds of interviews were conducted. An initial round with fishers in Hawston was followed by a round 
where certain issues were followed-up with the some of the same interviewees. The sorts of knowledge revealed 
by Hawston fishers were tested through interviews with fishers in another area (Kalk Bay/Ocean View). 
 
Questionnaires designed for the first and second round of interviews encompassed questions regarding: 
1. known gaps in scientific knowledge: habitat and spatial distribution of stocks, recruitment and life 
history; ecosystem effects (species interactions), damage and by-catch of gear, role of marine 
protected areas (MPAs). 
2. current rights held, fishing history, type of fishing operation 
3. attitudes to management: need for quotas, temporal and spatial constraints to fishing 
4. views on how fishers’ knowledge could help management 
The first round questionnaire is attached as Appendix 5 together with the responses. 
 
The questionnaire formed the basis for semi-structured interviews with the fishers.  Results of the first 
questionnaire were analysed to design the more detailed ‘follow-up’ and ‘confirmation’ questionnaire. 
 
Initial contact with the interviewees for the first round of interviews in Hawston was made through J Matthee, a 
member of the project team, who comes from the area and had ‘local knowledge’ of the various fishers in the 
community.  The first round of interviews, with 11 respondents, was conducted at the local school which was in 
close proximity to most interviewees and, where necessary, transport was arranged.  In the second round of 
interviews (Hawston, Kalk Bay and Ocean View), interviewees were met at restaurants closest to their home or 
harbour.  This minimised any costs to them of being involved in the study (as the cost of travel to meetings is a 
serious problem - Scholz et al. 2004 - particularly in ‘over-researched’ communities who are continually being 
‘consulted’).  Of the fishers in Hawston, six had limited commercial rights, while the others either had recreational 
permits or worked for other rights-holders.  Three of the limited commercial rights-holders had been involved in 
the experimental fishery.  The Hawston follow-up used three of the limited commercial fishers (two of whom had 
been involved in the experimental fishery).  The interviewees in Kalk Bay were full commercial fishers. 
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Interviewees had the option to remain completely anonymous, but most were happy to have their names revealed. 
Even so, no particular answer is associated with a particular interviewee.  The team also felt that it was important 
that they should be acknowledged for their time and contributions, and the fishers seemed to appreciate this. 
 
3.2.6 Results 
Results are presented for the three aspects used above to discuss sustainability. 
 
3.2.6.1 Environmental 
 
Habitat, spatial distribution, recruitment and life cycle 
Fishers were asked a range of questions aimed at elucidating where – locations and habitats – west coast rock 
lobster could be found, and whether this distribution changed over months and years.  They were also asked about 
the proportions of undersized to sized lobster, the proportion of male to female lobsters, and whether these 
proportions varied during the year or with weather conditions.  Fishers generally confirmed current scientific 
knowledge with respect to: 
1. West coast rock lobster are generally found on reefs, usually in association with kelp beds; 
2. West coast rock lobster are found in rocky areas from about 5 m to 50 m depth as well as in areas deeper than 
70 m associated with reefs; 
3. West coast rock lobster are usually distributed with small individuals inshore and larger offshore; 
4. West coast rock lobster move in- and offshore at different times of the year associated with breeding and 
moulting; 
5. The further south, the later in the year that various stages in life cycle (e.g. gravid females) are found or 
movement patterns occur. 
 
Fishers also provided new information: 
1. For the fishery east of Cape Hangklip, many gravid females are found in November and December, i.e. in the 
months when the lobster fishery is first open (a summary of comments regarding season is given in Table 3.1 
and shown graphically in Figure 3.3).  This information is consistent with the results of the experimental 
fishery in the area (Schoeman and van Zyl 1999).  The lobster season is intended to lessen the chance of 
gravid females and moulting individuals from being caught.  The information provided by the fishers suggests 
that the season should be staged, opening later the further south and east one moves (Figure 3.3).  Fishers 
from Kalk Bay confirmed that they would start the fishing season in areas further west in order to avoid soft / 
gravid individuals and gradually move south as lobster in these areas moved out of the moult cycle.  
Currently, in the north-west (Zone A only) the season starts on 15 October and on 1 November in all other 
zones. 
2. Large lobster were found in relatively large quantities on a large muddy area within False Bay, about 
equidistant between Cape Point and Cape Hangklip and stretching to Whittle Rock.  Although lobster have 
been found in muddy patches before (e.g. Heydorn 1969 found juveniles who were, however, not more than 
15 feet from Cape Town harbour wall) the distance from rocky shelter, the quantity of lobster, and the 
reliability of catching them there was surprising. 
The authors suggest that this may be because (a) the environment may be reasonably quiet with good feeding 
opportunities, (b) the lobster can relatively easily move to adjacent reef and rocky shelters, and (c) as they are 
large individuals they are relatively safe from predation. 
3. There appear to be small-scale movements and variations that make it difficult to make general statements 
about seasonal offshore - onshore movements and separation of sexes.  Some of these examples suggest that 
lobsters react quickly to environmental cues.  Examples are: 
(i) This year (2004), lobsters were not found in an area near Gansbaai where they had previously been 
found.  The respondent thought that they may have moved off-shore to avoid an area where large 
quantities of fish had been dumped by vessels, causing a temporarily unfavourable environment for the 
lobster, 
(ii) Although the general trend is for smaller lobster inshore and larger offshore, there are exceptions to 
this tendency.  A population of large individuals found at Die Gang near Hermanus, in November-
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December (2003), appeared to have moved offshore by February (Die Gang is close inshore, 3-8 m, and 
is a quiet, kelp environment), and 
(iii) In the deep water Area 8 (50-60 m) there was a good proportion of individuals of catchable size in 
one week, but the next week there were many small individuals (a suggestion was that the young had 
been attracted to the area by the bait from the previous days). 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of comments for Hawston/Hermanus area regarding female egg-bearing states, female to male 
composition of catch, undersize to size composition of catch, general condition and on- off-shore movements. 
 Females gravid? Female : Male (% 
composition) 
Undersize : Size Condition In-shore/Off-shore 
movement 
Sep Start to see gravid females 1% (in 30-35 m, Females in 5-
10 m at this stage) 
   
Oct Yes    Moulting  
Nov Yes 30% 1 in 15 or 20 Average size is smaller than Feb Soft  
Dec Yes (less)   More undersize than Feb Soft Deeper water? 
Jan Yes   More undersize than Feb  Deeper water? 
Feb A few 20% Fewer females 70:30 % size better than Dec Better/Hard. Deeper water? 
Mar No   60:40 (70% of undersize are 
female) 
Hard.  
Apr No   “                    Hard.  
May No   “                    Hard. Females inshore? 
Jun No  1 in 30 Area 8 (deep) one week all big, 
next week all small. 
Peak Females inshore? 
Jul     Peak Females inshore? 
Aug     Peak Moving into shallow 
water. Females inshore? 
 Females inshore. Keep fishery > 300 m offshore then will 
avoid females. 
Recreationals work closer inshore, they get the females 
December more small ones, and a few big ones. 
Average size smaller but variable than Mar, Apr, 
May when average size is bigger and more 
consistent. 
Smaller ones tend to be inshore, larger offshore 
(exceptions, e.g. die Gang). 
Smaller crayfish have increased in number over 
the last few years. 
Move inshore when 
water is warmer to breed 
and feed after moult. 
 
 
The fishing technique does not necessarily lend itself to answers regarding size distributions and, to a certain 
extent, sexual composition.  The fishers tend to move to a new location when they are catching too high 
proportions of undersized individuals, soft individuals or gravid females.  One interviewee suggested that if a trap 
brought up, say 15-20%, undersized lobster or gravid females, then the operation would move elsewhere.  
However, fishers from Hawston seemed more willing or able to answer this question.  The authors suggest that 
this may be due to their association with the experimental fishery and/or that they were somewhat younger and 
therefore more likely to be actively involved (the two Kalk Bay fishers had not been to sea for two years). 
 
Responses indicated that the catch is predominantly male, usually more than 80% although the proportion changes 
over the year.  This conforms to the scientific view that the sexes are relatively segregated outside of the breeding 
season.  One interviewee suggested that in November about 1 in 15 or 20 lobsters caught is female, all of which 
are small, soft-shelled or in berry, whereas in June, 1 in 30 is female, hard-shelled, much larger and not gravid.   
 
All fishers confirmed that there was no point in fishing for west coast rock lobster in rough weather, notably seas 
and swells generated by SE and NW winds.  This was largely due to concerns for safety of crew and equipment 
but also because they know that lobsters will not “climb in” in rough weather, presumably because they seek 
cover in crevices from the resulting bottom swell.  The decline in catchability with rough weather is confirmed in 
the scientific literature.  One full commercial respondent suggested that weather was probably less of an issue for 
full commercials as they are operating in larger vessels and in deeper water that was less dangerous. 
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Ecosystem effects 
Fishers were asked about species interactions, damage and by-catch of gear, and the role of MPAs. 
 
Only a few other species are caught in nets and traps,.  Many are predators of west coast rock lobster, for example, 
octopus and small sharks.  The by-catch is usually thrown back or used as bait, or occasionally taken home.  
Species interaction questions were only asked in the first round (Hawston) surveys and 9 of the 11 respondents 
commented on the interaction between west coast rock lobster and abalone, confirming the current scientific view 
that lobster prey on sea urchins, thereby reducing the cover provided to juvenile abalone and adversely affecting 
abalone stocks. 
 
The view was generally held that ringnets or traps did little damage to either catch or habitat, although some 
suggested that the damage from traps was likely to be slightly higher (one reason offered was that, should the trap 
cable break, the lobster cannot escape and therefore die, whereas they can escape from ringnets).  They felt that 
ringnets were more likely to be damaged by the reef than the other way around.  They acknowledged that lobster 
may lose a leg as a result of being caught, but did not consider that this might affect mortality or growth.  The 
main damage to the lobster, reported by several fishers, occurs when the net or trap is overfull.  The lobster 
furthest from the bait may begin to eat those further in.  This source of damage will occur when there are many 
lobster, and/or when gear is left for longer periods. 
 
The notion that marine protected areas could support west coast rock lobster stocks was generally accepted, 
although sometimes only following the explanation that a reserve could support a breeding population whose 
young would then recruit to areas available to fishers.  However two exceptions or qualifications were offered.  
Firstly, that MPAs are created in particular areas because of multiple and possibly confused objectives.  
Conservation objectives are not always in line with fisheries objectives, and may even be in conflict.  One 
interviewee suggested that the closure of Robben Island for some years had not resulted in a marked increase in 
lobster population.  Secondly, some advocated the closure of areas to fishing on a rotational basis (say for 10 to 20 
years).  They felt that the repopulated closed areas should, after sufficient time, be made available to exploitation, 
otherwise the lobster would “just grow old” and, in effect, be “wasted”. 
 
3.2.6.2 Economic 
Non-recreational fishers complained that the quota system compromises their ability to earn a viable income, and 
to employ crew and offer them good employment conditions.  There are two aspects to this complaint.  The first is 
that the size of the quotas granted is too small (a result of the TAC being divided over too many fishers).  The 
west coast rock lobster quotas are caught very quickly.  Limited commercial rights-holders with 200 to 1500 kg 
quotas may take, at most, a few days to fill their quotas, while full commercials with up to 90 ton quotas, take a 
couple of weeks.  This gives no continuous employment opportunity for crew and leaves equipment, such as 
boats, inoperative for 10-11 months of the year.  The second is that west coast rock lobster is a seasonal fishery, 
and most fishers previously supplemented their income with linefishing (formerly A or B permits).  Access to 
linefishing and the consequent income and year-round activity is not possible under the new regulations if fishers 
have other rights (although, clearly, the west coast rock lobster right-holder may crew for a right-holder in another 
fishery, including linefishing, outside of west coast rock lobster season). 
 
The limited commercials, in particular, argued that 500 kg quotas, with no access to supplementary income via 
line-fish, provided an insufficient income.  This conforms to estimates by Sauer et al. (2003a) of a minimum 
viable quota (for a small boat) being between 1 and 1.5 T (in 2000) conditional that the boat was attached also to 
an A linefish licence.  MCM presumably knew of these economic constraints before allocating quotas but chose, 
nevertheless, to spread the benefits wider and to rely on self-organisation by the fishers to remain active 
throughout the year by crewing for those with other rights. 
 
3.2.6.3 Social 
According to the interviewees, non-fishers have been awarded rights.  Numerous examples were cited (as 
happened in all the interactions with fishers during this project).  Some of these rights-holders had not taken their 
rights at all or had asked others to harvest their catches for them.  When asked what information fishers could 
provide managers, almost all interviewees responded with “we can tell them who the bona fide fishers are”.  
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While there is no doubt that fishers can identify fishers, and that this information can be corroborated to ensure 
that this is not an attempt to monopolise, the matter is no longer simple given the past allocation of rights, even 
though rights have been removed in cases where inappropriate allocations were made.  However, those who 
manage to retain their rights until the next allocation, have some claim now as legitimate fishers.  Full commercial 
fishers argued strongly that quotas should be allocated to boats, and complained that quotas were allocated to 
crewmembers without boats. 
 
3.2.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
There are positive conclusions to be drawn from this survey in terms of the contribution of local knowledge to 
improved sustainability of the west coast rock lobster resource.  The positive aspects are discussed under the same 
three headings as before.  There are also some “words of warning”. 
 
Environment 
Although results were somewhat mixed, the overall impression is of knowledgeable fishers, well able to assess 
and articulate different aspects of west coast rock lobster biology and management.  It is unsurprising that they 
know the habitats and conditions that favour the catching of healthy, large lobster.  They would not be good 
fishermen if they could not.  However, they were also able to offer local insights that were not available to 
scientists and could improve management.   
 
Primary among these were refinements in terms of the timing of various life cycle stages and lobster movements.  
This information could provide MCM with a better means to protect gravid females and soft individuals through 
better timing the catching season (Figure 3.3), therefore offering better chances of good recruitment.  A specific 
suggestion was offered as to how the timing could be determined annually.  The suggestion was that near the 
beginning of the expected season in a particular area, observation surveys were undertaken jointly by MCM and 
some fishers to determine the condition of the lobsters.  If a certain proportion were still gravid, then the opening 
of the season would be delayed.  A flexible season might be difficult for managers, because the season needs to be 
gazetted each year, as well as for fishers as they need to plan their marketing and fishing strategies.  Two different 
suggestions were made about how the seasons for recreational and commercial fishers could be managed.  One 
was that they should be relatively distinct (recreational fishers should retain their right to fish over the main 
holiday period in December and full and limited commercial rights-holders would use the new refined season 
timing).  The other suggestion was that, to have better control, all seasons within an area should be the same. 
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Figure 3.3. Summary of the information gleaned regarding seasonal changes in the Hawston/Hermanus area also 
showing the fishers’ proposed fishing season. 
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Economic 
The intimate knowledge of the fishers regarding multi-fishery interactions and minimum viable quotas could be 
used by MCM to improve decisions on quota sizes and on the relationships between access rights in different 
fisheries.  Although the rule that people with other rights should not have linefishing rights was intended to 
broaden access to the benefits of marine resources, perhaps a different approach could be found which would 
satisfy both this objective and that of providing fishers with a liveable income.  This also has obvious implications 
for the social part of sustainability. 
 
Social 
It was clear that those who had been involved in the experimental fishery had been empowered by the experience.  
They felt that they had contributed to the research, that their contributions were reasonably valued and that they 
had learnt new things.  Experimental fisheries would seem to be an appropriate vehicle for introducing some 
aspect of co-management into fisheries management.  Clearly experimental fisheries are only possible with new 
fisheries, but the proposal that MCM and fishers jointly conduct pre-season surveys to assess stock condition, 
could accomplish a similar result. 
 
All of these aspects of local knowledge would contribute to creating a bi-directional arrow between managers and 
fishers (in terms of Raakjær-Nielsen et al.’s (2004) view of co-management) in terms of “defining and providing 
the knowledge base for management” of the resource.  They would also contribute to the bi-directional nature of 
the third aspect of management: implementation. 
 
The words of warning concern the fact that many of the fishers alluded to feeling “used” by scientists and other 
researchers.  Some were quite vociferous about this point.  They felt that, in some cases, they (a) were not 
acknowledged for their help (e.g. as scientists acknowledge other colleagues in their reports), (b) once their 
knowledge had been given and assimilated, their inputs were no longer respected or wanted, and (c) the same 
people who had learned from them then imposed rules on them (sometimes, they felt, without a good scientific 
basis).  Processes have to be found such that the feeling of being used is avoided and that co-management 
empowers fishers and does not take the form of using them as “monitors”. 
 
Finally, fishing communities are no longer relatively cohesive units.  Possible factors behind this include a 
younger generation “too lazy” (as suggested by some respondents) to undertake the arduous and risky task of 
fishing, as well as MCM’s recent policies.  Current third and fourth generation fishers may not “spawn” another 
generation of fishers because the tradition of “father to son” does not enter MCM’s criteria for evaluating fishers.  
The inevitable result of this is that local knowledge and any existing norms of local resource protection of 
resources will disappear.  Not only does this have negative implications for sustainable management, it also leaves 
society as a whole, the poorer.  Making use of and respecting such knowledge can contribute to its sustainability. 
 
3.3 Interaction with communities: Skills and training needs for empowerment of 
fishers 
In many fishing communities and that of Hawston in particular, there are high levels of unemployment and the 
traditional employment sector of fishing has shrunk over the last few years due to overexploitation of resources 
and consequent quota cuts (see previous Chapter).  A frequent complaint from the fishers since the new allocation 
system was introduced in 2001 was that the application forms were extremely complicated.  Some fishers who 
certainly can be classified as “bona fide fishers” are illiterate and others, though literate, have a limited education.  
Thus, filling in the application forms was often beyond them, and they had to pay “consultants” to assist them.  In 
addition, applicants had to provide “business plans” and in some cases demonstrate that they were “financially 
viable” and had sufficient “business acumen” etc.  This was beyond the capabilities of many fishers and again 
they had to resort to consultants to assist.  Besides this, with the new emphasis on fishers as businesspeople, 
fishers had to think about their activities in a different way.  Many lacked the necessary skills to adequately 
budget, particularly given the highly seasonal nature of many fishing sectors, especially those which are more 
accessible to the traditional fishers of the Western Cape.  The lack of skills and education also mean that fishers 
have little chance of entering the formal job market in other capacities.  Coupled with this, is the context of a 
frequently changing rights allocation process over the last 15 years, and reduced TACs in precisely the fishing 
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sectors most relevant to these communities.  These factors together mean that fishers whose livelihoods were 
already relatively precarious and vulnerable have become even more so, and have had little or no government or 
MCM support for coping with the manifold changes in resource availability and management approach. 
 
With this in mind, the Hawston community was chosen for further interactions geared towards empowerment.  
The intention of the interventions was to find solutions from within the community to the challenges faced, given 
the reality of more limited access and reduced fishing quotas.  The three additional interactions were: 
• Workshops with Grade 11 school students, 
• Informal discussions with community organisations, and 
• The dedication of one “post-it” session (see explanation Section 5) of the MCDA workshop to this 
issue. 
 
3.3.1 Hawston grade 11 students 
Young people entering the job market when leaving school feel particularly disempowered, disillusioned and 
without hope, given the issues mentioned above.  During the 1990s in South Africa the belief was that education 
and skills training would address rising unemployment among young people.  However, it was apparent that very 
few participants in technical training programmes ended up in the formal sector after their training.  Reasons cited 
for this were that the formal economy was in decline and there were consequently fewer jobs and that the skills 
needed were different from those with which the young people left school.  Many young people went through 
secondary school and other training programmes without acquiring the technical or functional skills which would 
allow them to access or create new opportunities for themselves. 
 
The legacy of the apartheid educational system together with the social context of poverty, substance abuse and 
crime which was common for many young people, meant that even with well-intentioned policies and 
programmes, few young people were able to access the opportunities available to them and were ill-equipped to 
learn effectively.  It was clear that even if there was a massive increase in job opportunities, young people would 
not be likely to benefit.  Enabling them required more than literacy and numeracy, but also (a) addressing issues 
of self-esteem and self-worth, (b) re-establishing the network of relationships with family and community, (c) 
development of decision-making and conflict management skills and (d) the development of entrepreneurial 
skills. 
 
It was in the context of the failure of youth training programmes that the YIELD (Youth Initiative for 
Entrepreneurial and Leadership Development) model was developed21.  The first pilot project of YIELD was 
implemented in 1994 and subsequently in various rural and fishing communities.  YIELD uses a system of co-
operative learning and mentoring which is seen as a viable model of equipping and engaging young people from 
impoverished communities.  The programme is geared towards addressing unemployment and poverty of school 
leavers by unlocking their entrepreneurial and leadership potential. 
 
Only the first phase of the YIELD programme, the Entrepreneurial Programme, was undertaken at the Hawston 
Secondary School.  It was facilitated by three YIELD team-members (Abayome Buys, Carmen de Vries and 
Lincoln Pilane).  Forty Grade 11 students, many from impoverished backgrounds, were involved, selected on the 
basis of their school subjects (i.e. if they had accounting or economics as subjects).  The aims were to: encourage 
creative thinking about alternatives to fishing and to teach them how to develop business plans including 
cashflows.  The handling of cashflows is particularly relevant to the fishing business given the often seasonal 
nature of fishing income. 
 
During day one the agenda for the three days was explained and discussed with the students, as well as the 
benefits and privilege of being a part of the programme.  The students then discussed their backgrounds, their 
families’ degrees of dependency on fishing and came up with ideas about other businesses.  They were then 
introduced to the basic concepts of developing a business plan.  During day two the previous day’s activities were 
summarised.  The remainder of the day was spent developing their business plan (on an individual basis) with the 
                                                        
21 YIELD was developed by Prof. Linda de Vries of the University of the Western Cape (Faculty of Economic and 
Management Sciences) and the YIELD team consists of students under the leadership of Prof. de Vries. 
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help of the facilitators.  The business ideas included internet cafés, bed and breakfasts and tourguiding.  During 
day three specific problems with the business plans were further discussed and more detailed aspects explained.  
Subsequently, the business plans were marked and the students will be presented with certificates.  The intention 
is also that attempts will be made to find funding for the implementation of the best business idea and plan. 
 
Insights from these workshop are combined in the general conclusions in Section 3.3.4. 
 
3.3.2 Informal discussions 
Informal discussions were held with representatives of the Hawston Seafarms Foundation and the Overberg 
Community Trust.  The discussions were intended to identify skills and training needs and potential business 
opportunities.  The two organisations involved are described below, but the identified opportunities and needs are 
discussed together with those arising from the MCDA “post-it sessions” in the next section. 
 
The Hawston Seafarms Foundation is a Section 21 (not for profit) organisation representing a number of 
Hawston’s community organisations including woman’s groups, church groups, old-age homes and schools.  In 
2004 they the provincial government sold them a 40 hectare piece of land and they have acquired further funding 
from the Development Bank of South Africa and WesGro22 (Creamer 2004).  This land is intended for, amongst 
other things, an abalone mariculture project.  Global Oceans (Pty) Ltd, the technical partner in this initiative, has 
already established several other farms, and this will be their first involvement with a “community farm”.  It is 
intended that HSF will create job opportunities, encourage small-scale enterprise development.  In this way, the 
dependency on fishing rights can be reduced.  South African abalone farms already produce more than double the 
commercial TAC annually.  Although this is a capital intensive and high technology approach, with appropriate 
funding and technology partners it is seen to be an ideal opportunity for Hawston.  Abalone farming apparently 
produces one direct job for each 2T of abalone produced and several indirectly through associated industries such 
as seaweed production (for abalone food) (Creamer 2004).  There are also associated environmental impacts and 
mariculture rights still need to be applied for.  Naturally, the construction activities for the abalone farm and other 
initiatives will also mean there will be a number of construction related jobs.  Hawston has a broad base of 
construction skills available and, in fact, people often take up both the fishing and construction trades as both are 
strongly seasonal.  Another strong emphasis is on encouraging tourism to Hawston in general and to the HSF in 
particular. 
 
The Overberg Community Trust is a community based organisation with members across the Overberg region 
including from the towns of Caledon, Hawston, Gansbaai, Elim, Bredasdorp, Middleton and Botrivier.  The trust 
holds shares in various enterprises, including for example, the Caledon Casino, and uses dividends to support 
organisations such as the Genadendal Brass band, local church groups, schools, craft and other organisations as 
well as to develop job creation programmes and encourage small-business development (Creamer 2000). 
 
3.3.3 MCDA “post-it” session 
As part of the investigation into the allocation system, a number of workshop was held with the Hawston 
community, one of which (on 26 November 2003) included three “post-it sessions” (see Section 5.2.1 for a 
description), where the participants responded to a series of questions.  Two of these questions were designed to 
identify community and individual objectives in relation to fishing rights and their ideas regarding appropriate 
criteria and processes for rights allocation.  The third question was aimed at identifying what facilities and training 
they felt were needed.  The results are included in Section 3.3.4. 
 
3.3.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
There are various opportunities available in the Hawston community and the Hawston area, many of which can 
build on the skills and knowledge within the community which derive from the fishing background: 
• Fishing: A number of opportunities in the fishing industry will remain for fishers in the Hawston community.  
However, those who do not currently hold rights are unlikely to obtain them in the future except by acquiring 
shares in existing companies or CCs or through buying rights from those who have decided to move out of the 
                                                        
22 WESGRO is the official trade and investment promotion agency for the Western Cape Province. 
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fishing industry.  Both of these options will require capital which most will be unlikely to obtain.  For those 
who cannot acquire capital and who wish to remain fishers, the only opportunity will be as crew. 
• Other fishing-related activities: Other than directly being fishers there will also remain opportunities in 
processing, marketing, abalone farming, seaweed farming, etc.  In this regard, there are probably 
opportunities for innovative businessmen. 
• Tourism There have been very few tourism initiatives in Hawston thus far.  Any initiative has to first 
overcome the negative image of the town before attracting sufficient numbers to make any real difference to 
the community.  The wealth of local natural resource knowledge currently existing in the community (see 
Section 3.2) could be an invaluable contributor to any tourism initiatives (for example as boat- and shore-
based whale watching guides, recreational lobster and abalone harvesting guides, recreational line-fisher 
guides). The existing culinary expertise could be used in small restaurants bed and breakfasts etc. (Hawston 
used to be famous for its local recipes).  Other skills needed for the hospitality sector could be provided in 
training programmes and these could specifically target young people.  The Hawston Fishing Company, 
started by previous poachers, has shown the way by investing money in a boat which is used for boat-based 
whale watching (the coastline near Hermanus and Hawston is famous for its whale watching). 
 
However, anyone wishing either remain in the fishing industry and to successfully apply for and utilise fishing 
rights or to be involved in some part of a tourism initiative will need to acquire or improve their business skills. 
 
One of the aims of government with its GEAR (growth, employment and redistribution) programme has been to 
encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and this has been one of the philosophies underpinning the 
changes in the rights allocation process over the last five years or so.  This means that fishers are expected in one 
way or another to become businessmen.  One approach that has been actively encouraged by MCM for some 
sectors has been the formation, by groups of fishers, of closed corporations.  However, this encouragement has not 
been accompanied with any form of support (e.g. in the form of supporting legal costs) nor training in business 
skills, nor advice on the differences, costs and benefits of closed corporations, registered companies etc.  The legal 
costs of the formation of closed corporations and assistance with quota applications has become a considerable 
burden to communities.  One of the urgent training and support requirements, therefore is that of (a) legal support 
and advice, (b) business skills training and (c) assistance with the completion of rights applications.  Without 
these, MCM cannot achieve its goals of transformation and economic growth, or not in a way which benefits 
traditional, poor and poorly educated fishers.  Young people, in particular, need to be part of the search for a 
solution within impoverished communities and, given the reality of overexploited fish stocks and reduced TACs, 
there needs to be greater emphasis on reducing their future dependency on obtaining quotas.  Therefore, there is 
clearly a need for mentoring in business and technical skills and to exposure to livelihood ideas which are not 
dependent on fishing. 
 
Arising from the contributions of the students on the YIELD programme, from the informal discussions and 
MCDA post-it session, the following needs and opportunities can be identified: 
 
Computing in the form of computing skills training, access to computers, access to the internet.  Computing skills 
and access will have a number of potential benefits: better computing skills will improve chances of employment, 
while access to the internet will improve access to information (including that relating to allocations, regulations 
etc.).  Internet access will also increase exposure to other ideas for careers.  For example, an internet terminal at 
the local library, or the opening up of an internet café could partially address this need.  The latter, at the same 
time, would provide an additional social activity in the community and be a business opportunity for a Hawston 
entrepreneur. 
 
Training programmes in business skills (budgeting, developing business plans), basic legal knowledge, the basics 
of resource exploitation (overexploitation, harvesting strategies etc.) 
 
MCM, NGO, or other governmental support programmes (based for example at a community centre or at the 
library) providing basic legal advice (advantages of different organisation formats such as CCs, proprietary 
limited, etc. and support for filling in of fishing rights application forms. 
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There are a number of training programmes aimed at fishers which have been developed and are being run, 
particularly under the auspices of the Department of Labour, Transport Sector Education and Training Authority 
(Maritime Chamber).  The YIELD programme has contributed to the development of these programmes.  The 
focus is on providing entrepreneurial, legal and life skills training within poor fishing and rural communities.  The 
target groups are young adult students, fishers and boat owners who are currently unemployed or self-employed in 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  The level of approach is determined by the level of education of each 
target group or community (e.g. whether basic literacy needs to be first addressed or whether the programme can 
go straight to other modules).  The programme has been developed so that participants with no economic or other 
advanced qualification can understand and implement it in practice.  However, the content is such that those with 
higher education levels also find it useful.  During this project, about 200 people from the Hawston community 
expressed an interest in being involved with the training programme and indicated a preference for the modules 
relating to Life Skills, Basic Legislation and Business Skills. 
 
Some fisher training courses have included modules on sustainable resource use (sustainable yield, harvesting, 
and population growth concepts), but the content and depth of the material is not known.  While it is clear (as seen 
in Section 3.2) that the fishers have good knowledge of the habitats and habits of their species, there remains a 
lack of knowledge (or acknowledgement at least) of the relationship between current harvesting rates and future 
quota sizes, and therefore such courses are essential.  The course could include, for example, computer games 
where the student plays with harvesting different amounts of the resource (and perhaps at different seasons and 
locations) for a number of years and can see the effects of the different harvesting strategies on the resource size 
and on their future income. 
 
3.4 Summary and conclusions: Empowerment and co-management 
In the first part of this report, aspects of sustainable management were discussed (Section 3.1).  In Section 3.2 a 
pilot survey to assess the potential contributions of local knowledge to sustainability (Section 3.2.6) and the 
mechanisms by which these might be implemented (Section 3.2.7).  Section 3.3 described how skills and training 
needs were identified and how these could better be met.   
 
Nielsen et al. (2004) offer the view of three components to management: setting objectives, developing a 
knowledge base and implementation.  If co-management is the way of future fisheries management all of these 
components will have to be in place.  Chapters 5 and 1 will deal with the first component: setting objectives as 
part of the MCDA process for rights allocation.  The appropriate and acknowledged use of local knowledge (the 
second component) has implications for improved management and sustainability of the resource (e.g. through 
more appropriate seasons) and empowerment of the fishers involved, and provides a positive feedback to 
implementation (component three).  Use of their knowledge regarding quota sizes and interlinkages between 
fisheries could have benefits in terms of poverty reduction, maintenance of social cohesion and of existing norms 
regarding resource protection.  Improved knowledge skills will also have benefits in terms of empowerment, 
poverty reduction and economic efficiency. 
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4. The current allocation system 
 
4.1 Description of the allocation process 
In 2001, in response to the chaos that had existed for some time, MCM adopted a new rights allocation system.  
According to the MLRA the allocation of rights is the responsibility of the Minister.  He is assisted by staff of 
MCM who are in turn assisted by two independent bodies, the Rights Verification Unit (RVU) and an Advisory 
Committee (AC) (DEAT 2002a).  A consortium of the auditing firm Deloitte and Touche and Sithole AB&T 
Chartered Accountants formed the RVU.  The RVU was supposed to receive, file and store all the applications, 
generate data concerning the numbers and types of applicants, verify information supplied by the applicants and 
investigate specific cases as requested by the Minister.  The AC comprised a team of about 20 people (from a 
consortium formed by the Resolve Group and Nkonki Sizwe Ntsaluba, an auditing firm), none of whom have an 
interest in the fishing industry.  At least two members of the Advisory Committee (AC), provided with the criteria 
and guidelines developed for each fishery, then assessed each applicant (DEAT 2002a).  The AC presented their 
recommendations to MCM and the recommendations of the DDG were presented to the Minister. 
 
The system was (and still is) therefore based on giving scores to applicants according to a number of criteria (see 
also Sections 2.2 and 2.3).  Before scoring, the applications were checked to see that they had been ‘properly 
lodged’ (i.e. not late, properly paid, submitted on the proper application form, accompanied by a certified copy) 
and that there were no ‘material defects’ (i.e. the applicant had signed, the signature was attested to by a 
commissioner of oaths and only one application had been submitted).  
 
Depending on the fishery concerned there were a number of “essential requirements”.  These varied between 
fisheries and included, for example: 
1. Having access to an appropriate vessel and use of the appropriate gear or method.  This applied to all 
fisheries. 
2. Residence in the appropriate fishing zone: This applied for the 2003/04 abalone legal entities and divers 
allocation, the 2002-05 west coast rock lobster limited commercial allocation, the 2003/04 east of Cape 
Hangklip west coast rock lobster limited commercial allocation and the beach seine and gill-net fisheries. 
3. Being a “bona fide fisher”. This applied to the traditional linefish sector amongst others (it is not evident how 
this was measured.  “Proof” of involvement in the fishery was required.) 
4. Being at least 66% HDP owned and managed. This applied in the 2003/04 abalone legal entity allocation. 
5. Dependent on the resource for 50-75% (depending on fishery) of annual income. This applied to the 2003/04 
abalone legal entity allocation, traditional linefish, and net-fisheries. 
 
These essential requirements can be considered to be “vetos”.  In addition, depending on the particular allocation, 
the degree of paper quota risk (see 2.2 and the glossary for descriptions of paper quota risk) of the applicant was 
either regarded as a veto (i.e. excluded from further consideration), or given a negative score in the scoring 
process, or in some cases (e.g. the west coast rock lobster limited commercial 2001-2005 allocation) both.  In the 
latter case, in other words, within the same allocation, some applicants were not further considered, apparently 
because of their paper quota risk (as deduced from comments in the spreadsheet), while others had similar 
comments yet remained within the scoring process, and in some cases were given rights. 
 
Once an applicant had passed all the essential requirements they were scored according to a number of criteria.  
The basic criteria for all allocations since 2001 have been: 
1. Degree of transformation.  This was measured by the actual HDP status of the applicant (usually for limited 
commercial applications) or by the percentage of HDP ownership in the enterprise (“black economic 
empowerment”), by the degree of HDPs in senior management positions (“employment equity”), by the 
quality of a transformation plan and by compliance with the employment equity act (or whether the applicant 
was a “designated employer”). 
2. Degree of investment and involvement in the industry.  This was measured in all cases by the degree of 
ownership of or access to a vessel.  In some cases whether the applicant had previously held relevant rights, 
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quotas or exemptions was also considered and /or whether the applicant was involved in relevant processing 
(although the latter was also sometimes regarded as a negative attribute, e.g. abalone divers) and /or by 
“investment in human resources”. 
3. Past performance was a criterion in some fisheries, and this related to whether the applicant had previously 
caught less than or more than his/her quota and/or had operated at more than the prescribed effort level. 
4. Compliance with the MLRA, Customs and Excise and other relevant legislation. 
 
Within these categories, various criteria were defined and scored.  Some of the scores given related directly to a 
reasonably directly measurable attribute (e.g. percentage HDP ownership) while for others it is unclear how 
consistency in scoring was maintained (e.g. quality of the transformation plan, or degree of “business acumen, 
financial capacity and capacity to catch, process and market”).  In any case, the scores for the various criteria were 
then added within the spreadsheet.  The Advisory Committee would recommend on whether the applicant should 
get a right, the DDG would add his recommendations and these would go to the minister. 
 
4.2 Analysis of criteria and weights 
The following sections describe the criteria used in the allocations in the four fisheries of relevance and the 
weights applied to them. 
 
4.2.1 Hake deep sea trawl, longline and handline 
The criteria used in the 2001-2005 allocations for the hake deep-sea trawl and longline sectors are the same, with 
slightly different scores being applied.  Figure 4.1 shows the criteria and the scores normalised to sum to one.  The 
criteria measure degree of involvement and investment, transformation, strategies for by-catch and offal, past 
performance, legislative compliance and the degree of paper quota risk.  However, it is not clear that the scores for 
by-catch and offal strategies were used.  There is no “past performance” measure for new entrants, but the related 
criterion of “business acumen, financial viability, ability to harvest” is weighed slightly more (Figure 4.1).  For 
previous entrants the “marketing plan” was used instead of “business acumen..”.  Although the general criteria 
applied for the handline fishery are similar to those for deep sea and longlining, handlining was handled quite 
differently (it is a new fishery).  Essentially only three criteria were used: transformation (measured in a similar 
way to the other sectors - percentage HDP ownership and HDPs in senior management positions, transformation 
plan, etc.), investment and involvement (measured by the degree of ownership of or access to a vessel and 
“investment in human resources”-percentage of permanent employees) and reliance on resource (if more than 
75% of the applicant’s income was derived from hake handline they scored 0.154 points).  For hake handline, 
transformation accounted for nearly 50% of the points, whereas for previous rights-holders in longline and deep 
sea trawl it accounted for about 20% of the points and for new entrants about 30%. 
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Figure 4.1. Criteria and weighted scores (normalised to sum to 1) for the allocation of rights in the various hake 
sectors. “Previous”= previous rights-holders, “new”= potential new entrants, CEA=Customs and Excise Act. 
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4.2.2 Traditional Linefishery 
The criteria applied and the weighted scores (normalised to sum to 1) in the 2003 traditional linefish allocations 
are illustrated in Figure 4.2.  For the full commercial sector, of those not rejected for “material defects” etc., those 
who scored 7 or higher (out of a total of 15 points), were granted rights.  For the limited commercial sector, of 
those not rejected for “material defects” etc., those who scored 9 or higher (out of a total of 18 points) were 
granted rights.  “Investment in human resources” related to whether crew were employed and whether they were 
permanent or temporary.  The hake handline criteria scores are very similar to those for the traditional linefishery.  
They were previously one fishery (linefishing), remain the same type of fishery and accessible to the same type of 
fisher. 
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Figure 4.2. Criteria and weighted scores (normalised to sum to 1) for the traditional linefish allocations in 2003. 
 
 
4.2.3 West Coast Rock Lobster 
The weighted score applied for HDP (limited commercial) status or transformation (full commercial) in the 2001 
allocation ranged from 20% to 24% of the score, while for the limited commercial allocation east of Cape 
Hangklip in 2003/04, HDP status accounted for 39% of the score.  Previous involvement in processing and access 
to a vessel accounted for less in the full commercial allocations (about 20%) than for the limited commercial 
allocations where in 2001 it accounted for 46% and in 2003/04 it accounted for 62% (Figure 4.3).  Note that 
‘independent sale’ (2001, limited commercial) was considered an additional measure of paper quota risk. 
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Figure 4.3. Weighted scores given to west coast rock lobster full and limited commercial applicants in 2001 and in to 
limited commercial applicants east of Cape Hangklip in 2004. CEA=Customs and Excise Act. 
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4.2.4 Abalone 
The criteria used for the allocation of abalone for 2001-2003 allocation and for the 2004-2014 allocation are 
shown in Figure 4.4.  The criteria and their importance show a distinct change from 2001 to 2004.  For example, 
the score given to HDP status or transformation has increased from between 0.18 and 0.24 in 2001 to being a veto 
(if there were less than 66% HDP ownership and senior management) for legal entities and a score of 0.33 for 
divers.  
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Figure 4.4. Criteria and weighted scores (normalised to sum to 1) allocated to different criteria (or criteria groups) for 
(a) the 2001-2003 abalone allocation and (b) the 2004-2014 abalone allocation. 
 
 
4.3 Analysis of the allocation spreadsheets 
4.3.1 Data entry and spreadsheet design 
Applicant information was entered into Excel spreadsheets (with applicants in rows, criteria and comments in 
columns).  The spreadsheets used during the period 2001-2004 were made available to us by MCM.  There were 
numerous problems evident in terms of spreadsheet design and data entry: 
• Only some of the information from the application forms was entered.  This did not include, for example, 
identity numbers, addresses, contact persons for companies, shareholders in companies, etc. all of which 
information was available from the application forms (it is possible that this data had been entered in more 
complete spreadsheets elsewhere and a subset of this was used in the scoring and allocation process).  This 
made cross-checking of information (e.g. applications of shareholders in other fisheries) and other analyses 
impossible. 
• Depending on the fishery, subsets of fishers were separated from each other by a blank row with a heading 
(e.g. applicants from different zones, or groups of “improperly lodged” applicants).  This meant that data had 
to be manipulated and re-arranged in order to analyse, for example, percentages of various groupings of all 
applicants. 
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• In some cases, a number of different versions of the file of applicants for a particular fishery was created.  
Information in the different sheets was not consistent and numerous errors crept in, for example: 
◦ The same names were spelt differently and / or were different order (surname-name in one and 
name-surname in another) in different versions.  This made cross-checking difficult. 
◦ Applicants in one version were not present in another (for no apparent reason). 
◦ Different scores for criteria appeared in different versions for the same applicant. 
◦ Data (scores etc.) became attached to the incorrect applicant. 
◦ Formulae for calculating sums of scores were sometimes replaced by a fixed number, which was 
sometimes incorrect. 
The latter three points meant that some applicants’ total scores were wrong (or at least different in 
different places).  This, however did not appear to adversely affect the overall allocations.  All of 
these features were particularly present in the WCRL limited commercial allocations of 2001. 
• Some information was incorrect.  The only clear case of this was in the case of certain HDP persons, who 
were known to be HDP by the authors, but were listed as non-HDP and where their residential area and name 
indicated a high probability of being HDP but they were listed as non-HDP. 
 
A frustrating aspect of the spreadsheet design was that, in some allocations, separate material defect, improper 
lodgement or essential requirement aspects were usually combined in one column (one for each of these groups).  
This was particularly worrisome in terms of the essential requirement category as one could either not at all or not 
easily determine why an applicant had been excluded and consistency checking was extremely difficult.  For 
example, as mentioned above, in one fishery sector it was the case that paper quota risk was applied both as a veto 
and as a negative score.  This shortcoming became even more of a problem in later allocations, for which, 
although the relationship between score and allocation was improved, the number of essential requirements and 
the consequent percentage of applicants excluded had increased.  This was particularly the case for the abalone 
legal entity and diver allocations in 2004.  Although reasons were listed for exclusions, because they were 
lumped, one could not easily determine, for example, what percentage of the exclusions were because of lack of 
vessel access, residence, % of dependence or HDP ownership. 
 
4.3.2 Consistency of relationship between score and likelihood of getting a right. 
While the total scores of the applicants were referred to in the process of deciding whether s/he should get a right, 
it is clear, for many of the allocations (particularly those done in 2001 and 2002), that decisions were based on 
grounds other than the scores and on information not available on the spreadsheets.  Some examples are provided 
below, referring to Figure 4.5 to Figure 4.15 where the applicants’ total scores, whether they were granted a right, 
and where available, whether they appealed and whether the appeal were successful are given for hake handline, 
traditional linefish, west coast rock lobster and abalone allocations: 
Hake handline 2002-2005: Figure 4.5.  Compare applicant 2602 (bottom graph) and the applicant to the right.  
The one on the right has a slightly higher score, yet did not receive a right, and was also not successful on 
appeal.  Applicant 4765 and the one to the right are similar, but the latter applicant did succeed on appeal.  
Some applicants with scores above 6 were not granted rights, while others, with scores of 4 and below, did. 
Traditional linefish 2003: Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7.  In this case the scores and whether a right were granted were 
consistent.  There was some flexibility on how strictly improper lodgements, material defects and essential 
requirements were applied.  However, it was generally clear from the comments why a particular decision 
was taken (e.g. vessel size might have been slightly larger than the recommended 5-10m). 
West coast rock lobster: Full commercial 2001-2005 (Figure 4.8): Compare applicant 08053 (bottom graph) and 
the applicant to the right.  They have the same scores, yet the one on the right did not receive a right, and 
was also not successful on appeal.  Five applicants with negative overall scores still received rights (their 
scores would still have been very low, 1 or 1.5, if they had not had negative paper quota risk scores).  In the 
new entrants (Figure 4.9) there are two anomalous allocations to applicants 12427 and 12875. 
Limited commercial 2001-2005 (Figure 4.10). Only Zone C and Area 11 scores were available and only 
Zone C is shown.  Compare applicant 17436 and the one to the right who has the same score but did not 
receive a right and was not successful on appeal.  Some people were excluded from the scoring process 
because of their paper quota risk (left of graph) while others were given a negative paper quota risk score, 
remained in the process and were granted rights (14054 to 14100, for example). 
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East of Cape Hangklip, limited commercial 2003 (Figure 4.11-Hermanus area). The allocations appear 
consistent with scores.  The one anomaly someone not given a right to the right of 03853, is because the 
bareboat charter agreement had not been signed, so this applicant should have been grouped with those 
earlier excluded for essential requirement failures. 
Abalone: Full commercial (Figure 4.12) and limited commercial 2001 (Figure 4.13): Anomalies are more 
apparent in the limited commercial allocation. 
Diver (Figure 4.14) and legal entity allocation 2004 (Figure 4.15). No particular anomalies can be detected.  
However as can be seen, a large proportion of applicants are excluded for essential requirement failures, 
where it is often not evident from the spreadsheet, which of the many essential requirements was not met.  
There were however, anomalies in terms of the amounts allocated.  For example, one legal entity was given 
600 kg, but was only 25% reliant on abalone, had a (relatively) large west coast rock lobster right and was 
apparently not a right-holder in 2001.  According to the documentation this applicant should (a) not have 
got a right (because of not being at least 75% reliant, and not being a previous right-holder), and given that 
they were granted a right (b) they should possibly have received a smaller amount (given their additional 
access to west coast rock lobster).  (75% reliance on the resource was supposed to be a requirement but was 
not applied in the actual allocation).  In contrast, another entity which conformed to all the requirements 
(and had been a right-holder for a number of allocations), was excluded because a deposit slip did not 
accompany the application. 
 
Given the above inconsistencies, one must assume that (a) either additional criteria were in fact used (for example, 
there are extensive comments within the spreadsheets which provide additional information about the applicant), 
or that (b) allegations of corruption were not completely untrue.  That the scores were not the only consideration 
was confirmed by the DDG, who said that, depending on the “profile” of the applicants, one might choose, for 
example, to remove some badly performing previous rights-holders, in order to allow entry to some new 
applicants.  It is possibly also true that, legally, both the DDG and Minister need to show that they “applied their 
minds” and this might require them to consider additional information.  However, that the DDG and Minister 
applied their discretion, cannot fully explain the discrepancies evident in the figures. 
 
However, by the time of the allocation of west coast rock lobster right for the areas east of Cape Hangklip and the 
abalone allocation (which both took place in late 2003 / early 2004), the process appears more systematic (e.g. 
Figure 4.11, Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15).  However, what is not clear from these figures is that, in fact, there 
were different and more extensive ‘essential requirements’ and that a higher proportion of applicants was 
excluded on this basis than in previous allocations.  Adding to the problem is the fact that the different essential 
requirements are not listed in separate columns in the spreadsheet.  Therefore, the actual reason for a person being 
excluded from the possibility of getting a right may have in fact become more obscure. 
 
4.4 Summary and conclusions 
In summary, despite the emphasis on improved process and rigour, there were a number of flaws in the previous 
allocations.  Firstly, data entry and spreadsheet design left much room for improvement.  Secondly, there were 
numerous inconsistencies between rights granted and scores allocated, which could not easily be explained by 
discretion applied by the DDG and Minister.  Generally, however, the process has improved since 2001 (for the 
(traditional linefish, west coast rock lobster and abalone allocations) in terms of data entry, spreadsheet design and 
simplicity of criteria and in terms of an improved relationship between the score and whether a right were granted 
or not.  However, the latter point was due mainly to the increased number of ‘essential requirements’ and the 
consequent increased number of applicants excluded.  In general, the emphasis on transformation increased 
between the 2001 allocation and those which took place in 2003 and 2004 (traditional linefish, west coast rock 
lobster and abalone).  However, other than this it is difficult to detect any obvious trends in terms of changes in 
emphasis on the main objectives of transformation, equity and stability. 
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4.5 Annexure to Chapter 4: Applicant’ scores and rights granted in hake handline, 
traditional linefish, west coast rock lobster and abalone 
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5. Interaction with stakeholders: Improving the allocation 
system 
 
5.1 Approach: MCA workshops and action research 
This chapter describes the main focus of the project: interaction with stakeholders in order to develop an improved 
allocation system.  As mentioned in Section 1.2 the work was undertaken within the broad framework of MCDA 
with the view that MCDA was an appropriate approach for a justifiable allocation system.  The workshops 
described here, therefore, were aimed at eliciting the types of information (as briefly described in Section 1.3) 
needed for an MCDA approach (e.g. identifying objectives and criteria).  The use of direct interactions and 
workshops with the stakeholders to elicit values and priorities fits into the action research approach as described 
in Section 1.4. 
 
5.2 Identification of criteria, development of value trees, refinement of process. 
5.2.1 Hawston 
Three meetings / workshops were held with the Hawston community in 2003.  The first meeting (15 September 
2003) was advertised in the local press, and approximately 100 people attended.  The attendees completed a 
questionnaire (Appendix 1) and nominated a group of people to represent them at subsequent meetings.  The 
majority of those that attended the first meeting were interested in either abalone or crayfish quotas or both (63%) 
and relatively few were interested in linefish quotas (33%).  Of this meeting, 44% currently had a quota or had 
previously had a quota of some kind (including so-called “experimental” and “subsistence” quotas) (see Sections 
2.2.1 and 2.3.3 for the various sectors).  Table 5.1 summarises the comments extracted from the questionnaire 
regarding criteria which should / should not be applied in the allocation process as well as other comments. 
 
Table 5.1. Frequency of responses regarding criteria for allocation (n=43) from the first Hawston meeting 
questionnaire (15/09/2003). 
Involvement with industry 24 
Dependence on resource 17 
Previously disadvantaged (race, gender) 1 
Not only to boat owners/ commercial divers 2 
Age shouldn't be criterion 1 
Qualifications and equipment to exploit 1 
Law-breakers IN or OUT IN : 2 OUT : 2 
 
The second meeting was a workshop held on 18 September 2003 with fourteen of the people nominated at the 
first meeting (Appendix 1).  The intention of this meeting was simply to provide a platform for the participants to 
“air their views” rather than to attempt any formal problem structuring process.  Each participant spent some time 
explaining their background in fishing and their communities and gave their perceptions of the current problems 
with allocation, fishery management, the resource and their community.  They all also gave written “submissions” 
on these topics.  The oral and written submissions were combined and an initial cognitive map and value tree were 
constructed from these issues together with the responses to the first meeting questionnaire for presentation and 
the third meeting. 
 
The third meeting was a workshop held on 26 November 2003.  As the fishing season had begun only six of the 
representatives could attend (Appendix 1).  The intention of this meeting was to undertake more formal ‘problem 
structuring’ in order to understand the fundamental objectives of the community and their links to means-end 
objectives and their suggestions for changes to the allocation process, etc.  The process was as follows: 
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• Two “post-it” sessions (Figure 5.1) were conducted.  For each a question was posed (see below) so as to 
elicit responses which would help to develop a value tree and identify criteria for rights allocation and 
to identify possible improvements to the process.  (Post-it responses are given in full in Appendix 1). 
• After each post-it session, “points” were allocated to the issues within each question by asking each 
participant to distribute 10 stickers among the groupings or individual post-its (Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3). 
• After the first two post-it sessions, the initial cognitive map and value tree (prepared from the first two 
meetings) were presented to the participants for discussion and updating in light of the post-it responses. 
• A third post-it session was held to identify areas in which the community felt they could benefit from 
capacity building / training.  This is discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
 
The first question (“What does having or not having a fishing right mean to you personally or your community”) 
was intended to elicit responses which would, among other things, reflect the fundamental issues of concern of the 
representatives as individual fishers and as members of their community.  The second question (“What should 
MCM be doing”) was addressed in two parts.  Question 2A was “What should MCM’s aims and goals be?” and 
Question 2B was “What process should be followed? (committees, decision-makers, criteria, fees, etc.)”. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. A post-it session in progress at the third Hawston meeting (photo: Leanne Scott). 
 
Figure 5.2. Post-it session from the third Hawston workshop after the grouping of like issues (photo: Leanne Scott). 
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Figure 5.3. Post-it session from the third Hawston workshop after points were allocated to groups (red spots) (photo: 
Leanne Scott). 
 
A more complete cognitive map was developed after the third meeting (Figure 5.4) based on the previous 
meetings and the responses to these questions.  This served to highlight what might be considered the “drivers” of 
the problems encountered by the community (for example, the apparent lack of acknowledgement by MCM of the 
applicants’ history of involvement in fishing) and potential actions which could improve the process and broad 
level goals (e.g. involve the community in verification of applicants).  One of the more important goals was the 
need to have social continuity (in the sense of enabling people to continue with traditional fishing activities) and 
“re-integration” of the community (in the sense of overcoming the divisions caused by perceived unfair 
allocations, poaching and the legacy of apartheid). 
 
 
High, non-
refundable
application fees Preservation
of stocks
Poverty
alleviation
No assistance or
training from
government
Wrong people get
rights rather than
traditional fishers
Decreased
crime/  poaching
Social
continuity,
reintegration
Conflicts
between haves
& have-nots
Lack of control
over large
companies
Overexploitation
Insufficient
recognition of
women, Khoisan
Quotas too
small  for viable
livelihood
Unemployment
/ unemployed
periods
Scientists/ MCM ignore
local knowledge & don’t
know whats happening
with the resource or
communities
MCM allows
fishing at
wrong times
Community
involvement
in allocations
Hawston unfairly
targetted by police/
army
MCM limits fishing
when stocks are
actually available
x
x
x
x
Drivers
Proposals for action / process
Goals
Standard issues
Has a decreasing / negative effect on (e.g. high application fees have a negative effect on poverty alleviation
Causes / has a positive / increasing effect on (e.g. lack of control of large companies increases overexploitation)
Elaboration / Detail
Open up new
fisheries e.g.
mussels,
periwinkles
Insufficient recog-
nition of people with
history in fishing &
who rely on the sea
Create bursaries
from proceeds from
confiscated goods
Write crew into
rights or
licence
Chopping,
changing,
complex rules
 
Figure 5.4. Cognitive map developed from the first two Hawston meetings. 
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The responses to Question 1 (“What does having or not having a fishing right mean to you (personally or your 
community)” were grouped into four main areas of concern to the community: 
 
1. Caring for the family and Avoidance / improvement of social problems, 
2. Empowerment and the Acquisition of training and information, 
3. The ability to make money for the individual and foreign exchange earnings for the country, and 
4. Involvement in and commitment to the conservation of marine resources. 
 
A value tree was developed from the cognitive map, the post-it responses, these groupings and other inputs from 
the three workshops (Figure 5.5).  This attempts to link the higher level or fundamental goals with means to those 
ends and / or criteria with which applicants could be evaluated in terms of their potential contribution to those 
goals. 
 
Fundamental concerns Means - ends and Criteria 
  
       
 
  Residence in area     
        
      
  
 
 Transformation  HDP status 
   
Only one right per family 
  Social continuity, 
reintegration   Fair distribution  Not only to boat owners 
  
   
 
 
No age restrictions 
  
        
   
 
 
Number of years involvement in whatever form 
  
    
Dependence on the resource 
  
   
Dependence and 
involvement  Will be involved in actual harvest 
  
   
 
 
Have appropriate equipment 
  
Figure 5.5. Value tree extracted from inputs at the three Hawston meetings. 
 
 
The responses to Question 2A (“What should MCM’s aims and goals be?”) fell into three groups: 
1. Conservation of marine resources, 
2. Keeping the “wrong” people out of, and the “right” people in the fishery, using corrective action, giving 
traditional fishers preference, etc. , and 
3. Supporting communities’ interests. 
 
Points were allocated by the participants to the various groupings of Question 1 and Question 2A by each 
distributing 10 points between the issues (Figure 5.1 to Figure 5.3 show this process in progress).  These were 
translated into weights (by adding all the points together per issue and normalising to sum to one) (Figure 5.6).  
This clearly showed that the issue of social continuity was of primary importance to the community (i.e. was their 
most important goal) while the community felt that MCM’s primary goal should be the transformation of the 
industry and redress of imbalances caused by the apartheid past. 
 
Responses to 2B (“What process should be followed?: committees, decision-makers, criteria, fees,…”) were 
combined with ‘actions’ extracted from the previous meetings (e.g. in Figure 5.4) (summarised in Table 5.2). 
 
Another meeting was held on the 30th of November 2004 during which feedback was given to the community 
regarding the project and a number of exercises were undertaken in order to obtain a first impression of the 
different priorities of the communities both within criteria (scores) and between criteria (weights).  The results are 
summarised in Section 5.4. 
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Figure 5.6. Points (converted to weights) allocated by the Hawston workshop to (left) fundamental concerns (Question 
1) of fishers in Hawston community and to (right) what the aims of MCM should be (Question 2A). 
 
 
Table 5.2. Suggestion regarding the allocation process and general approach arising from the Hawston meetings. 
Community involvement 
• Establish a community forum to advise allocations 
• Establish co-management arrangements 
• Make use of traditional / local knowledge of resource 
• Establish zonal rights 
Community support 
• Establish a community trust fund for bursaries, factories, employment 
creation (which, for example, could be funded by confiscations) 
• Provide training (e.g. for filling in forms, developing business plans) 
Enforcement 
• Better monitoring and enforcement (poachers, commercial fleets, etc.) 
Application fees and forms 
• Application fee should be lower and refundable or only 
payable if successful 
• Simplify the application form 
New fisheries 
• Establish new fisheries for periwinkle, mussels, kelp, etc. 
 
 
5.2.2 Kalk Bay 
A meeting was held with the Kalk Bay harbour master (Pat Stacey) to obtain background information regarding 
fishers and his perceptions of the allocation process in Kalk Bay area.  He also suggested fishers who would 
provide a range of views from within the Kalk Bay community.  They were contacted and invited to a meeting 
and to suggest additional names of those who could provide a different viewpoint than those already attending.  
The first meeting was held on the 23 February 2004 with four people.  The meeting combined the steps 
undertaken in the second and third Hawston meetings, namely, “free” oral representations of concerns and 
personal stories from the representatives followed by two post-it sessions relating to objectives, criteria and 
processes relevant to the allocation process.  The two questions posed for the post-it sessions were:  
 
• What should be the aims and goals of MCM in allocating rights? 
• What specific criteria and processes should be adopted by MCM in order to achieve these aims? 
 
The responses from the post-it sessions are given in full in Appendix 2.  The cognitive map developed by the team 
based on the discussions in the workshop is shown in Figure 5.7.  The main driver of the perceptions of the Kalk 
Bay community was dissatisfaction caused by rights being allocated to new entrants but not to people who had 
been involved in fishing for generations.  Goals included the need to maintain or re-establish traditional fishing 
communities such as Kalk Bay. 
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refundable
application fees
Economic
upliftment of
communities
Community role
in allocating
rights
Rights to new
entrants instead of
4th generation fishers
Ski-boats
Monitoring &
control of
exploitation
especially large
companies
Traditional
activities
Greater
pollution
damage
Penguins,
seals
Previous long-
term investments
not adequately
recognized
Loss of
investment
Preservation
of  resource
Maintain &
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x
x
x
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Proposals for action / process
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•Very mobile
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Figure 5.7. Cognitive map derived from first Kalk Bay meeting (23 February 2004). 
 
 
A value tree was developed from the cognitive map and other inputs during the workshop (Figure 5.8).  There was 
insufficient time to allocate points to different issues. 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
   
 
 
Recognise long term investments and 
therefore allow rights in several sectors 
or in other sectors together with linefish 
  
        
      
      
Preferential rights to traditional 
fishers (and control ski-boats*) 
Sustainability 
of resource and 
industry 
     
  
A sense of ownership 
of the resource through 
maintenance / re-
establishment of 
traditional fishing 
communities   
Upliftment of communities 
  
Right to those who earn a living 
from the sea 
 
       
 
Rights to boats not individuals** 
         
*Refer to cognitive map and Table 5.3. 
**This point was not explored in depth, but was mentioned    
Figure 5.8. Value tree developed from the first Kalk Bay meeting (23 February 2004). 
 
 
Comments regarding the allocation process are summarised in Table 5.3.  These include the blue shaded blocks 
from the cognitive map.  There was particular concern over the explosion in the number of ski-boats over the last 
few years. There was a perception that there was little control over ski-boat operations, and this was problematic 
in terms of resource protection and crew safety. 
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Table 5.3. Suggestion regarding the allocation process boat regulations arising from the first Kalk Bay meeting (23 
February 2004). 
General suggestions 
• Need to have a community role in the allocation process 
• Need to better investigate applicants 
• Need to acknowledge local knowledge 
• Need to better monitor exploitation especially large companies 
• Limit the number of participants in order to have workable rights 
• Need to give training regarding responsible resource management to new (and old) entrants 
  
Suggestions regarding the treatment of ski-boats and harbour-bound boats 
Ski- boats Traditional harbour-bound boats 
• Institute 1 m = 1 crew rule (or similar) • Institute 1 m = 1 crew rule (or similar) 
• Restrict hours to daytime for safety reasons • Give rights preferentially to traditional fishers’ boats in harbours 
• Restrict to zones and to specified launching and landing 
harbours 
• Don’t penalise hard work (ownership of a number of vessels built 
up over years - want to pass these on to children) 
 
 
5.2.3 Ocean View 
It was apparent that the group of participants from Kalk Bay represented a particular point of view: perhaps those 
of the more well-established fishers who had, despite the challenges of apartheid etc., managed to establish 
themselves in the fishing industry through buying vessels and obtaining access to quotas over the years.  
Therefore, we felt that we needed, in addition, the views of those who were in a less established position.  The 
Ocean View community, most of whom had been forcibly removed from Simonstown during the apartheid era, 
included many fishers from traditional fishing families and we felt that they could represent slightly different 
point of views to complement those from the more established Kalk Bay representatives. 
 
Through contact with Andy Johnston (representative of the Artisanal Fishers Association) and Moeniba Isaacs 
(from the University of the Western Cape who undertook extensive work relating to fishers in both Kalk Bay and 
Ocean View) some initial contact names were obtained and a meeting arranged with these and additional people 
suggested by them.  Approximately 17 people attended this first meeting on 26 April 2004.  As with the Kalk 
Bay meeting, we combined the steps undertaken in the second and third Hawston meetings, namely, “free” oral 
presentations of concerns and personal stories from the representatives followed by two post-it sessions relating to 
objectives, criteria and processes relevant to the allocation process.  The two questions posed for the post-it 
sessions were:  
 
• What should be the aims and goals of MCM for a fair rights allocation 
• What should be the specific processes and criteria used (in order to make this question more explicit 
it was also paraphrased as “What would you do in Horst Kleinschmidt’s shoes?” (i.e. the deputy 
director general of MCM)) 
 
The post-it responses are given in full in Appendix 3.  Figure Figure 5.9 shows the cognitive map and Figure 5.10 
the value tree which were both developed from these responses.  Goals included the maintenance or re-
establishment of community stability, the recognition of bona fide fishers and the redress of the imbalances 
caused by the apartheid past.  A number of specific criteria were proposed which could be used in the comparison 
of applicants. 
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Figure 5.9. Cognitive map derived from first Ocean View meeting (26 April 2004). 
 
  
   
 
Historical involvement 
 
• Record of / proof of / verifiable history of 
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• Knowledge of the industry 
  
Experience 
 
• Skill and experience 
 
2. Give rights to bona fide fishers or artisanal 
fishers who make a living from the sea (although 
they may never have had formal rights before) 
 
   
   
 
 Investment  • Investment in the industry 
  
   
   
• Access to fishing vessel 
 
 
 
Access to the means of 
fishing  • Access to gear and equipment 
 
     
 
3. Address imbalances of the past 
 
Transformation 
 
• Genuine transformation and equity 
 
     
 4. Empower with a sustainable income   
 5. Poverty reduction  
Dependence 
 
• Dependency on the resource (other 
employment and other earnings should 
count against) 
 
     
   
• How the previous quota was handled 
1.
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6. Ecosystem management and sustainability 
 
Compliance 
 
• No lying on forms 
       
  
?  Maintain social / community stability  Rights to men in preference to women* 
* Note that the value tree arises from the general discussions and the post-it sessions, not through agreement on each point and this 
particular point was not endorsed by all participants (women representatives had left by this stage). 
Figure 5.10. Value tree developed from the first Ocean View meeting (26 April 2004). 
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Table 5.4 summarises the post-it responses and discussions regarding the allocation process itself. 
 
Table 5.4. Suggestion regarding the allocation process and general approach arising from the first Ocean View 
meeting (26 April 2004). 
Community involvement and interactions 
• MCM should consult the community in the allocation 
process (e.g. to check who are bona fide fishers) 
• MCM should pay more attention to community views (and 
actually visit the community) 
MCM processes 
• A completely new allocation approach is needed with new people 
overseeing the process 
• There should be better verification of information. 
• MCM should use their own databases more effectively (e.g. to 
check on involvement over the years) and make use of other 
departments’ data (e.g. SARS for compliance). 
• MCM should involve the fisheries inspectors in the identification 
of bona fide fishers. 
Application fees and forms 
• The application fee should be refunded if the application is 
unsuccessful 
• Application forms should be simplified 
• Assistance should be given to those who need it (for filling 
in the forms). 
Information 
• Provide the correct advice to fishers (about whether to apply for 
full or limited commercial, whether to establish CCs etc. 
• Provide accurate information regarding the criteria to be used 
• Linefish rights should be “on their names” 
Length of rights 
• Rights should not be for 10 to 15 years (because of the 
current “wrong” rights allocations and the likelihood of 
future mistakes – should have a somewhat shorter period to 
allow for corrections) 
 
 
Ocean View meeting 26 April 2004 (Photo: Ron Janssen) 
 
 
Another meeting was held on the 2nd of December 2004 during which feedback was given to the community 
regarding the project and a number of exercises were undertaken in order to obtain a first impression of the 
different priorities of the communities both within criteria (scores) and between criteria (weights).  The results are 
summarised in Section 5.4. 
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5.3 Comparison of the issues of concern of the three communities 
Most of the issues of concern are shared between all three communities.  Of those which more directly affected 
the community, the primary one was that involvement in fishing over the years was not adequately recognised in 
the allocation process and that there was inadequate verification/investigation of applicants.  These, in 
combination led to inappropriate people getting rights.  These “inappropriate” people included those with other 
jobs, those with no experience or history with fishing and those who had no intention of fishing themselves, but 
would sell their quotas (paper quotas).  All three communities suggested that the community should be involved in 
the allocation process in some way as “real” fishers could easily be identified by the community.  There was also 
a feeling that there had been too many changes in rules and processes over the years and that people were often 
misinformed or misguided by consultants and sometimes by MCM officials (e.g. told to form big / small CCs, 
advised to apply for full / limited commercial rights) and that, in general, the process was complicated and the 
application form was difficult to fill in.  This meant that applicants often had to pay lawyers or consultants for 
assistance.  This expense, together with the application fee, meant that they often ended up deeper in debt to loan 
sharks and / or had to sign their rights away.  All communities agreed that the application fees were too high, and 
should be refunded if the application were unsuccessful.  In addition, they felt that the quantum allocated was 
often too small to be viable.  Many of these issues were felt to have contributed to mistrust within the 
communities and to worse poverty than had previously been experienced (and consequent law-breaking).  In 
general, the communities were aware of the need to limit exploitation in order to preserve the resource.  However, 
at the same time they did not always appear to make the connection to the system designed to control 
overexploitation: i.e. the need for a quota system or effort control which limits the number and size of quotas or 
effort, because of the limited size of the resource. 
 
Also common to all three communities was a feeling of mistrust towards MCM.  This had a number of facets.  
Firstly, it was felt that, overall, MCM had done a terrible job of the allocation process (for the reasons in the 
previous paragraph).  Associated with this was that they felt that MCM had often misinformed people, were not 
genuinely interested in the communities’ concerns, and did not investigate applicants properly (despite persuading 
people that the high fees were necessary precisely for this purpose).  Secondly, they felt that the scientists did not 
really know what was happening with the resource and so put in place arbitrary or ineffective restrictions and 
allowed fishing in inappropriate seasons.  They felt that MCM did not acknowledge local knowledge nor make 
use of it for making decisions regarding seasons, restrictions, the opening up of new fisheries etc.  Thirdly, they 
felt that large companies were not adequately controlled leading to far larger irregularities and ecosystem 
consequences than occurred with smaller-scale fishers.  Finally, there were suspicions of corruption and of 
unspoken motivations (e.g. that of converting fishing harbours to tourism activities which would exclude fishers 
because of higher berthing fees, etc.) within MCM. 
 
There were some differences between the issues raised by the communities.  For example, while Hawston and 
Ocean View representatives wanted more protection of crew, through, for example, writing them into the licence, 
the Kalk Bay representatives were concerned that in this way the investments that they had made over many years 
of hard work would be “signed away”.  The Kalk Bay participants felt that rights should be given to boats/boat-
owners while others felt that rights should be given to individuals rather than only boat-owners.  The Ocean View 
representatives suggested that the fisheries / harbour inspectors should be more involved in the rights allocation 
process (Hawston representatives also brought this up at a later meeting).  The Kalk Bay representatives were 
particularly concerned about the proliferation of ski-boats, the lack of control over them as opposed to harbour-
bound boats and felt that their mode of operation was more damaging to the resource than the harbour-bound 
boats (as ski-boats were more mobile they could catch more and a number of different species at different places 
on the same day).  They offered some specific suggestion to limit these problems.  This issue did not arise in the 
other communities. 
 
Hawston fishers suggested that new fisheries, such as for mussels, periwinkles and seaweed could be opened up in 
their area (but that MCM did not act on this), while this did not apply to Kalk Bay and Ocean View.  Finally, the 
issue of preferential treatment of women by MCM’s allocation process arose in Hawston and Ocean View.  There 
were several concerns: (a) that at a time when many experienced male fishers are out of work, it did not make 
sense to give rights to less experienced women and perhaps spend resources on training them, (b) that giving 
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rights to women disempowered the men in the community and led to further social breakdown and (c) that women 
usually did not want to go to sea anyway and so they employed men to catch their quotas (many applying to 
MCM for “exemptions” to be allowed to not be on the boat (as this is a condition of the permit)), further 
disempowering the men.  Unfortunately, these issues arose at the third Hawston and the first Ocean View meeting 
at times when the women had left so there was no general discussion around them.  However, it was clear from 
other discussions that the female representatives felt that they should be given particular recognition and, 
furthermore, that the allocation system was not adequately doing so.  For example, a CC in Hawston felt that their 
status as a HDP women empowerment group was not recognised. 
 
In general, although the representatives of all three communities brought up very similar issues, the slight 
differences suggested that those from Ocean View had more in common with those from Hawston than those from 
Kalk Bay (despite the geographic proximity and community links between Ocean View and Kalk Bay). 
 
5.4 Summary and comparison of the scores and weights of the three communities 
Additional workshops were held with Hawston and Ocean View fishers (November and December 2004) to give 
feedback about the project and to try to obtain the communities’ views on the importance of different criteria 
applied in the allocation of fishing rights.  While the results should help to inform discussions within MCM, the 
results can not be considered definitive, because the participants were not necessarily representative of the entire 
fishing community.  The criteria in the first (weighting) exercise were an amalgamation of the main criteria used 
in the allocations relevant to the communities, while the criteria and levels in the second and third 
(scoring/ranking) exercise were based primarily on those used in the west coast rock lobster allocation east of 
Cape Hangklip, because there were relatively few of them (three) and because the levels of performance were 
clearly defined. 
 
Note that in most of the analyses (averages, medians and standard deviations), three participants have been 
excluded (two from Ocean View and one from Hawston) as the participants had appeared not to understand the 
exercises and/or had given very inconsistent and/or anomalous responses.  However, in giving the percentage of 
people with a particular rank order these participants are usually included. 
 
5.4.1 Weights of criteria 
Participants were asked to distribute a total of ten adhesive stars among the criteria in each grouping of criteria 
presented to them.  The first group (‘overall’) compared the four main groups of criteria: those relating to 
economic, transformation, equitability and compliance, the second group compared four specific criteria within 
the economic group, the third compared four criteria relating to transformation and the fourth compared four 
criteria relating to equitable distribution. 
 
5.4.1.1 Overall 
The was a high degree of consistency among participants in terms of the order of importance of the four main 
criteria.  The order of importance taken from the average of the (18-3) respondents was: 
1. Previous involvement (average weight = 0.38) 
2. Knowledge and skill (average weight = 0.33) 
3. HDP status (average weight = 0.18) 
4. Compliance (average weight = 0.12) 
 
• 61% of respondents’ (11/18) ranked the criteria in the same order as above. 
• 72% of respondents (13/18) agreed that previous involvement was the most important criterion. 
• Nobody gave HDP status the highest weight. 
• HDP status and Compliance were given significantly less weight than Knowledge and skill and Previous 
involvement. 
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Figure 5.11. Average weights given to the criteria representing each of the four groups of criteria (Ecosysterm 
health=Compliance, Transformation=HDP status, Economic=Knowledge, skill, Equitability=Previous involvement,). 
 
5.4.1.2 “Economic” criteria 
There was a reasonable degree of consistency among participants regarding the relative importance of the criteria 
within the economic group.  The order of importance taken from the average of the (18-3) respondents was: 
1. Knowledge and skill (average weight = 0.40) 
2. Access to vessel (average weight = 0.35) 
3. Business, financial skills/viability (average weight = 0.16) 
4. Undercatching (average weight = 0.07) 
 
• 50% of respondents (9/18) agreed with this order. 
• 78% of respondents (14/18) agreed that knowledge and skill was the most important criterion in this group. 
• 44% felt that access to a vessel was the most important criterion (three gave Knowledge and skill and Vessel 
access tie first place). 
• Business, financial skills and viability and Undercatching were given significantly less weight than Access to 
a vessel and Knowledge and skill. 
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Figure 5.12. Average weights given to the economic criteria. 
 
5.4.1.3 “Transformation” criteria 
The group of criteria relating to transformation had the least consistent answers - there is no clear picture or trend 
as each individual clearly had different views.  Noting that the average is not a good measure in this case, 
nevertheless, the order of importance taken from the average of the (18-3) respondents was: 
1. HDP status (average weight = 0.29, Std dev 0.11) 
2. Number employed (average weight = 0.27, Std dev 0.11) 
3. Paper quota risk (average weight = 0.22, Std dev 0.17) 
4. Transformation plan (average weight = 0.21, Std dev 0.12) 
 
• None of the individual responses agrees with this order. 
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• Only 2 of the individual response agreed with the order taken from the median reponse (1=Number employed, 
2=tie of HDP status and Paper quota risk, 3=transformation plan). 
• Although the average weight gives the order of HDP status and then Employment, in fact, 44% of 
respondents (8/18) felt that Employment (the number of people employed) was the most important criterion, 
while only 28% felt that HDP status was the most important criterion. 
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Figure 5.13. Average weights given to the transformation criteria. 
 
5.4.1.4 “Equitability” criteria 
The weighting responses for the group of criteria relating to ‘equitability’ was also not very consistent.  The order 
of importance taken from the average of the (18-3) respondents was: 
1. Previous involvement (average weight = 0.29, Std dev 0.05) 
2. Personally involved in harvest (average weight = 0.27, Std dev 0.06) 
3. Dependence on the resource (average weight = 0.26, Std dev 0.09) 
4. Residence in the area (average weight = 0.18, Std dev 0.1) 
 
• 39% of respondents (7/18) agreed with this overall order. 
• 67% of respondents (12/18) felt that Previous involvement was the most important criterion. 
• 56% of respondents (10/18) felt that Dependence on the resource was the most important criterion. 
• 39% of respondents (7/18) felt that personal involvement in the harvest was the most important criterion. 
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Figure 5.14. Average weights given to the equitability criteria. 
 
5.4.2 Ranking of “performance” levels of criteria: Scoring applicants for each criterion 
Participants were asked to place the ‘levels of performance’ of each of three criteria in rank order.  The levels 
were those used by MCM in the west coast rock lobster allocations east of Cape Hangklip, except that for Ocean 
View “experimental permit holder” or “experimental crew” were replaced with “limited commercial right holder” 
or “limited commercial crew”.  Note that some participants found this exercise somewhat confusing initially as in 
the previous exercise “more” (stars) was “better”, whereas in the ranking exercise a lower number was better.  The 
confusion was apparently cleared up after additional explanation to individuals.  Note also that some participants 
did not rank all levels, so percentages are based on the number of respondents who ranked that particular level 
rather than the total number of respondents. 
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5.4.2.1 HDP status 
There were three female respondents out of the 15 used.  53% of respondents (8/15) gave HDP male the highest 
rank, 33% (5/15) gave HDP females the highest rank and a further 13% (2/15) gave HDP males and females joint 
highest rank.  There seemed to be a larger ‘gap’ between HDP and non-HDP in Ocean View than in Hawston.  In 
other words, Ocean View participants were more concerned with race – this is also reflected in their slightly 
higher weights on average given to HDP status in the transformation criteria (Figure 5.13) and in HDP status 
when compared to other group criteria overall (Figure 5.12).  53% of participants gave non-HDP females the 
lowest rank. 
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Figure 5.15. Average ranks to HDP status levels (although taking an average of a rank is not valid this does at least 
give some indication of the trends). 
 
5.4.2.2 Vessel access 
69% gave 75-100% vessel ownership the highest rank.  Strangely, 71% gave a 50-100% Purchase Agreement a 
rank of 4 or better, while 75% gave a 1-24% Vessel ownership a rank of 5 or lower (i.e. on average an agreement 
to purchase a large share in a vessel was better than an existing small share).  The Hawston respondents seemed 
somewhat more consistent (Figure 5.16). 
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Figure 5.16. Average ranks to vessel access levels VO=vessel owner, PA=purchase agreement, ChA=charter 
agreement, CA=catching agreement (the average of ranks indicates trends, but is not strictly a valid operation). 
 
5.4.2.3 Previous involvement 
60% of respondents gave previous involvement consisting of a subsistence permit the highest rank, while 80% 
gave having previously been part of a commercial crew a rank of 3 or higher (Figure 5.17).  86 % gave having 
previously been neither crew nor a licence holder the lowest rank (1 gave having a limited commercial licence a 
lower rank, and one gave having only processing or marketing experience a lower rank).  The two rankings are 
shown separately as slightly different ‘performance levels’ had to be used in Ocean View to those used in 
Hawston. 
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Figure 5.17. Average ranks to previous involvement levels (although taking an average of a rank is not valid this does 
at least give some indication of the trends).  Slightly different levels had to be used in the two communities (limited 
commercial rights replaced experimental rights in Ocean View). 
 
5.4.3 Overall ranking of applicants: ‘Holistic’ ranking 
The respondents were asked to assess 10 hypothetical applicants with combinations of different levels of the three 
criteria: HDP status, previous involvement and degree of vessel access.  Table 5.5 shows these applicants in the 
order they were presented to the participants.  The applicant number on the left is referred to in subsequent 
discussions. 
 
Table 5.5. Ten hypothetical applicants presented to the participants. 
Applicant Number HDP STATUS PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT VESSEL ACCESS 
1 HDP Female Experimental permit / Limited commercial right 75% - 100% Vessel Owner 
2 HDP Female No permit / Not crew Bareboat Charter Agreement 
3 HDP Female Commercial Crew 50% - 100% Purchase Agreement 
4 HDP Male Subsistence Permit 1 - 24% Vessel Owner 
5 HDP Male Recreational Permit 40% - 74% Vessel Owner 
6 Non-HDP Female No permit / Not crew 75% - 100% Vessel Owner 
7 Non-HDP Male Experimental crew / Limited commercial crew 75% - 100% Vessel Owner 
8 Non-HDP Male Experimental Permit / Limited commercial right Charter / Catching Agreement 
9 Non-HDP Male Commercial Crew 25% - 39% Vessel Owner 
10 Non-HDP Male No permit / Not crew Charter / Catching Agreement 
 
 
The results have to be viewed for the two communities separately because of for the Ocean View workshop 
“limited commercial” replaced “experimental” in the performance levels relating to previous involvement.  
However, in general, the majority of participants placed either applicant 1 (HDP-female, Experimental right 
(Hawston) / Limited commercial right (Ocean View), 75-100% Vessel Owner) or applicant 4 (HDP-male, Subsistence 
Permit, 1-24% Vessel Owner) in the top two positions (Table 5.6).  In general, applicant 1 had a higher rank in 
Hawston than in Ocean View.  The same four applicants are the top ranked applicants in both Hawston and Ocean 
View. 
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Table 5.6. Rank orders given by participants to 10 hypothetical applicants. 
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 HAWSTON   Respondent       
    1 3 4 5 6 2      
1 HDP F Experimental Permit 75% - 100% VO 1 1 3 1 2 1 1.6 1 0.89 1 0.80 <=2 
4 HDP M Subsistence Permit 1 - 24% VO 2 4 1 3 2 1 2.4 2 1.14 2 0.60 <=2 
3 HDP F Commercial Crew 50% - 100% PA 4 3 3 6 1 7 3.4 3 1.82 3 0.20 <=2 
5 HDP M Recreational Permit 40% - 74% VO 8 1 6 3 2 9 4.0 3 2.92 4 0.60 <=5 
8 Non-HDP M Experimental right Charter / Catching A 6 6 7 3 5 1 5.4 6 1.52 5 0.80 >=5 
7 Non-HDP M Experimental crew 75% - 100% VO 3 9 9 1 6 9 5.6 6 3.58 6 0.60 >=5 
9 Non-HDP M Commercial Crew 25% - 39% VO 7 10 3 7 6 1 6.6 7 2.51 7 0.80 >=5 
2 HDP F No permit / Not crew Bareboat Charter A 5 5 7 9 8 1 6.8 7 1.79 8 1.00 >=5 
6 Non-HDP F No permit / Not crew 75% - 100% VO 9 8 1 8 8 8 6.8 8 3.27 8 0.80 >=5 
10 Non-HDP M No permit / Not crew Charter / Catching A 10 7 10 10 8 1 9.0 10 1.41 10 1.00 >=5 
          
 OCEAN  VIEW  Respondent      
    1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 2 11      
4 HDP M Subsistence Permit 1 - 24% VO 2 5 1 1 1 4 3 1 3 2 5 2 2.33 2.0 1.50 1 0.60 <=2 
1 HDP F Limited comm right 75% - 100% VO 3 4 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 10 7 10 2.44 2.0 1.01 2 0.60 <=2 
3 HDP F Commercial Crew 50% - 100% PA 1 1 9 3 3 3 8 3 1 4 10 4 3.56 3.0 2.96 3 0.30 <=2 
5 HDP M Recreational Permit 40% - 74% VO 5 6 2 5 5 1 1 5 4 8 1 8 3.78 5.0 1.92 4 0.80 <=5 
7 Non-HDP M Limited commercial crew 75% - 100% VO 7 1 5 7 8 6 5 7 5 5 3 5 5.67 6.0 2.06 5 0.90 >=5 
2 HDP F No permit / Not crew Bareboat Charter A 4 8 10 4 4 10 9 4 8 10 7 10 6.78 8.0 2.73 6 0.60 >=5 
8 Non-HDP M Limited commercial right Charter / Catching A 8 8 5 8 9 8 5 8 6 6 3 6 7.22 8.0 1.48 7 1.00 >=5 
9 Non-HDP M Commercial Crew 25% - 39% VO 9 9 4 9 7 7 4 9 7 9 10 9 7.22 7.0 2.05 7 0.80 >=5 
6 Non-HDP F No permit / Not crew 75% - 100% VO 6 8 10 6 6 9 8 6 9 6 2 6 7.56 8.0 1.59 9 1.00 >=5 
10 Non-HDP M No permit / Not crew Charter / Catching A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0.00 10 1.00 >=5 
M=Male, F=Female, VO=Vessel owner, PA=Purchase Agreement, A=Agreement 
 
 
5.4.3.1 Comparison of the ranking obtained from applying the scores and weights to the ‘holistic’ ranking 
The results from Sections 5.4.1 (weights) and 5.4.2 (ranks), where used to see how well the holistic ranking in 
Section 5.4.3 could be replicated by applying these weights and scores.   The ranks given in Section 5.4.2 where 
converted to scores by converting the “average rank” into a score from 0 to 100 (we acknowledge that finding an 
“average rank” is not “correct” procedure, but felt that the trends shown would be valid nevertheless and of 
interest). 
 
There is rough agreement between the results from the holistic ranking and from the applying the derived scores 
and weights (Table 5.7), although there are some anomalies, for example, the relative positions of applicants 4, 8 
and 7 in Hawston and applicant 5 in Ocean View. 
 
Table 5.7. Overall scores and ranks of the ten hypothetical applicants calculated using the weights given in the first 
exercise and scores derived from the ranks given in the second exercise. 
SCORES derived from scoring exercise Applicant 
number 
  
HDP status Prev Involve Vessel Access 
Weighted sum 
of scores 
Resultant 
Rank 
Average rank 
from Table 5.6 
 HAWSTON        
1 HDP F Experimental Permit 75% - 100% VO 100.0 100.0 100.0 28.3 1 1.6  
3 HDP F Commercial Crew 50% - 100% PA 100.0 91.7 78.3 24.8 2 3.0 
7 Non-HDP M Experimental Crew 75% - 100% VO 42.9 83.3 100.0 23.8 3 5.0 
9 Non-HDP M Commercial Crew 25% - 39% VO 42.9 91.7 54.3 19.4 4 6.0 
5 HDP M Recreational Permit 40% - 74% VO 61.9 50.0 82.6 18.5 5 4.0 
4 HDP M Subsistence Permit 1 - 24% VO 61.9 100.0 10.9 16.2 6 2.0 
8 Non-HDP M Experimental Permit Charter / Catching A 42.9 100.0 0.0 14.1 7 5.0 
6 Non-HDP F No permit / Not crew 75% - 100% VO 0.0 0.0 100.0 11.7 8 6.0 
2 HDP F No permit / Not crew Bareboat Charter A 100.0 0.0 10.9 5.7 9 6.0 
10 Non-HDP M No permit / Not crew Charter / Catching A 42.9 0.0 0.0 1.9 10 9.0 
 WEIGHTS (separate community weights) 0.044  0.122  0.117     
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SCORES derived from scoring exercise Applicant 
number 
  
HDP status Prev Involve Vessel Access 
Weighted sum 
of scores 
Resultant 
Rank 
Average rank 
from Table 5.6 
 OCEAN VIEW        
5 HDP M Recreational Permit 40% - 74% VO 100.0 76.7 86.3 23.9 1 3.8 
1 HDP F Limited commercial right 75% - 100% VO 83.3 52.8 100.0 22.0 2 2.4 
3 HDP F Commercial Crew 50% - 100% PA 83.3 93.0 53.0 20.8 3 3.6 
4 HDP M Subsistence Permit 1 - 24% VO 100.0 100.0 12.1 17.8 4 2.3 
7 Non-HDP M Limited commercial crew 75% - 100% VO 8.3 49.5 100.0 17.3 5 5.7 
9 Non-HDP M Commercial Crew 25% - 39% VO 8.3 93.0 50.5 16.3 6 7.2 
6 Non-HDP F No permit / Not crew 75% - 100% VO 0.0 0.0 100.0 11.6 7 7.6 
8 Non-HDP M Limited commercial right Charter / Catching A 8.3 52.8 24.2 8.9 8 7.2 
2 HDP F No permit / Not crew Bareboat Charter A 83.3 0.0 11.0 6.0 9 6.8 
10 Non-HDP M No permit / Not crew Charter / Catching A 8.3 0.0 24.2 3.3 10 10.00 
 WEIGHTS (separate community weights) 0.057  0.107  0.116     
M=Male, F=Female, VO=Vessel owner, PA=Purchase Agreement, A=Agreement, Prev Involve=Previous involvement 
 
5.4.4 Conclusions 
While one cannot deduce absolute priorities for the communities together or separately, some distinct trends can 
be seen.  The most clear is that the communities are less concerned with the HDP status of an applicant than with 
his or her previous experience, knowledge and skill. 
 
 
5.4.5 Interactions with Marine and Coastal Management  
Mr S Lamberth (SL) of MCM provided liaison between the team and MCM.  Besides several meetings with him, 
three further meetings were held.  The first meeting was with the deputy director general of MCM, Mr 
Kleinschmidt (HK) on the 4th November 2003.  This meeting was the equivalent of the meeting of the 18th 
September with the Hawston community in that the intention was to simply hear the point of view of MCM.  The 
second meeting (3rd December 2003) was the equivalent of the meeting of the 26th November with the Hawston 
community in that the intention was to try to structure a value tree representing MCM’s objectives and to link 
these to specific criteria.  A list of objectives and criteria was extracted from previous meetings with SL, the 
meeting with HK, the literature (Kleinschmidt et al. 2003), documentation relating to specific allocation 
processes, and the MLRA and the spreadsheets.  A draft value tree was prepared linking the broader level 
objectives with the criteria used in the allocation process for the west coast rock lobster rights allocation process.  
We asked for clarification of certain of the objectives and for refinements to the value trees (Figure 5.18).  
Unfortunately, the meeting had to be cut short and so the process could not be completed. 
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Figure 5.18. Value trees for west coast rock lobster (a) limited commercial, (b) full commercial and (c) east of Cape 
Hangklip limited commercial allocations extracted from MLRA and MCM documentation. 
 
The third meeting with MCM (27/05/2004) was more broadly attended and the intention was to undertake more 
formally all of the initial steps of an MCDA process (problem structuring to identify criteria, development of a 
value tree, development of scoring systems and weights for the criteria).  The intention was to both illustrate the 
process to MCM and to gain insights regarding the objectives and criteria for this project.  Parts of the agenda 
were also devoted to feedback to MCM about the analysis of the most recent rights allocations.  This was an 
analysis of the spreadsheets and documents relating to the allocations with an assessment of consistency and the 
implied weights of criteria (i.e. a summary of the works described in Chapter 4).  Feedback was also given 
regarding the work with the three communities. 
 
For the problem structuring stage, the post-it session was divided into three parts with corresponded to the three 
main objectives of the MLRA: 
• Goal 1: Economic: To achieve optimum utilisation and economic growth 
• Goal 2: Social: To achieve human resource development, capacity building and employment and to 
restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances. 
• Goal 3: Ecological: To achieve ecologically sustainable development and protect the ecosystem 
including non-exploited species 
 
As with the community meetings, the participants were asked to write down ideas in response to specific 
questions.  For each of the above goals the following question was posed: “In order to satisfy this goal (a) what 
factors need to be considered when choosing rights-holders? and (b) How should the extent of goal achievement 
(c) 
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be measured?”.  Participants were asked to specify where necessary if they were referring to full or limited 
commercial and new applicants or previous rights-holders.  This session and other stages of the workshop were 
applied to the west coast rock lobster sector as it well reflected the various challenges to any allocation system: it 
involved full commercial, limited commercial and recreational sectors, had previously involved a “subsistence” 
sector and was also subject to poaching.  West coast rock lobster is also a sector which is relevant to all three 
communities with which we were involved. 
 
The responses from the post-it sessions were summarised and grouped (Appendix 4, page 139).  During the 
workshop, the main grouping criteria and some details were captured with the VISA software in a rough value 
tree for further discussion around the structure of the value tree and clarification of issues.  However, there was 
insufficient time to complete this process with the group in the workshop and so the process was continued 
afterwards by the team, leading to the value tree in Figure 5.19.  This value tree attempts to capture all of the 
issues relevant to MCM and some of the possible measures that could be / have been used.  Not all criteria would 
be relevant for all fisheries. 
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Under-catching4
Past / potential future
financial performance
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Investment  /
commitment
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Involvement in fish processing3
‘Optimal’ use
Employment
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Interpretations comments: 
Note: that the three main groups (economic, social and ecological) correspond to the expanded versions given in Figure 5.18. 
     Differences in the emphasis/interpretation of these issues by MCM and fishers: referred to in Section 5.5 and Table 5.9. 
* These were the three criteria used for the limited commercial west coast rock lobster allocation East of Cape Hangklip. 
1. Non-compliance with any of these has implications for financial sustainability (EEA=Employment equity act, CEA=Customs and 
Excise Act, IRS=Internal Revenue Service). 
2. Value adding contributes to multiplier effects.  It could also indicate ‘commitment’ through investment. 
3. In the allocations this criterion was sometimes positive and sometimes negative (e.g. abalone - see Chapter 4) 
4. Under-use of the resource means that the economic benefits to society are lost. 
5. Agreements and shareholding can tell about PQR: they may either indicate positive contributions to empowerment / transformation or 
potential PQR. Paper quotas may affect transformation and empowerment, where the paper quota is held by an entity fronting for an 
untransformed entity.  PQR also affects local economies because local economic benefits of a quota held within a zone will not be felt 
if sold to an established company outside the zone. A quota sold off only benefits the paper quota holder not the broader community 
and thus affects equity. ‘Independent sale’ was used in the west coast rock lobster allocation in 2001 as an additional indicator of PQR. 
6. Not really an issue for choosing between west coast rock lobster applicants as mostly separated into full commercial using traps and 
limited commercial using hoopnets. This might influence the split of the TAC into full and limited commercial. 
Figure 5.19. Value tree developed during and after the third meeting with MCM (27/05/2004). 
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For the development of scoring systems, the simplest available system, for the allocation of rights for west coast 
rock lobster east of Cape Hangklip, was used as an illustration.  This was for reasons given above and because it 
was relatively simple because only three criteria were used in this allocation: HDP status, access to or ownership 
of a vessel, and historical involvement.  Levels of “performance” were already established for these criteria.  For 
each criterion, first the participants established the order from best to worst of these levels of achievement.  Worst 
and best were given scores of 0 and 100 respectively.  Then, emphasising the relative “gaps” between the levels, 
all the other levels were scored inbetween by discussion with the participants (Table 5.8).  Subsequently, the 
participants were asked to weight the three criteria relative to each other and were guided to do this using the 
“swing weighting” (see Section 6.1) procedure (Table 5.8). 
 
 
Table 5.8. Scores and weights from the workshop for the west coast rock lobster east of Cape Hangklip allocation. 
VESSEL ACCESS / OWNERSHIP Score Wt* HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT Score Wt* HDP Score Wt* 
75% - 100% Vessel Owner 100 Experimental Permit 100 HDP Female 100 
40% - 74% Vessel Owner 95 Experimental Crew 80 HDP Male 90 
25% - 39% Vessel Owner 80 Commercial Crew 60 Non-HDP Female 80 
0.36 
1 - 24% Vessel Owner 75 Subsistence Permit 40 Non-HDP Male 0  
50% - 100% Purchase Agreement 50 Processing / Marketing 20    
1 - 49% Purchase Agreement 35 Recreational Permit 10 
0.4 
   
Bareboat Charter Agreement 25 No permit / Not crew 0    
Charter / Catching Agreement 0 
0.24 
     
No access VETO     Wt*=Weight.  
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Figure 5.20. Weighted scores (calculated from Table 5.8) given during the workshop for the three criteria used in the 
allocation of west coast rock lobster east of Cape Hangklip compared to the scores used in the actual allocation. 
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The weights were combined with the scores to obtain weighted scores for each level of the three criteria which 
were normalised so that the maxima of the three criteria would sum to one (the weighted scores for 75-100% vessel 
owner, Experimental permit holder, HDP female were 0.24, 0.4, 0.36 respectively).  The weighted scores were com-
pared to those used in the actual allocation in 2003 after also converting these so that the maxima summed to one 
(Figure 5.20).  An applicant who has a 1-49% purchase agreement, was a commercial crew member and is a HDP 
male scores: 
 Under the actual system:      3.85     +      12        +       30.8    =   46.2 
 Under the workshop system: 35 × 0.24  +  60 × 0.4  +  90 × 0.36  =  64.8 
 
That the two sets of weighted scores are different (Figure 5.6) is not all that surprising, however it is interesting to 
note that: the order of importance has changed.  In the actual allocation, HDP status and vessel access were the 
two most important criteria.  In the workshop exercise, “historical involvement” was the most important criterion 
and “vessel access/ownership” was distinctly less important than the other two criteria.  The workshop weights 
seem to reflect more closely the priorities of the communities than do the weights which were used in the 
allocation.  In other words, fishers were far more concerned with rewarding fishers who had some previous 
involvement than with vessel ownership (as long as the fisher had some access to a boat) or with race (although 
transformation and equity were of concern to them). 
 
There were also differences in the rank order of the levels of performance within criteria (Figure 5.6).  For 
example in the workshop:  (a) HDP males and non-HDP females were given higher scores (after some debate), (b) 
Having a bareboat charter was scored lower than having a 1-49% purchase agreement (the workshop participants 
felt that any purchase agreement involved “more risk”), and (c) Processing and marketing experience was placed 
ahead of having a recreational permit. 
 
 
5.5 Comparison of fisher and MCM issues and criteria and the development of a 
combined value tree 
The criteria gathered from communities and MCM could be divided broadly into two ‘themes’: criteria relating to 
the effects of allocation on social continuity, transformation and local economic development, and criteria relating 
to the involvement, experience, ability and performance of fishers and stability and continuity of the industry 
(Table 5.9). There were several objectives, goals, values and criteria which were common among the communities 
and between the communities and MCM.  For example, communities and MCM were concerned with 
transformation, with the abilities of the fishers, and with whether they had previously been involved in fishing 
(Table 5.9).  However, in some cases there are differences in the interpretation of the groups and the criteria 
within them (although on the surface they appeared the same).  These differences are discussed in the next few 
paragraphs. 
 
At the ‘theme’ level the slight differences in points of view between MCM and the communities are already 
apparent (as also reflected in their different headings in Table 5.9).  For example, while all were concerned with 
transformation and local economic development, the communities emphasised the aspect of social continuity.  The 
view was that if people had been involved in fishing, were dependent on the resource and had been long residents 
in the fishing community, and their rights were “taken away” this contributed to social breakdown in various 
ways.  Social continuity was not raised by MCM.  The community felt that the allocation system had had direct 
negative effects on social continuity, while MCM apparently either did not perceive these consequences of their 
actions or did not regard it as part of their responsibility to deal with them. 
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Table 5.9. Comparison of criteria from communities and MCM. LC= limited commercial, FC = full commercial, 
WCRL = west coast rock lobster, ECH = east of Cape Hangklip. 
Criterion / Issue Communities Marine and Coastal Management 
   
 THEME 1 
   
 Social continuity, Transformation, Local economic 
development 
Transformation, Local economic development 
1. Previous 
involvement in 
the industry 
All (implicit or explicit): Previous involvement in any role, 
crew, boat assistant etc. (This appeared to be the most 
important issue from the point of view of fishers). 
Depending on the right applied for, explicit involvement awarded 
points. e.g. WCRL ECH: previous subsistence, experimental, 
experience as crew. 
2. Dependence on 
the resource. 
All: Dependence. “Those who earn a living from sea”. 
Hawston: Only one right per family 
Kalk Bay: not necessarily dependence on one particular 
sector for a particular percentage of income i.e. might earn 
living from a number of fisheries. 
Dependence specified for some resources, e.g. linefish LC, 
hake handline, listed as essential requirement for abalone 2004 
(but not used as such). 
Access to other rights excludes applicants from access to 
linefish. 
Access to rights other than abalone excluded applicants from 
access to WCRL and vice versa and reduces quantum 
Workshop: dependence specified for LC 
3. Residence in the 
area 
All: Implied or explicit in all communities Only for certain resources: e.g. abalone 2004, WCRL LC and 
ECH  
4. Transformation All: HDP involvement and status HDP status, % HDP ownership, % HDP management. WCRL 
ECH: 66% HDP owned an essential requirement 
   
 THEME 2 
   
 Involvement, Experience, Ability, Performance Stability and continuity in the industry 
5. Access to 
appropriate 
vessel and gear 
All: Access to appropriate vessel and gear 
Kalk Bay: boat-owners to get preference (but not 
exclusively) 
Hawston/Ocean View: not only boat-owners to get rights 
Access an essential requirement. Written agreement required 
showing access including ownership, purchase agreement, 
charter agreement. Highest points for ownership. 
6. Potential & past 
performance 
All: bona fide fishers  
Ocean View: Knowledge of the industry, skill and 
experience 
Business acumen, financial viability, business, marketing plans 
Workshop: financial viability 
7. Actually 
involved in 
harvest 
All: Explicit or implicit in all communities 
All: bona fide fishers 
Explicit essential requirement for e.g. WCRL ECH 
8. Investment in 
the industry  
All: recognise investment 
Kalk Bay: Don’t penalise accumulation of wealth (as 
expressed in boat ownership) and multiple rights access 
built up through years of work 
Primarily relates to vessel investment 
Abalone legal entities involvement in processing is positive, but 
abalone divers involvement in processing is negative 
9. Potential & past 
performance: 
Regulations 
Ocean View: How the previous quota was handled (i.e. in 
terms of regulations, over- and under-catching).. 
Past performance in terms of over and under utilisation in some 
resources, submission of catch returns in some resources. 
10. Compliance 
with MLRA 
Some felt law-breakers should automatically be excluded, 
others disagreed (“give them a chance to prove 
themselves”) 
Ocean View: people who lie on application forms should be 
penalised 
Compliance given a score. 
But MLRA Section 28 cases apparently exclusionary (not 
explicit) 
 
 
The issue of dependence on the resource was only regarded as a criterion for some fisheries or sectors by MCM, 
while (presumably because of the nature of the fisheries concerned) dependence was of prime importance to all 
the communities.  The connection between dependence and access to multiple fisheries was addressed by MCM 
by excluding rights-holders in other fishers from access to linefish rights.  In their view this meant that truly needy 
fishers who had not received access to any other rights would have some form of income23.  This would therefore 
enable them to spread the benefits of marine resources more broadly.  While this was an admirable intention, there 
are a number of problems with this approach.  First, combining linefishing with a seasonal high value fishery such 
as abalone or west coast rock lobster had been the traditional strategy of many fishers.  This new system therefore 
places a bigger business management burden on fishers (how to budget for an entire year with a seasonal income, 
                                                        
23 The restrictions arose after the crisis in the linefishery was declared in 2000.  The linefishery was split into three 
sectors, hake handline, tuna pole and handline and traditional linefish.  Some fishers were accommodated in the 2001 
hake handline and tuna fisheries allocations  In the traditional linefish sector, bag and size limits were revised, effort 
drastically reduced in the 2003 allocations and access limited to those who had no other access. 
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how to deal with crew now only seasonally employed, or how to find employment as crew elsewhere).  Second, a 
limited commercial abalone or west coast rock lobster right on its own would not be sufficient to maintain a fisher 
and his crew for more than a few months (e.g. see Table 2.2 and Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).  Dependence on the 
resource, therefore, should perhaps reflect multi-sectoral dependence. 
 
Access to an appropriate vessel was also a common requirement between communities and MCM.  All agreed 
that access was an essential requirement, but Ocean View and Hawston communities placed less emphasis on 
actual ownership.  The view of the Kalk Bay boat owners more closely reflected those of MCM in this regard.  
However, given the desire to ultimately limit access, MCM needs to beware of overemphasising vessel 
ownership, which will tend to lead to overcapacity rather than the reverse as well as to overcapitalisation.  
Besides obviously wanting people with the capacity to catch fish to participate, another part of MCM’s intention 
behind this criterion was, presumably, to limit paper quota allocations (as someone who owns a vessel is likely to 
use the right himself rather than sell it on).  One assumes that ultimately MCM would want an efficient fishery, 
and in this case the multiple use of boats by different rights-holders and for catching different fish species would 
increase efficiency rather than the current system which is encouraging the reverse.  The intention of this criterion 
from the fishers’ point of view was to an extent also due to concern about paper quota holders.  However, they 
also regarded it as a measure of whether the person were part of the fishing community and therefore would have 
access to a boat, but not necessarily ownership. 
 
Besides historical involvement in fishing which was common to the communities and MCM, additional measures 
of ability were mentioned by both.  For the fishers, ability should be measured by looking at knowledge and skills 
while MCM used the business plan, and measures of “business acumen” as indicators of the potential success of 
the fishers (MCM also being concerned with long-term stability and improved labour relations and conditiona).  
This difference points to one of the fundamental differences between the community and MCM: MCM requires 
the fisher to be a good businessman while the fishers feel that they should simply be good fishermen.  
Government in general and MCM in particular has adopted the position that small and medium enterprises are the 
way to provide employment (and the answer to other problems as well).  This may be an inappropriate assumption 
for some fisheries, and, in any case, it may be inappropriate and “unfair” to require fishers to become businessmen 
(Legum, 2004) virtually overnight.  Those who have been involved with fishing for generations, may be best 
positioned to find and harvest fish resources although they may not do this most efficiently (e.g. may not have the 
most efficient boats) and they may not necessarily, along with their fishing skills, have business skills.  But there 
seems no particular reason, why the government should require them to acquire these, if that fisher were 
managing to catch and sell his fish effectively without necessarily being efficient.  Given the threefold nature of 
sustainability (social, economic and environmental) it may be that the contribution of the fisher to the local 
community (e.g. in terms of “social continuity”), may far outweigh his possibly less economically efficient 
approach.  However, it is also apparent that government’s aims is not purely to maximise efficiency in the 
economic sense, otherwise it may make most sense to give rights to “big business” to manage as they wish.  
Therefore they need to be explicit about which goals apply to which fisheries and what the relative priorities of 
the goals are in these different fisheries. 
 
The weights given to the criteria by MCM during the workshop (Section 5.4.5) seemed to more more closely 
reflect those given by the fishers during the exercise described in Section 5.4.1 than did the weights actually used 
by MCM in the allocation (Figure 5.21).  In both cases Previous involvement was considered to be the most 
important criterion (remembering that only a subset of criteria was used in these exercises).  This was followed in 
the case of MCM by HDP status, but this was of less importance to fishers than was Knowledge and skill and 
Access to a vessel.  In terms of ranks (fishers) and scores (MCM) of the levels of the criteria, fishers gave non-
HDP females the lowest overall rank, whereas MCM gave this level a higher score than that of non-HDP males.  
A high percentage purchase agreement was given a higher rank by fishers than a small percentage ownership of a 
vessel as compared to MCM who gave any actual ownership a higher weight than purchase agreements.  In terms 
of previous involvement, a subsistence permit was given a higher rank by fishers than by MCM.  As mentioned, 
neither the weights and scores obtained in the MCM workshop nor those in the fisher workshops can be regarded 
as definitive, given the possible lack of representivity, however it is interesting to note these similarities and 
differences.  The important point is that this process of determining scores and weights could be used in future 
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allocations in order to ensure that MCM’s priorities (how they evaluate applicants) are not completely disjunct 
from fishers (given that MCM also has to pursue certain constitutional and MLRA objectives). 
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Figure 5.21. Weights derived for the three criteria used in the east of Cape Hangklip lobster allocation from the 
Hawston/Hermanus and Ocean View fisher workshops, the MCM workshop, and those actually used in the allocation. 
 
The numbered criteria on the left of Table 5.9 provides a checklist (together with any additional criteria in Figure 
5.19) to which MCM can refer for each allocation.  This list is not very different from (and of course in part 
derives from) the criteria that MCM has used in allocations since 2001.  However, it is important that MCM 
considers the different interpretations or actual measures which surfaced between MCM and the communities and 
which are reflected in the notes in Table 5.9 and in the preceding paragraphs.  However, before referring to this 
list, for each new allocation cycle, the broad objectives of government and MCM need to be clarified, given socio-
economic and resource changes since the previous allocation.  Then, MCM would need to reassess the specific 
objectives which can be met with allocations for the different fisheries and regulations associated with them.  For 
example, as was the approach in the recent allocations, different emphases and objectives pertained to different 
fisheries (e.g. capital intensive fisheries vs. more easily accessible fisheries such as west coast rock lobster and 
abalone).  Cognisance should also be taken of the linked nature of some fishing activities and strategies (e.g. links 
between seasonal fishing sectors (west coast rock lobster and abalone) and year-round ones (linefishing)).  The 
integrated approach across all sectors then should jointly address the objectives. 
 
Finally, while not part of the value tree and scoring process, the quantum allocated was also an issue.  Fishers felt 
that they were often given nonviable quotas.  Certain of them felt that the size of the score should affect the size of 
the quota (i.e. bigger score = bigger quota) and that the degree or type of previous involvement should also be 
rewarded.  The issue of quantum was not raised in the MCM workshops and was considered to be beyond the 
scope of the project. 
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6. Design of a new allocation process 
Although the allocation system developed in 2001 and applied since then has been both more systematic and more 
transparent than previous approaches it still had serious flaws.  First, there was a lack of focus on the objectives of 
the allocation.  There were clear objectives stated in the MLRA and in the documentation associated with each 
allocation, but there was no clear link between these and the criteria used.  The interactions in Chapter 5 were 
intended to improve on this aspect.  Second, there did not appear to be enough cognisance taken of the particular 
characteristics of different communities, fisheries, the linkages between fisheries and the particular dependencies 
of different communities on various fishing sectors.  The background in Chapter 1 and the interactions in Chapter 
5 were intended to clarify these linkages.  Third, the spreadsheets used for the allocations were “messy”, had 
numerous errors, and various analyses highlighted serious inconsistencies between scores and rights allocated (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
To improve on this, an “allocation protocol” needs to be followed for each allocation cycle.  Although, if 
allocations were annual this would be an onerous task, with the current longer term rights, this is no longer the 
case.  In this regard, however, it should be noted that, given the depth of unhappiness and the evident flaws of 
allocations since 2001 (and before), it would perhaps be unwise for the next (2005) allocations to immediately 
implement longer term rights (e.g. anything longer than about five years).  The suggested protocol is outlined in 
Box 6.1.  Note that many of the points in the protocol arose from the MCM meeting of 27/05/2004 and that MCM 
is about to gazette their new allocation policy for each fishery. 
 
Box 6.1.  The proposed allocation protocol. 
1. An initial analysis of: 
 • socio-economic status and needs on a zonal basis, 
 • the status of the various fishery resources on a zonal basis, 
 • geographic distribution of current rights and quantum, and 
 • geographic distribution of industry infrastructure (processing factories, markets, transport etc.). 
 
2. Identification of broad level goals (e.g. transformation, economic development, sustainability, 
etc.) of MCM and ways of assessing these, i.e. linking of objectives and criteria (value tree, 
scores, weights) 
 
3. An assessment of the zonal analyses in the light of identified goals, 
 
4. Data entry: all applicant information recorded in a database kept separate from later analyses, 
 
5. An analysis of the applicants in terms of whether and by how much the applicant can / will 
contribute to government and MCM’s broad goals.  In other words scores are given to the 
applicant on a number of criteria and then aggregated.  The criteria need to be organised in such a 
way that the applicant’s scores can be aggregated to indicate the applicant’s contribution to the 
broad goals. 
 
6. An analysis of the applicants’ scores in comparison to the analyses in 1 and 3.  For example, 
within a particular geographic area, emphasis might be placed on different criteria (different 
weights given) considering the socio-economic needs and the status of the resource in that zone. 
 
7. Initial decisions regarding the granting of rights, given the analyses in 5 and 6. 
 
8. Verification of applicants through, for example, interaction with communities. 
 
9. Decisions regarding quantum allocated to each successful applicant, given the criteria in 2 
and possible additional criteria. 
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It is clear from the interactions with fishermen communities and with MCM, that the problem of allocating fishing 
rights (specifically steps 2, 5 and 6 above) entails dealing with multiple and conflicting objectives.  Thus, it is 
fundamentally a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem, as suspected at the outset of the project.  In 
the next sections these aspects (how to score applicants, find an overall ranking, and other complementary 
analyses relating to the achievement of objectives) are discussed by first framing the current approach in an 
MCDM format and then proposing ways of improving this. 
 
 
6.1 Allocation procedures and systems 
This section outlines the theoretical considerations and mathematical formulation of the current and proposed new 
approach together with complementary analyses.  Section 6.2 provides a practical example of some parts of the 
system. 
 
6.1.1 Current system 
The procedures used by MCM up to now can be classified as an additive value measurement (scoring) system, 
i.e. an applicant i is allocated an overall score of vi defined by: 
 (1) 
where sij is the assessment (score) assigned to applicant i in terms of criterion j, and p the number of criteria being 
used.  Note that when an additive model is expressed in this form, the range of attainable scores for a particular 
criterion is a measure of the relative importance of that criterion.  For example, in the west coast rock lobster east 
of Cape Hangklip allocation, HDP status ranged from 0 to 5, vessel access from 0 to 5 and previous involvement 
from 0 to 3.  Levels of these criteria were scored within these ranges.  Normalised to sum to 1, the criteria have 
importance weights of 0.385, 0.385 and 0.231 respectively. 
 
In some approaches, it is conventional to express sij in the form sij= wiuij, where wi is an explicit importance 
weight, and uij is a standardized score (e.g. on a 0-10 or 0-100 scale for every criterion).  For example, in the 
exercise undertaken with MCM described in Section 5.4.5, scores (uij) on a 0 to 100 scale were first defined for 
the levels of each of these three criteria (e.g. HDP female=100, HDP male=90, non-HDP female=80 and non-
HDP male=0), and subsequently weights (wi) (e.g. HDP status = 0.36) were defined.  Thus, the weighted score of 
a HDP female is 0.36 (see Table 5.8 and Figure 5.20).  This is added to her scores for other criteria. 
 
 
6.1.2 Proposed system 
The basic approach adopted by MCM is sound.  However, there are various pitfalls of using weighted summation 
that need to be avoided, and a structured formal approach following the steps of MCDM helps in this regard.  Our 
primary recommendation is therefore that MCM maintain a weighted summation approach, but that that they 
follow the standard MCDM procedures at each stage.  The basic approach would be to: 
• Define the objectives or goals, identify distinct criteria used to judge goal achievement and form a 
value tree; 
• Develop scoring systems separately for each criterion so as to be able to compare applicants; 
• Score the applicants according to each criterion 
• Assign weights to the criteria and find the weighted sum of each applicant’s scores across criteria; 
• Decide on an initial allocation; 
• Analyse the allocations and rankings (graphically and numerically) in terms of achievement of goals, 
sensitivity to scores and weights, consistency, etc. 
 
A practical example of this procedure is given in Section 6.2 while the remainder of this section discusses the 
theoretical background to and the details of these steps. 
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Critical to good and defensible MCDM (see e.g. the review in Belton and Stewart (2002)) is the selection and 
definition of the criteria to be used for evaluation.  General principles of criteria selection include the following 
(Belton and Stewart, 2002, Chapter 3): 
 
• There is a need for balance between ensuring completeness (capturing all relevant concerns) and retaining 
a sufficiently concise set of criteria so that evaluations can be completed, and audited where necessary, 
with reasonable expenditure of time and effort.   
• The methodology used for aggregating assessments across criteria (e.g. trading off better and worse 
aspects of an applicant) needs to be simple and transparent. 
• Criteria need to have a broadly understood operational meaning, and to be clearly linked to the 
fundamental goals and values being strived after. 
• Criteria need to be defined in a judgmentally independent manner, in the sense that evaluation in terms of 
one criterion should not be dependent upon level of performance in other criteria. 
 
Objectives and Criteria: The results reported in Chapter 5 indicate a large degree of convergence of opinions 
from the different communities as to what the criteria are that need to be taken into consideration.  The 
various criteria that were identified appear to be broadly understandable to all groups, even if there 
remain differences in terms of priorities and emphasis, particularly when compared to those of MCM. 
 
Although there are criteria that might have been recognized by one group only, it seems that the union of 
all the criteria identified would generate a complete and comprehensive list of criteria, which are also 
broadly understood and operationally implementable.  Not all of these criteria may be relevant in all 
contexts (defined by community setting, fishery and region24).  Nevertheless, a combined set of criteria 
(e.g. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.19) can serve as a checklist or starting point, to be referred to whenever 
starting evaluations in a particular region and fishery. 
 
The one remaining issue in critically examining the criteria generated relates to judgmental independence.  
The effects of judgmental dependencies are strongly dependent on the methodology adopted for 
aggregating assessments of applicants across criteria to obtain an overall evaluation.  We thus delay 
discussion of judgmental independence until after dealing with aggregation methodology. 
 
Scoring and Aggregation: Additive scoring has the advantage of being simpler and more transparent than 
virtually any other methodology.  While the form of equation (1) above is appropriate it may be easier in 
some respects to adopt the alternative form and to explicitly specify both scores and weights, i.e.: 
 (2) 
The additive model can also be placed on a sound theoretical basis, provided that certain key assumptions 
are met (Belton and Stewart, 2002, Section 4.2): 
 
• The individual scores must be assessed on an “interval scale”:  Suppose that scores for a particular 
criterion are set between 0 and 100.  Then the value of moving (say) from a score of 20 to 40 should 
be equivalent to the value of moving (say) from 80 to 100 (in the sense of permitting the same 
tradeoff with other criteria).  One means of facilitating satisfaction of this criterion is to document 
clear operational descriptions of what constitutes different levels of scoring, especially for criteria 
with a substantial qualitative component. 
• Additive independence: The additive scoring model demands a somewhat stronger condition than the 
simple judgmental independence required for any set of assessment criteria.  The requirement is that 
the tradeoffs allowed between any two criteria in comparing two applicants who are identical on all 
other criteria should not in any way depend on the levels of performance on the criteria on which 
they are identical.  In other words, it is not permissible to say that a particular combination of HDP 
status and ownership of boats is preferable to another if both applicants have long involvement in the 
                                                        
24 Note that the new general policy groups all fisheries into four categories.  A general approach is defined for each 
category and specific policies specified for each fishery within a category. 
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fishery, but vice versa if they are recent entrants.  If this occurs then the criteria selected for scoring 
need to be redefined. 
• Use of “swing weighting”: Whether importance weights are defined explicitly (as the wi in equation 
(2)) or implicitly (through choice of range of scores sij as in equation (1)), these need to reflect the 
importance of the swing from the level of performance associated with the lowest score, to the level 
associated with the highest score.  This implies that these levels need to be made explicit at the 
outset, as part of the definition of the criteria (in much the same way as for ensuring the interval 
scale property above). 
 
All three of these conditions are simply expressed, but often need substantial care (“applying the mind”) 
to ensure that they are satisfied. 
 
As indicated earlier, there is no prima facie reason to reject the combined set of criteria developed (Table 5.9 
Figure 5.19) on grounds of completeness or operational meaningfulness.  With adequate care, it would seem 
possible to establish scoring systems that satisfy interval scale and swing weighting properties.  Our primary 
recommendation is thus that MCM continue with the practice of assessing applicants on the basis of a simple 
additive scoring system as at present (and as described above), provided that care is taken: 
• To define levels of performance on each criterion explicitly, and to associate scores with each level in a 
manner which satisfies the interval scale property described above; and 
• To allocate weights to each criterion according to the swing-weighting principle. 
 
The processes of selecting criteria, and of establishing scores and weights at the start of a new round of allocations 
would be facilitated by a half or one-day workshop run by a decision analyst with experience of scoring and 
weighting in this context.  This is particularly important in terms of ensuring that the provisos above are met.  It 
may be useful to also invite community representatives to participate in such workshops. 
 
The basic processes of applying the scores to the applicants, weighting criteria and analysing results graphically 
and otherwise can easily be undertaken in, for example, Excel spreadsheets, as was done by MCM for previous 
allocations.  However, given the criticisms in Chapter 4 and the suggestions here and in Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4, 
the entire process would be better facilitated by suitably designed software (which may remain Excel based), as 
described in Section 6.4.  Such a DSS can also be set up to support the elicitation of scores and weights in the 
workshops mentioned above. 
 
6.1.3 Graphical analysis 
It is recommended that all allocations should as a matter of course, be summarized graphically in the forms 
illustrated by Figure 4.5 to Figure 4.15.  This will allow management and auditors to obtain a clear picture of what 
has been done, and of any anomalies that might have arisen. 
 
6.1.4 Complementary analysis 
Although the additive scoring system would form the backbone of the allocation process, one word of warning 
needs to be expressed regarding the judgmental and additive properties (required, as we have pointed out, to 
provide justification for the additive scoring system) of transformation goals vis a vis the other criteria.  The 
additive model requires that relative scores and weights can be specified at the outset for these transformation 
goals as well as for all others, implying specific tradeoffs (e.g. the level of previous experience in the fishery that 
would compensate for not having the preferred HDP status). 
 
The practical and theoretical problem in selecting weights and scores to be allocated to individual applicants as a 
measure of their contribution to transformation goals, is that achievement of such goals can really only be 
assessed once the complete set of allocations has been made (when the proportions of HDP groups and women 
can be assessed).  It is thus possible that after the scores have been calculated, and rights allocated, the desired 
degrees of transformation either are not achieved or are over-achieved (implying perhaps less than desirable 
achievements of other goals). 
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If transformation targets are found not to be satisfactorily achieved, one possibility (besides ad hoc removal or 
addition of candidates) would simply be to reassign the weights between criteria, and to recalculate the scores.  
This is also essentially ad hoc, and while it may be convenient it could also open areas of litigation (however, it is 
important as part of sensitivity analyses to look at the effects of a range of weights on the resulting allocation).  
Our proposal, therefore, is that although the procedures should allow managers to reassign weights in this way, the 
decision support system should also provide a complementary means of evaluation, in which optimal allocations 
are determined in order to maximize scores on other criteria subject to specific transformation targets.  This would 
allow managers to apply a “what-if” mode of analysis, applying their minds to the potential effects of other 
allocations.  Such a target-seeking optimization procedure is relatively simple to implement, and is now described 
(for those wishing to avoid the mathematical formulation a practical illustration is given in Section 6.2). 
 
In order to implement this complementary procedure, we partition the criteria into two sets, namely: 
• Those which refer to characteristics of the applicant (e.g. access to a vessel, quality of the business plan) 
apart from membership of racial, gender or other groupings.  These can be listed as the first q<p 
criteria. 
• Indicators for membership of each group of interest such as race and gender.  Membership of a 
particular group would be expressed as a simple yes/no.  Formally, we define gik to be 1 if applicant i 
belongs to group k, for k=1,2,...,K (the number of groups to which transformation goals apply). 
 
Formally, let us represent the decisions for a particular fishery in terms of indicator decision variables, say xi, 
taking on the value 1 if an allocation is made to applicant i, and 0 otherwise.  For the purposes of the present 
report, we shall assume that the quantum of the allocation (e.g. numbers of tons) that would apply to each 
applicant if an allocation is made can be specified at the outset.  For example, currently in certain fisheries, 
characteristics of the applicant such as access to other rights and vessel ownership help to determine the size of 
the quota granted.  We shall denote the quantum by ai.  A potential extension to the model would be to allow 
consideration of different possible levels of allocation to be made to a particular applicant, but this would require 
more difficult assessments of the relative benefits accruing (to society at large) at different levels of allocation, in 
contrast to a simple score for the individual.  As such relative assessments have not been attempted up to now, we 
shall not discuss an extended model at this stage. 
 
A best set of allocations, achieving a best aggregate value score subject to meeting transformation goals is then 
obtained by solving the following integer linear programming optimization problem: 
Maximize ∑∑
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(where Gk is for each k, the target proportion for group k) 
}1,0{∈ix  for all i. 
Constraints can be added to limit, for example, the number of allocations so as to not exceed zonal TACs (given a 
minimum quota size) (see example in Section 6.2). 
 
Software for solving such problems is widely available, for example the Solver Tool in Microsoft Excel.  A 
“demo” of such a system using Solver has been developed and is described in Section 6.3. 
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6.1.5 Summary of procedural recommendations 
In summary, the procedural recommendations for undertaking steps 2 and 5 of the allocation protocol are as 
follows. 
 
1. At the outset of any new round of allocations, MCM would need to re-specify their overall objectives 
(e.g. once transformation goals have been met, this may no longer be an objective, or the objective may 
be to maintain rather than attain transformation targets).  Then, criteria need to be selected which are 
linked to these objectives and can be used to evaluate the applicants. Both quantitative and qualitative 
criteria can be used.  A combined set of criteria (e.g. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.19) can be used as a checklist 
from which the criteria for the allocation can be selected.  Reasons for including or excluding criteria 
should be documented. 
 
2. The additive scoring system should be used as the primary basis for evaluating applicants and 
determining allocations.  Attention should be paid to the following issues:  
a) Clear definition of levels of achievement to be used for each criterion; 
b) Allocation of scores to each level of achievement taking cognizance of the need to ensure an 
interval scale; and 
c) Determination of weights according to the swing weighting principle. 
Consideration of the above three issues might be facilitated by a decision analyst. 
 
3. The complementary mathematical programming system could be employed to give consideration to the 
effects of setting different target levels for transformation goals. 
 
4. Final allocations should be summarized graphically as illustrated in Figure 4.5 to Figure 4.15. 
 
6.2 The allocation procedure in practice 
This section illustrates steps 2 and 5 of the allocation protocol.  Combining these steps in sequence results in the 
following MCDM stages: 
• Define the objectives or goals and identify distinct criteria used to judge goal achievement and form a 
value tree; 
• Develop scoring systems separately for each criterion so as to be able to compare applicants; 
• Score the applicants according to each criterion 
• Assign weights to the criteria and find the weighted sum of each applicant’s scores across criteria; 
• Decide on an initial allocation; 
• Analyse the allocations and rankings (graphically and numerically) in terms of achievement of goals, 
sensitivity to scores and weights, consistency, etc. 
(Step 6 would also form part of the MCDA analyses, but is not addressed here). 
 
In terms of our recommendations above, an additional complementary analysis would be to: 
• Set specific goals such as the percentage of HDP applicants to be granted rights or the percentage of 
women to be granted rights, and utilising the goal program described, assess the implications of the 
resultant exploratory allocation. 
 
Defining the value tree 
The first step is identification of the objectives, selection of criteria and formation of the value tree.  A facilitated 
workshop may be needed to redefine and make explicit the objectives and link these to criteria.  A set of criteria 
has been identified (Section 5.5: Figure 5.19 and Table 5.9) that can be used as a starting point or checklist.  Each 
fishing sector (whether west coast rock lobster, abalone, hake handline etc.) and type (whether full or limited 
commercial) would probably require only a subset of these criteria, and a different value tree might be developed 
for each.  For example, the value tree for the west coast rock lobster, east of Cape Hangklip allocation constructed 
by the team from DEAT 2003b is given in Figure 6.1.  The criteria on the right of the value tree are intended to be 
measures in some way of the objectives on the left.  For example, if one applicant had more ‘historical involve-
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ment’ than another (e.g. an experimental permit rather than a recreational permit), s/he should get preference as 
granting him or her a right would go further towards restructuring the industry (given the various forms of 
involvement prevalent in the fishery and fishing communities of concern).  As it happens, in this case this 
criterion would also contribute to the goal of achieving ‘optimum’ use and economic growth, as the applicant with 
more experience is probably better able to exploit the resource. 
 
HDP status
•  To achieve optimum utilisation
•  To achieve economic growth
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•  To utilise marine resources in order to:
•achieve human resource
development and capacity building
•create employment
•  To restructure the fishing industry in
order to:
•achieve equity within all branches of
the industry.
•address historical imbalances
•  To achieve ecologically sustainable
development
• To protect the ecosystem as a whole,
including non-exploited species
Vessel relationship
Historical involvement
Experimental Permit; Experimental Crew
Member; Subsistence Permit;
Recreational Permit; Commercial Crew;
Processing / Marketing
% Vessel Ownership; % Purchase
Agreement; Bareboat Charter Agreement;
Charter / Catching Agreement
HDP female; HDP male; Non-HDP
female; Non-HDP male
Suitable gear - VETO
Has not been convicted under MLRA in last two years - VETO
Access to no other rights apart from abalone - VETO
Receives pension, disability or equivalent social grant - VETO
No personal involvement (must be on board and participate in
catching), excluding disabled)- VETO
Paper quota risk - VETO
Older than 18, Resident in area for >3 years - VETO
Individual (not CC or company) - VETO
No access to suitable vessel - VETO
 
Figure 6.1. Value tree for the west coast rock lobster east of Cape Hangklip allocation. 
 
Scoring the applicants 
As occurs in the current MCM process, the applicants would receive a score for each criterion, resulting in a table 
of performance profiles for each applicant.  An example extract, based on the east of Cape Hangklip west coast 
rock lobster allocation but using the scores developed in the MCM workshop (Table 5.8), is shown in Table 6.1.  
In this case all criteria had qualitative levels defined to which quantitative scores were attached, forming an index.  
It is possible that some criteria may be quantitative (e.g. the actual % HDP ownership of an enterprise) and then a 
function can be defined translating the % HDP ownership into a score on a 0-100 scale25.  Scoring systems of 
either kind should be developed with the guidance of an analyst, usually in a workshop setting in a similar way to 
the process in Section 5.4.5. 
 
Table 6.1. Performance of a selection of the applicants for the east of Cape Hangklip west coast rock lobster allocation 
using the scores and weights from Table 5.8.  Please note that the data arereal except that HDP status has been 
changed for later illustrative purposes. 
App No Landing Site 
HDP 
status 
Vessel owner-
ship or access 
Historical 
Involvement 
Total Score 
(all three 
criteria) 
Total Score 
(excluding HDP score 
- for goal program) 
Total score 
(original MCM 
scores) 
03170 Hermanus 90 100 100 96.4 64 12.0 
00955 Hermanus 90 100 100 96.4 64 13.0 
01032 Hermanus 90 100 100 96.4 64 12.0 
00083 Hermanus 90 95 100 95.2 63 11.0 
03559 Hermanus 90 80 100 91.6 59 10.0 
03656 Hermanus 90 100 80 88.4 56 12.0 
05556 Hermanus 90 100 80 88.4 56 12.0 
04398 Hermanus 90 100 80 88.4 56 11.0 
00248 Hermanus 90 100 80 88.4 56 12.0 
04085 Hermanus 0 95 80 54.8 55 7.0 
03416 Hermanus 90 80 80 83.6 51 10.0 
                                                        
25 Careful thought would have to go into decisions regarding whether a large company with numerically more HDP 
employees (but lower percentage) was contributing more to transformation than a smaller entity with a higher 
percentage of HDPs but fewer numerically. 
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App No Landing Site 
HDP 
status 
Vessel owner-
ship or access 
Historical 
Involvement 
Total Score 
(all three 
criteria) 
Total Score 
(excluding HDP score 
- for goal program) 
Total score 
(original MCM 
scores) 
03503 Hermanus 90 80 80 83.6 51 10.0 
04062 Hermanus 90 100 60 80.4 48 11.0 
04321 Hermanus 0 100 60 48.0 48 7.0 
04330 Hermanus 90 100 60 80.4 48 11.0 
03387 Hermanus 90 100 60 80.4 48 10.5 
03435 Hermanus 90 100 60 80.4 48 10.5 
03794 Hermanus 90 100 60 80.4 48 10.5 
03874 Hermanus 0 100 60 48.0 48 6.5 
03012 Hermanus 90 95 60 79.2 47 10.0 
 
 
Allocating weights to criteria 
Weights need to be given to the criteria in order to find the total scores given in Table 6.1.  These should be 
elicited using the swing weight approach, usually with the guidance of an analyst in a workshop setting.  The 
weights for the three criteria used in the east of Cape Hangklip allocation which were elicited during the MCM 
workshop are shown in Figure 6.2. (The weighted scores, i.e. wiuij were shown in Figure 5.20). 
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Figure 6.2. Weights from the MCM workshop for the performance criteria for the east of Cape Hangklip allocation. 
(see also Table 5.8 and Figure 5.20). 
 
 
Ranking of the applicants and initial allocation 
To determine the ranking of the applicants the criterion scores are multiplied by their weights and added to obtain 
a total score (third last column in Table 6.1).  The total score of each applicant is then used to rank the applicants.  
The result of this step, the ranking of 60 applicants from the three east of Cape Hangklip areas, based on their total 
score, is shown in Figure 6.3 which is displayed together with the figures of the goal programming results for ease 
of comparison. 
 
The weighted contribution of each criterion to the total score and an initial allocation are also shown.  For this 
allocation example, in order to not exceed the constraint placed by the TAC, all applicants with a score over 55 
were given a right.  As two more could still be accommodated, details regarding the three applicants with the next 
highest scores were assessed.  In this case, additional information had to be used (number of years involved, for 
example).  Note that the scores are ranked from highest to lowest within zones according to the score without the 
HDP status score for ease of comparison with later graphs.  Also recall that the levels for HDP status were HDP 
female, HDP male, non-HDP female and non-HDP male.  Thus, a non-HDP female (such as the last applicant on 
the right) still receives a positive score for HDP status.  In this initial allocation, three non-HDP applicants 
received a right, and the total score (i.e. overall performance of those granted rights) was 50% of the maximum 
possible (this is relevant for later comparison with the goal program results). 
 
 
Setting goals and analysing allocations resulting from achieving these goals 
Current policy goals are to increase the participation of HDPs and women in the fishing industry (the term HDP is 
actually used, in this context, to refer also to women).  One way to make this goal operational is to set a minimum 
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percentage for each group to be included in the applicants which are allocated rights (e.g. set a goal that 60% of 
rights should go to HDP applicants).  This is the complementary analysis described in Section 6.1.4.  Table 6.2 
shows the formulation of the goal program as set up for Solver in Excel.  The goal programming routine finds a 
solution that maximises the overall performance of the applicants (i.e. the sum of their scores excluding HDP 
scores, second last column in Table 6.1)) that are allocated rights while meeting the transformation goals.  It is set 
up in this example, to find an appropriate number of applicants within each of the three east of Cape Hangklip 
areas in order to not exceed the zonal TACs (i.e. the zonal TACs are an additional constraint). 
 
 
Table 6.2. Formulation of the goal programming (Solver) problem in Excel. 
INPUT: Percent     
      
% HDP goal (race) 0.80     
% HDP goal (gender) 0.00     
 
     
OUTPUT   Allocation 
 
TAC constraint 
    
 
 
Total # allocated Hermanus   18.00 <= 18.00 
Total # allocated Kleinmond   13.00 <= 14.00 
Total # allocated Gansbaai   9.00 <= 9.00 
    
 
 
 Percent  Number  HDP constraint 
Total HDP allocated 0.825  35.00 >= 33 
Total women allocated 0.100  4.00 >= 0 
    
  
Total Score (excluding HDP score)   1853.60 <= 2560 
Total Score percent   0.725   
      
ZONAL TACs 
    TAC 
Hermanus     7380 
Kleinmond     5405 
Gansbaai     3622.5 
 
 
In the illustrative example the target for HDP representation was first set at 30%.  This actually results in 75% of 
the allocations being granted to HDP candidates, while the total score (overall performance of the rights-holders) 
is 73% of the maximum possible.  Increasing the goal to 80% of HDPs, does not significantly change the results.  
82.5 % of the resulting rights-holders are HDP, while the total score is 72% of the maximum (i.e. more HDPs 
slightly reduces the overall score).  This is because one HDP candidate, 03012, has been granted a right, but s/he 
had a slightly lower score than the non-HDP candidate to the left.  The results of these goal programming runs 
(Figure 6.4) should be compared with the initial allocation of Figure 6.3, where 97% of the allocation went to 
HDP candidates, but the overall score was only 50% of the total possible (i.e. it is possible that HDP goals were 
overachieved at the expense of performance in terms of rights going to applicants with previous involvement etc.). 
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Figure 6.3. Weighted contribution of each criterion for the east of Cape Hangklip allocation (applicants in Table 6.1 
are the leftmost twenty).  Applicants are ranked in the same order as Figure 6.4 for later comparison; i.e. from highest 
to lowest in zones in order of total scores without HDP scores. HDP status has been changed from the original for 
illustrative purposes.  For the initial allocation example, those scoring higher than 55 were granted a right. 
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Figure 6.4. Results of the goal programming routine run (top) with a goal of 30% HDP and (bottom) with a goal of 
80% HDP. 
 
Final allocation of rights 
Two elements play a role in the allocation of the rights.  First the scoring and ranking of individuals according to 
all criteria which indicates the overall achievement of various goals for the fishery and second the targets set for 
various goals such as the proportion of HDPs who are granted rights.  The example above shows that, in a sense, 
one can “overachieve” in terms of the representation of HDPs (Figure 6.3) (e.g. 97%), this may result in 
underachievement of other goals (total performance in terms of all three criteria was only 50% of the maximum 
possible).  In the example above, underachieving in terms of the two other criteria, means underachieving in terms 
of the degree of vessel ownership/access the rights-holders in the fishery might have, or in terms of how many 
experienced applicants are included.  While in this particular case, underachieving in terms of these two criteria 
may not be terribly important, it might well be that for larger scale and more capital intensive operations there are 
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broader economic and employment consequences.  In such a case, the alternative, produced by the goal program, 
where 72% of the total possible score is achieved with 82.5% HDP representation may be a fair compromise 
(especially as in this example, 78% of the applicants were HDP). 
 
It is at this point, presented with these various alternatives, that the DDG and Minister will have to “apply their 
minds”. 
 
6.3 Software support 
The previous sections described the procedures that should be adopted in allocating rights in any particular 
fishery.  One means of ensuring that the recommended steps are followed in each case is to provide suitable 
software; i.e. a decision support system (DSS) specially designed to take managers through the process. 
 
A number of software systems do exist for the general support of multicriteria decisions making use of additive 
value scoring models.  These include V.I.S.A, DEFINITE, HiPre, HiView, Expert Choice and Logical Decisions.  
None of these are specially designed for the fishery rights allocation process, however. 
 
A specially designed system would need to include support for the following aspects: 
• Selection of criteria from the master check list; 
• Definition of levels of performance on each criterion and scoring of these; 
• Swing weighting to define the full scoring system; 
• Data entry (for each applicant); 
• Calculation of scores for each applicant; 
• Specifying of allocations; 
• Implementation of the complementary mathematical programming model; 
• Graphical displays; and 
• Provision for extraction of an audit sample (e.g. for review by the minister). 
 
Initial discussions have suggested that the DEFINITE software developed at the Institute for Environmental 
Studies (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam) could relatively easily be modified to provide the above functionality.  
This would involve time and costs beyond that supported by the current project, however.  As an interim measure, 
a “demo” system has been developed using Microsoft Excel.  This, together with other information management 
needs, is discussed in the next section. 
 
6.4 Decision support system 
The aspects needing “support” were grouped into four functional sections of the DSS (Figure 6.5): 
• Section 1: Simple data entry with data-checking procedures. Data kept separate from later data analysis, 
• Section 2: “Higher level” components, such as choosing criteria, setting scores for the different 
performance levels of the criteria, and setting weights for the criteria.  A standard list of criteria from 
which to choose, and graphical support for scoring and weighting is provided, 
• Section 3: Applying the scores to the applicants 
• Section 4: Analysis of the applicants graphically, to assess consistency of allocations. (The goal 
program is currently separate but could be included in this section). 
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User  interface and menu
2a. Select criteria and criteria 
levels
2b. Apply scores to criteria levels
2c. Apply weights to criteria
1. Entry of applicants’ basic data
3. Entry of applicants’ scores, 
initial allocation
4. Graphical data analysis, goal program
 
Figure 6.5. Basic architecture of the DSS and order of proceeding. 
 
The user can navigate to each of the four sections by clicking the relevant menu button on the main menu 
interface (pictured below).  However, activities within these sections can only be reached from within a section in 
order to maintain the correct order of events (e.g. scoring of levels of criteria can only happen once criteria have 
been chosen and numbers of levels of performance for each criterion defined. 
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1. Entry of applicants’ basic data 
In order to avoid later analyses overwriting and compromising raw data, the original applicant data is kept 
separate from the analyses.  The general format used by MCM (rows of applicants and columns of criteria and 
comments) was maintained with the additional following guidelines: 
1) Although attachments and certified documents cannot be “entered” into this database, all other 
information on the application form should be entered.  This would include identity numbers, crew 
names, addresses, landing sites, shareholder names, joint venture partners, etc. 
2) In addition, a separate field should be used for each.  For example, each different “material defect”, 
“improper lodgement” or “essential requirement” should be separately listed.  First names and 
surnames should be separated. 
These two points together would help to avoid the situation which arose with the previous allocations 
where analysis was difficult if not impossible because the reasons for exclusions were not clear and 
where applicants could not be traced in different spreadsheets because there was no agreed system of 
name entry (and no identity numbers in the files available to us). 
3) For criteria, where possible, the relevant information rather than a score should be entered.  In other 
words, where levels of achievement on a particular criterion have been defined and scored, the level 
should be entered rather than the associated score.  (This has not been incorporated into the current 
version - scores need to be entered manually and are not automatically determined from previously 
entered data) 
 
2. Choice of criteria, scoring and weighting 
In a separate section of the DSS (click on <Select criteria, define levels and scores>) a system is set up which 
supports the selection of criteria, the determination of the number of levels for each criterion and the definition of 
levels of the criteria: 
1) A checklist of criteria is provided (see picture below).  Different criteria can be selected depending 
on the fishery or whether limited or full commercial. 
2) The number of performance levels for each criterion is chosen (e.g. 4 for HDP status). 
 
 
 
 
 
From this sheet one can navigate to the next process; applying scores to the levels and applying weights to the 
criteria. 
3) The performance levels for each criterion are defined (e.g. HDP female, HDP male, non-HDP 
female, non-HDP male). 
4) The levels of achievement of the criteria are scored.  This is supported graphically. 
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5) The “worst” and “best” levels of each criterion (from (2)) are automatically carried across to the 
weighting section to assist in the swing weighting of the criteria.  This is also supported graphically. 
 
 
 
 
3. Entry of applicants’ scores and initial allocation 
Based on the selection of criteria, a new spreadsheet is automatically created which includes the previously 
entered data and additional columns with appropriate headings for each criterion.  The scores need to now be 
applied to the applicants.  In the current format of the DSS, this has to be done manually.  In other words, for each 
applicant, the data enterer needs to ascertain what level of performance they have achieved and type in the 
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associated score.  Ideally, for many criteria this could be “automated” so that, for example, if the data enterer 
typed “HDP male” in Step 1, a score of e.g. 80 would appear in this spreadsheet. 
 
The applicants’ total scores are automatically determined by summing their weighted scores for each criterion.  
The applicants can now be sorted according to total score.  The number of applicants of a particular kind or 
scoring above a certain score can be calculated. 
 
For the initial allocation, all applicants receiving more than a certain score can be allocated a right (as in the 
practical example in Section 6.2 and Figure 6.3). 
 
4. Analysis of the allocations 
The ranked applicants (and those allocated a right) can be viewed graphically (as in Figure 6.3).  Overall 
performance of the initial allocation (e.g. percentage of total possible score achieved for the allocation) can be 
determined. 
 
The goal program has not been included within this version of the DSS but can easily be formulated as an 
additional spreadsheet analysis. 
 
The allocations by the two different approaches can then be compared and final decisions made. 
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7. Summary and recommendations 
The problems of the management of marine fishery resources, the allocation of rights to exploit those resources 
and of allocating associated quota (in terms of quantum or effort) are universal (see Shotton 2001 for a collection 
of excellent case studies).  This project has attempted to investigate and offer solutions to some of the problems in 
a context of the additional need for transformation.  The objectives of the project were to (a) investigate the role of 
local knowledge in resource management, (b) to investigate the skills and training needs precipitated by the 
introduction of new approaches to allocations in previous years and the empowerment of fishers for more 
successful application for and use of fishing rights and, primarily, to (c) develop a simple, transparent and legally 
defensible allocation system. 
 
To provide background material for the project, the development of rights allocation internationally and in South 
Africa was investigated.  Three communities were chosen who would contribute to the various parts of the project 
through workshops and other interactions.  Four fisheries relevant to these communities were investigated in more 
depth in terms of the changes in rights allocation over time.  This background material is presented in Chapter 1. 
 
The analyses and interactions undertaken to achieve the three objectives of the project led to a number of 
recommendations all of which have implications for environmental management, sustainable use, empowerment 
and poverty reduction.  The activities and methods are summarised below together with the recommendations 
associated with each. 
 
7.1 The potential role of local knowledge in resource management 
A questionnaire / semi-structured interview survey and two follow-up surveys (in-depth and confirmation) were 
used as a pilot study regarding local knowledge (Section 3.2).  West coast rock lobster was used as an example 
and interviews were conducted with fishers in Hawston and Kalk Bay.  Respondents generally had good 
knowledge of the habitats and habits of lobster, although the approach to fishing did not lend itself to assessing 
detailed size and sex distributions as the fishers would move to a new location to avoid undersize lobster (often 
females).  It appeared that local knowledge could best be used to refine rules regarding seasons as fishers were 
more aware on a local and day-to-day basis of in- and offshore movements and breeding stages than scientists.  
This means that they could advise on zonal seasons (and possibly even within season refinements to these). 
 
Besides potentially improving environmental management and sustainable use of the resource, the use and 
acknowledgement of local knowledge is empowering to fishers.  In addition it was evident that the experimental 
fishery conducted by MCM and fishers in the area east of Cape Hangklip had been empowering to the fishers.  
Further studies of this sort, such MCM/fisher surveys to determine the start of the season, (a) would provide a 
powerful tool for knowledge sharing between “scientific” and “local” communities, (b) is empowering to 
participants and (c) provides a means of introducing aspects of co-management into a fishery. 
 
7.2 Empowerment of fishers for more successful application for and use of fishing 
rights 
A combination of approaches was used to develop an understanding of skills and training needs in communities.  
These were a workshop with school students, informal interviews and an MCDA “post-it” session.  With high 
unemployment levels in all sectors of society, skills training alone will not provide a solution and so the emphasis 
of the schools interaction was on the development of business and entrepreneurial skills and mentoring.  It was 
felt that existing training programmes could be improved by, for example, the inclusion of a “sustainable resource 
use” component. 
 
It was evident that the “chopping and changing” of approaches to rights allocation over the last decade have had 
severe social consequences both in terms of poverty and in terms of social continuity.  The feeling from the 
fishing communities was that specific support and training programmes should be undertaken by MCM.  This 
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could include, for example, advice on applications and advice on developing business plans (as the quality of the 
business plan is assessed as a criterion in many fisheries).  However, MCM have apparently been advised by the 
state attorneys that they should not give specific advice as this could lay them open to litigation.  The only other 
solution would be to improve communication from MCM in terms of providing more information which is more 
widely and easily accessible.  Queries (phone calls) from fishers also had to be better dealt with as a frequent 
complaint was that phones were never answered. 
 
7.3 Development of simple, transparent and defensible allocation system 
A number of avenues were pursued with the aim of developing a new approach to rights allocation: 
1. The actual allocation process and allocations made since 2001 were investigated, 
2. Communities and MCM were consulted to help to develop a new approach, 
3. A new, MCDA-based allocation system was developed, and a prototype DSS for the implementation of 
such a system was developed. 
 
Each of these aspects is discussed in a little more detail below. 
 
7.3.1 Analysis of previous rights allocation 
Fishing rights allocations made in South Africa since 2001 were analysed by consulting the documentation and 
spreadsheets made available to us by MCM (Chapters 1 and 4) and by talking to MCM and three communities 
Section 2.4 and Chapter 5).  Four fishing sectors were considered: hake, traditional linefish, west coast rock 
lobster and abalone.  The spreadsheet analysis revealed flaws in spreadsheet management and inconsistencies in 
the relationship between the score and whether someone was granted a right. Various suggestions were made 
regarding spreadsheet design and evaluation of allocations.  Some of these are incorporated in the prototype DSS 
described in Section 6.4.  Interaction with communities revealed deep unhappiness regarding the allocations and 
the process.  These were further pursued (Chapter 5) with the aim of designing a new system (Chapter 1). 
 
7.3.2 Interactions with stakeholders to develop a new rights allocation system 
The interactions with the communities and MCM were designed so that information for an MCDA-based 
approach could be elicited.  In the communities, informal submissions were made by all participants, and then 
post-it sessions were held during which specific questions were addressed.  From these sources, cognitive maps 
were developed for each community, which highlighted their particular concerns, drivers, goals and from which 
criteria could be extracted.  Initial value-trees were then constructed.  Priorities were determined for one of the 
communities (Hawston) during the initial meetings and more formal processes were used in both Hawston and 
Ocean View to determine weights and scores during subsequent meetings.  A similar but more condensed 
workshop process was followed with MCM to determine criteria, develop value trees and to give scores to 
performance levels for criteria and weights to criteria (using the west coast rock lobster east of Cape Hangklip as 
an example).  Issues from the communities and MCM were compared. 
 
The criteria derived from the different sources appeared to be very similar (see Sections 5.3 and 5.5, Figure 5.19 
and Table 5.9) and related to transformation and stability in the industry and to performance of fishers.  However, 
there were subtle differences in the interpretation of similar sounding issues, which included that: 
• Communities were concerned primarily with social continuity and that rights allocation should not 
disrupt traditional ways of life.  MCM’s concern was rather stability in the industry. 
• Communities felt that people who were dependent on fishing for a livelihood and who were bona fide 
fishers should get rights.  While MCM considered dependence as a criterion for some fisheries, this 
was dependence on a single sector, rather than dependence on year around fishing activity, or multi-
sectoral dependence.  MCM relied on fishers to find employment as crew with other fishers if they 
only had a single seasonal right themselves.  Two associated issues were: 
◦ The size of the quotas granted in some fisheries (e.g. limited commercial west coast rock 
lobster) were not viable, and 
◦ The ruling regarding traditional linefishing (fishers with rights in other sectors may not hold 
linefishing rights). 
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• While all agreed that access to an appropriate vessel was an important criteria, there were differences 
between communities and between communities and MCM regarding the emphasis placed on this 
criterion.  The highest score was given by MCM to those who owned a vessel while the communities 
(except for Kalk Bay) felt that access was more important than ownership.  There are two potential 
problems with overemphasis by MCM on ownership: (a) it may well lead to overcapacity in a context 
where the aim of a quota / effort control system is to limit capacity, and (b) sharing of vessels would 
improve the viability of small quotas. 
• Communities wanted historical or previous involvement in fishing to be recognised and for the most 
part this was a criterion used by MCM in the allocations.  There were a number of factors 
encompassed by this issue.  Previous involvement is, to some extent, a proxy for “performance” or 
“ability”.  MCM was concerned with business skills in terms of ability, while communities were 
concerned with fishing skills: there seems no particular reason why a good fisher (and one who fishes 
within the law) should need to be a businessman with business plans to prove it.  In addition, 
recognition of previous involvement should ensure some stability in the industry, while for those 
previously informally involved, recognition contributes to transformation and equity. 
 
A recommendation is, therefore that MCM considers these differences (and other mentioned in Chapter 5) when 
developing criteria and objectives for their new round of allocations in 2005. 
 
During the workshop with MCM scores were given to performance levels of criteria and weights were given to 
the criteria used in the east of Cape Hangklip allocation.  The resulting weighted scores were different to those 
used in the allocation.  Interestingly, the priority given during the workshop was closer to that indicated by 
communities: i.e. emphasis was placed on previous involvement rather than on vessel access and HDP status.  
Weights and scores were also obtained from Hawston and Ocean View communities which confirmed the above 
view.  Interestingly there was most consistency in terms of overall weights, and less in terms of how important 
various criteria within the main groupings were, especially with regard to those concerning transformation. 
 
7.3.3 Development of a new allocation system and prototype DSS. 
The basic approach used by MCM to evaluate applicants - the sum of scores on a number of criteria - remains an 
appropriate, simple and transparent approach and should be retained (see Section 6.1 for more details of the 
specific MCDA-modified proposal and Section 6.2 for a practical example).  Approaching this same task with the 
help of MCDA “thinking” and methods will improve a number of aspects, particularly: 
• the explicit linking of objectives to criteria, and 
• the applying of scores to performance levels of criteria (interval scales) and weights to criteria (swing 
weights) in a way which justifies using a weighted sum of scores. 
 
In addition to using a weighted sum of scores an additional complementary analysis was proposed using goal 
programming (set up in Solver for Excel).  In this approach, specific goals are defined (e.g. percentage HDP 
representation) and the program allocates rights to applicants in order to achieve this goal while maximising a 
measure of overall performance of the applicants (for example, the sum of the scores of all those who received a 
right (excluding the score for HDP status)). 
 
The results of the two approaches (awarding rights based on the individual achieving a score of above a certain 
amount and awarding rights in order to achieve a specific goal) can then be compared and evaluated and final 
decisions made by the delegated authority. 
 
A prototype DSS was designed (in Excel) which implements some of the recommendations made.  Facilities are 
available to: 
• Separate basic data entry from other functions, 
• Select a subset of criteria appropriate for the particular fishery and to define performance levels for 
the criteria, 
• Support (with graphs) the allocation of scores to performance levels of criteria and the allocation of 
weights to the criteria, 
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• Analyse resulting allocations graphically. 
 
7.4 Overall recommendations for the allocation process 
In summary, the recommendations are: 
 
1. An allocation protocol needs to followed for each allocation cycle (Chapter 1, Box 6.1).  This will 
contribute to the overall legitimacy of the process, while specific points within the allocation protocol 
will help to minimise potential adverse social and economic consequences of inappropriate allocations. 
 
2. An MCDA-based allocation system should be used within the allocation protocol (Chapter 5 and 1).  
Inputs from MCM and fishers should contribute to the definition of objectives and criteria, the scoring of 
levels of achievement on criteria and the weighting of criteria. 
 
The use of the MCDA approach has implications for environmental management and the sustainable use 
of the resource.  This is because without a generally accepted approach to allocation, and without one 
which appropriately uses inputs from fishers, there will be little “buy-in” from consequently alienated and 
marginalised fishers and they will therefore have little incentive to abide by management rules.  Although 
no system will make everyone happy, any perceived arbitrariness or administrative bungling will 
immediately undermine the entire system.  Further, in order for the marine fish resources (a public good 
managed by government) to be managed in the best interests of society it is important that MCM 
acknowledge and make explicit the different goals and different priorities of goals which pertain to 
different fishery sectors.  Thus, for certain fisheries the emphasis may be on poverty alleviation, while for 
others it might be economic efficiency or for others (e.g. threatened stocks) ecosystem protection.  In this 
regard, MCM also needs to ensure that their goals (for example, the requirement for fishers to be 
businesspeople) or management decisions (e.g. the decoupling of seasonal fishing sectors from line-
fishing) are not incompatible with the nature of certain fishing sectors. 
 
The use of MCDA also has implications for empowerment of communities in that their inputs are 
required and acknowledged. 
 
Finally, it has implications for poverty reduction in that with this system appropriate criteria can be 
chosen in order to evaluate allocations in terms of the contribution to poverty reduction (given that this is 
one of government’s goals).   
 
3. There should be community input into verification of applicants or initial allocations.  The current 
Minister has already suggested that an initial allocation will be published for comment before final 
allocation decisions are made (Marthinus van Schalkwyk pers. comm. Fishing Imbizo, 17 Aug 2004).  
This has implications for the legitimacy (and therefore sustainability) of the process as well as in terms of 
empowerment of communities (their views are being heard and acknowledged). 
 
4. The local ecological knowledge of fishers can be used to improve management on a zonal basis, 
particularly with regard to the timing of fishing seasons.  This is empowering to fishers, and may improve 
the sustainability of resource use. 
 
7.5 Future research needs 
The further research needs arising from this project include: 
• The processes which could be used to determine the relative priorities of fishers in different communites 
and to compare these with those of MCM were illustrated during this project.  These processes could be 
fine tuned for use during an allocation process to investigate what scores and weights different 
stakeholders feel should apply to the evaluation criteria.  Therefore, “protocols” need to be developed for 
the identification of criteria, value trees, scores and weights for future allocations, 
• Determining appropriate mechanisms for the use of local knowledge in certain aspects of local resource 
management, and 
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• Determining the “minimum viable quota” for different small-scale fishing sectors and alternative 
livelihood strategies associated with the new rights allocation system and regulations.  This would entail 
dealing with the seasonal nature of many fishing sectors and developing ways to support fishers in 
establishing strategies so that, where rights-holding in many sectors by one fisher is not possible, a fisher 
with rights in one sector crews for someone with rights in another sector and vice versa.  This will help to 
ensure that fishers earn a viable living and that rights are distributed through the community.  While the 
utilisation of such strategies was one of the implicit intentions behind MCM’s new approach, no support 
was provided to communities in achieving them, nor was the intention, apparently, ever explicitly 
expressed. 
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APPENDIX 1: HAWSTON 
Questionnaire - first Hawston meeting (15/09/2003) 
 
 
Meeting in Hawston 
Date: 15.9.2003 
 
Information of interested parties 
 
Naam:…………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………. 
Adres:…………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………. 
 
Indicate with an X: 
 
 
1. You are interested in the following type of quota: 
 
 Abalone Lobster Linefish Trek net 
 
 
2. Indicate your experience in the abovementioned in the blocks below: 
 
 1-10 years 10-20 years 20-30 years 30-40 years 
 
 
3. Have you previously had or do you currently have a quota: 
 
 Yes No 
 
 
4. Do you think you deserve to have a quota?. Briefly provide reasons: 
…………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….………………………………………………….……
……………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….………………………………………………….……
……………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
5. Indicate with an X if you own or have access to the following type of telephone/s: 
 
 Home phone Cell phone Public phone Other 
 
 
6. Which of the following type of transport/s do you use?: 
 
 Car 4 x 4 car Taxi Bus 
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
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Post-it session responses - third Hawston meeting, Hawston library (26/11/2004) 
Note that all post-its are recorded (therefore there is repetition) in the participants words. They are organised into different 
sections and where two ideas were joined these are separated and may appear in two separate sections. 
Question 1: What does having or not having fishing rights mean to you (personally or the community) 
Group Post-it comments Points 
Food for children 
Generate income for me and my family (crayfish / abalone) 
If fishers don’t have the right to catch lobster or perlemoen within the law, they will have a problem to support 
their families (lobster, perlemoen) 
If fishers don’t have the right to catch fish from the sea or freshwater, then he has nothing with which to care 
for himself and his family (fish) 
It will mean a lot to the community to have fishing rights as it will alleviate poverty within the community (kreef) 
Family 
Fishing rights bring money, money brings security and security brings stability 
24 
It is an opportunity for the community to make money in a legal fashion and to stay away from illegal activities 
There is a link between fishing rights (having or not having), poaching and drugs in the community Social problems 
Not getting a fishing right makes you skelm [dishonest] 
3 
Co-management (people and government) 
empowerment 
octopus quota to Khoisan / Strandloper BK, opportunities for job creation and women empowerment, sharing 
of opportunities 
coastal communities - community quotas to community organisations, churches, schools to share amongst 
community, pay for study and school fees, upliftment of whole community 
zonal / area rights 
Empowerment 
one lobster right per person  economic empowerment, family uplifted, food security, make a good livelihood 
13 
certificate for involvement with PREM process 
Training and empowerment 
Disadvantaged community fishers should get scientific / management training free 
Training, 
information 
Need to know more about how parliament works with fishing rights 
4 
Access to a savings account 
The money generated is also a way for the state to make money from taxes etc. 
MCM funds should be made available for fish / lobster processing factories at the coast. These can be 
associated with export rights, packing and processing. 
Money 
Generates money for the community 
10 
 Foreign currency earnings  
Marine resource I am committed to the restoration of our marine resources 6 
 
Question 2B: What should MCM be doing - What process should be followed (committees, final decision-makers, criteria, fees…) 
Group Post-it comments Points 
The community should establish a committee which works with MCM to check the applications and decide 
who gets. 
 
A mandate for all the coast towns to organise representatives [for a?]  
Those that use the resource make sure that they are heard  
Representation, 
involvement 
MCM should pay more attention to people’s pleas / appeals (3)  
The community should make decisions with MCM  
Resource users must be taken into account  
MCM must decide to the satisfaction of the fisher community and fishers and work together with them  
Joint decision-
making, co-
management 
MCM mustn’t close anyone out of the process, they must consider all groups and communities  
If someone is not successful in their application then they should get their application fee back.  
MCM should give some rights free (i.e. to traditional fishers)  Fees, time 
MCM takes too much time to process the applications  
Local knowledge Scientists should not underestimate our traditional environmental knowledge  
Freshwater fish What about freshwater fish rights? Nature conservation, MCM and Western Cape Govt. need to work 
together) 
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Question 2A : What should MCM be doing - What should their aims be? 
Group Post-it comments Points 
Seasons should be respected Conservation of 
the resource To protect marine resources 
10 
What our parents didn’t get right in terms of fishing rights, we must get right (for later generations) 
MCM should apply fair division of rights.  There should be no corruption. (1) 
There are many who have everything, e.g. boat bakkies and they don’t get a right. What do they do then? 
Their should be corrective action (2) 
Keep wrong people out, get right people in (10) 
Give traditional fishers preference 
MCM should give the Khoisan Strandlopers’ descendants what they want and in this way give back and 
reinstate their rights (1) 
MCM must reinstate the rights that were taken from the Strandlopers’ descendants (7) 
A fishing right is a human right (11) 
MCM should manage healthily and co-ordinate so that don’t give out paper quotas (1) 
Fees shouldn’t be too low (to keep “chancers” out) 
They should go and look at what every boat actually does, look at if there is fishing everyday and where 
Ensuring that 
allocation is 
appropriate 
It is not understandable that there is an overflowing of fishermen but MCM insists on giving women training as 
fishers [i.e. rather use the people who already have the skills and equipment and are out of work]. (7) 
32 
MCM should work together with the community to make decisions about what should happen in the industry. 
MCM should put the communities interests in the resource first 
Fishers should give the necessary training to their sons who want to make a living from fishing and this should 
be supported by MCM (4) 
Aims+goals: That the traditional fisher should get his rightful / just share of the fishing resource, and that they 
are not exploited by factory bosses like in the past (3) 
Community 
interests (3) 
The minister can make more quotas available to fishers. Many are dependent on the sea. 
18 
 
 
Question 3 : Where do you feel you lack skills, knowledge, resources to be able to obtain and benefit from 
fishing rights ? 
 
 
General 
Training centre  Training 
Management 
Computer  Access and training 
 
Understandability of process 
 
Fairness 
 
Funds   Access 
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Attendees - first, second and third Hawston meetings 
Attended Name Town Organisation / CC Sub-
mission 15/09 18/09 26/11 
EoH ltd 
WCRL? 
1. Annie Booi   N  Y   
2. John Prins   N Y Y   
3. Jakobus JDC Swart   Y Y Y   
4. Paul Wyngaard   N Y Y   
5. Richard Geweldt Mount Pleasant Arrowline Fourteen CC Y Y Y   
6. Adam Meyer Hawston Baaigat Visserye CC Y Y Y Y  
7. Belinda Hess Hawston  Y Y Y   
8. Hans Montague Hawston Plankhuis Baai Vissers CC, Hermanus Commercial West Coast Rock Lobster Ass Y Y Y   
9. Riaan J Erwee Hermanus  Y Y Y Y Y 
10. Calvin Hendricks Bredasdorp  Y Y Y   
11. Hendrick Boois Bredasdorp  Y Y Y   
12. Hendrika Johannes Bredasdorp Weltevrede Vissery CC Y ? Y   
13. Salie Cyster Stanford  N Y Y Y Y 
14. Rosie Swartland Stanford  Y Y Y Y  
15. Robert Groenewald   N ? N Y  
16. Yeshuo Sias Hawston Khoisan - Strandlopers CC N ? N Y  
TEAM        
Jossette Mathee    Y Y Y  
Linda de Vries    N Y Y  
Theo Stewart    N Y Y  
Alison Joubert    N Y Y  
Leanne Scott    N N Y  
Ron Janssen    N N Y  
Visitor: Arabinda 
Tripathy 
   N N Y  
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APPENDIX 2: KALK BAY 
Post-it session responses - first Kalk Bay meeting (23/02/2004) 
 
Note that where issues are slightly distinct from the main group, they are separated by “∆”. 
Note that all post-its are recorded (therefore there is repetition) in the participants words. They are organised into different 
sections and where two ideas were joined these are separated and may appear in two separate sections. 
 
Question 1:  What should aims of MCM be in allocating rights? 
 
Group 2: (protect traditional fishers): 
• Protect the real / traditional fishermen 
• To cater for the needs of traditional fishers in their specific sectors 
• To give the traditional fishermen the right to exploit the resource and to earn their living from the sea. 
• Allocate rights to real fishing people 
• Leave / give the opportunity to long participants to participate in other sectors 
• Taking away the boat licences : the crew working on those vessels have no work so MCM is creating poverty 
 
Group 3: (manage and protect): 
• Manage the resource for present and future generations 
• Protect the resource e..g. bank fish. 
• To manage the marine industry 
 
Question 2:  What criteria and processes should be adopted by MCM? 
 
Criteria Group 1: (consult) 
• To consult with the fishermen about what criteria must be used to prove to MCM that he qualifies to be a 
fisherman 
• To meet with elected fishing community leaders to identify (true) role players in the industry 
• Consult with representatives of recognised fishing groups 
• Consult with traditional fishermen to jointly manage the resource 
 
Criteria Group 2: (investigate) 
• To investigate all phony CCs and companies 
 
Criteria Group 3: (educate / train) 
• To educate users to responsibly manage their newly acquired “wealth”. 
 
Criteria Group 4: (protection measures) 
• To protect reef fish, put a moratorium on exploiting those that are under pressure for 5 years. 
 
Criteria Group 5: (differentiate between ski boats and harbour boats) 
• Limit ski-boat entry (i.e. designated harbours) 
• Limit launch points for ski-boats 
• Make a distinction between ski-boats in yards and boats in harbours 
• Harbour-moored vessels should be looked at differently than ski-boats 
 
Criteria Group 6: (licenses to traditional fishers’ boats in harbours) 
• Return the fishing rights of traditional fishing vessels 
• To give the boats the licenses so that the crew members can go to sea. 
• Give licences to boat owners who had traditional fishing licences 
• No licences for individual fishermen (except for switching harbour boats) [???] 
• Limit the amount of participants in the various sectors (so that we get workable rights / quotas). 
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Attendees - first Kalk Bay meeting (23/02/2004) 
TEAM:  Theo Stewart , Alison Joubert, Leanne Scott. 
 
Name Edriees Manuel (ME) Tony Trimmel Jacobus Poggenpoel Sulaiman Achmad 
Company Name Company = Jaffa’s Bay  Marion Dawn Fishing CC  
Phone Number 082 8220224 / 7034571 082 564 555 / 788 2827 
(ph/fax) 
7887421 783 1070 / 084 789 5050 
Current rights held if 
any 
Crayfish and pelagic None Crayfish and pelagic Crayfish and pelagic 
Previous rights held if 
any 
Crayfish, pelagic, longline, 
handline 
Handline permits x 2, squid 
permit x 2 
Crayfish, pelagic, handline 
permit x 2 
Crayfish, pelagic, longline 
Sectors involved with 
(previous or current) 
Crayfish and pelagic Handline fishing  Crayfish, pelagic 
Do you belong to a 
fisher organisation? 
Kalk Bay Lobster & 
Commercial Linefishing 
Association 
Kalk Bay Lobster & 
Commercial Linefishing 
Association 
Kalk Bay Lobster & 
Commercial Linefishing 
Association 
Kalk Bay Lobster & 
Commercial Linefishing 
Association 
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APPENDIX 3: OCEAN VIEW 
 
Value tree from post-its: Aims and objectives (Qu 1) and Criteria (Qu 2), first  Ocean 
View meeting (26/04/2004) 
HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT Record of / proof of / verifiable history of involvement 
over the years 
Knowledge of the industry EXPERIENCE 
Skill and experience 
INVESTMENT Investment in the industry 
Access to fishing vessel 
2. GIVE RIGHTS TO BONA FIDE FISHERS 
or ARTISANAL FISHERS WHO MAKE A 
LIVING FROM THE SEA (ALTHOUGH 
THEY MAY NEVER HAVE HAD FORMAL 
RIGHTS BEFORE) ACCESS TO THE MEANS OF 
FISHING Access to gear and equipment 
3. ADDRESS IMBALANCES OF THE PAST TRANSFORMATION Genuine transformation and equity 
4. EMPOWER WITH A SUSTAINABLE 
INCOME 
5. POVERTY REDUCTION 
DEPENDENCY Dependency on the resource (Other employment and 
other earnings count against) 
How the previous quota was handled 1.
 
PR
O
M
O
TE
 
CO
NS
TI
TU
TI
O
NA
L 
DI
RE
CT
IV
ES
 
6. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND 
SUSTAINABILITY COMPLIANCE No lying on forms 
    
 
7. RIGHTS TO MEN IN PREFERENCE TO 
WOMEN   
 
Process recommendations, first Ocean View meeting (26/04/2004) 
Process: 
 Consult with community 
 Get inspectors more involved 
 Fee (or balance thereof) payable if get right 
 Give proper information 
 Use existing MCM databases 
 Take cognisance of the mistakes of last couple of allocations when considering next lot (are those not 
given rights, new applicants, and paper quotas old?). 
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Post-it session responses - first Ocean View meeting (26/04/2004) 
Note that all post-its are recorded (therefore there is repetition) in the participants words. They are organised into different 
sections and where two ideas were joined these are separated and may appear in two separate sections. 
 
QUESTION 1: What should be the aims and goals of MCM for a fair rights allocation 
1. PROMOTE CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVES 
1. Firstly, the present fisheries management model (MLRA) is not conducive to, or promoting of, the aspirations, political, 
socio-economic objectives and constitutional directives of government: 
2. To meet the political and social directives of the constitution of RSA and the Bill of Rights 
3. Socially responsible basis.  
 
2. GIVE RIGHTS TO BONA FIDE FISHERS or ARTISANAL FISHERS WHO MAKE A LIVING FROM THE SEA 
(ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NEVER HAVE HAD FORMAL RIGHTS BEFORE) 
4. MCM must make sure that real fishermen get quotas because in the past they made a mess of the quotas.  
5. MCM should first see to the bona-fide fishermen when allocating fishing rights 
6. MCM should first identify all the fishermen 
7. First look at the fishers who make a living from the sea.  
8. Identify first the real fishers in each community 
9. The right fishermen.  
10. Identify the real fishermen.  
11. Give the bona fide fishermen the rights.  Fishermen go out to sea, winter and summer, we don’t just go out to sea when it 
suits us.  
12. Recognise fishers such as us as not being new entrants, for this is the only skill that we could exercise our entire lives 
though we may currently hold no formal rights.  
13. I’ve been a fisher half my life.  
14. MCM must see to all fisherfolks.  
15. MCM must come out and see who are the people who live from the sea before they give out quotas to people.  Because 
there are people who got quotas who have never had anything to do with the sea.  
16. Artisanal fishers must be accepted in RSA.  
 
3. ADDRESS IMBALANCES OF THE PAST 
17. We need to address the imbalances of the past by identifying the bona fide fishers.  
18. To equalise and democratise the industry, restoring the historical and cultural rights of previously marginalised and 
currently disadvantaged fishery-dependent sectors.  MCM should have facilitated the role of transformation and not 
created a “rent-a-black” scheme.  
 
4. EMPOWER WITH A SUSTAINABLE INCOME 
19. We need to empower those that derive their income solely from the ocean.  
20. Fishing is seasonal and dependent on weather conditions.  When allocating a quota, consideration should be given to full 
year’s income, not seasonal.  
21. The aim of rights allocation should be to ensure a sustainable income for the fisherman.  
22. Rights are to uplift and empower the fisherman.  
 
5. POVERTY REDUCTION 
23. Less poverty 
24. If I was in HK’s shoes, I would look at the poor fishers.  
25. MCM should first help the poor fishermen before giving to the rich. 
 
6. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
26. Manage the resources on an ecosystems-based and sustainable fishing concept to meet optimum social and economic 
needs of present and future generations.  
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7. RIGHTS TO MEN IN PREFERENCE TO WOMEN 
27. MCM mustn’t even give rights to women while the man is the breadwinner in the house, because then the man is no 
longer the roof in the house.  
28. According to my thoughts, I wouldn’t give a fisher’s job to women as HK has done.  Now we fishermen suffer because of 
HK.  
29. The fisherman in the house should get preference above the women for quota allocations because wherever you look it is 
just men that are taking their lobster out.  
 
QUESTION 2: Specific Processes & Criteria (OR: What would you do in HK’s shoes?) 
SCIENTISTS 
1. HK must give more attention to what the scientists tell him.  People such as George Branch. 
2. They shouldn’t ask the scientists what goes on in the sea.  They don’t know anything. 
 
PROCESS 
• Start afresh with new people and a new process 
3. I feel that if they can’t do the job they should leave it to somebody else.  
4. Discard the current process and start afresh with the new allocations 
5. They should have totally new people there [MCM] to do the job.  
• Obtaining information and Verification of information 
6. Do a survey or get a marketing company like Markinor to do a survey. 
7. Appoint an unbiased monitor from MCM to liase with the fishermen and women to ascertain the needs. 
8. Thorough networking with SARS, DTI, DL26. 
9. Old [MCM] databases can act as guidelines [to provide information about involvement over the years]. 
10. The verification process is to be improved… 
• Involvement of MCM with the communities and of the communities in the allocation process 
11. HK should pay more attention to what the communities have to say. 
12. They should have fishers there at MCM to help them with the new laws that are coming out. 
13. Consult with the community leaders to help in the identification process. 
14. In order to achieve their aims, MCM must come out to the community and listen to their needs. 
15. Through networking ascertain [information regarding other jobs, income etc.]. 
16. Draft policy must be discussed with fishing communities before final decisions are made. 
17. Get more fishers (and inspectors) involved in policy making… 
18. The aims of MCM in allocating rights is to come out to the community and find out who the real fishermen are before 
allocating quotas to anyone in this community of Ocean View.  
19. Come to the communities and look at what the problems are there. 
20. MCM should first come and hold meetings with the communities 
21. Fishers should have a say or an involvement in the decision making 
22. Fishers should be able to have their say in who should get rights 
• Involve inspectors in identification of bona fide fishers 
23. Inspectors should be involved 
24. Get more (fishers and) inspectors involved in policy making… 
25. Inspectors from each community should be involved when rights are awarded.  
26. MCM must identify the fishers 
27. MCM should ask the inspectors to help in order to make the rights decisions 
28. MCM should ask the inspectors to help identify the fishers. 
29. And they should find four fishermen out of each fisher community to help MCM to identify the fishers 
30. The fisherfolk should first be identified by the local fisher official 
31. Get the fishing inspectors involved and let them identify fishers.  
• Feedback 
32. We’ve been sitting in meetings about HK for the last 2 ½ years but we hear nothing of the results.  We would like to 
please hear of the results of this process. 
• Applications forms simplified 
                                                        
26 SARS=South African Revenue Services, DTI=Dept. of Trade and Industry, DL=Dept. of Labour. 
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33. MCM must make applications easy for fishermen to read and to understand 
34. Most fisherfolk are uneducated.  Make the applications simpler.  
35. Make the criteria easier for fishers to understand.  
36. Keep application forms fisher friendly … 
37. There should be simplified application forms.  
• Assistance for illiterate 
38. Room should be made for illiterate people to access information and gain entry into the industry.  
• Provide correct information about criteria and assistance in understanding them 
39. MCM has an obligation to assist people to understand the criteria.  
• Application fee 
40. [Keep] the application fee within the reach of fishermen/ women.  
41. Make provision for the poorest of fishermen to apply.  Provide the finances and maybe get them to repay it once their 
allocation has been caught.  Something like a levy.  
• Corruption 
42. Corruption must be stopped.  
43. Get rid of corruption at MCM.  
 
Particular comments on the nature of the rights 
44. MCM shouldn’t apply 10 to 15 year rights, because they don’t know what the seawater will bring in that time.  
45. When allocations of quotas are made they should be monitored… 
46. Criteria must be well researched… 
47. The guiding principles for the allocation process should be looking at individuals.  
48. The rights for line fishers should be on their names  
 
CRITERIA 
49. Check on how many applicants having fishing vessels when applying for a quota. 
50. Eliminate proposed candidates with no history records and who assume the role of fishermen / women. 
51. MCM should be able to identify:  Investment in the industry 
       Access to equipment and 
       Knowledge of the industry. 
52. Access to vessel(s), resources, gear, tackle, etc. 
53. Genuine transformation and equity. 
54. Should ascertain (in order to be fair)  what other jobs a candidate holds and 
       what amount of investment he / she has and / or 
       what they earn, if anything, per month,.  
55. Involvement over the years.  
56. Suggested Criteria: Proof of   (i) historical involvement, 
       (ii) knowledge, skill and experience, 
       (iii) dependency. 
57. [They should check]:   How the previous quota was handled... 
       Investment in the industry… 
58. There should be verbal motivation of (a) involvement and 
       (b) dependence 
59. There should be physical demonstration of involvement etc. 
60. People who lie on application forms should not get rights. 
 
 
ADDITIONAL POINTS REGARDING BUSINESS TRAINING and EDUCATION 
1. Educate the fishers as to how to manage their own business 
2. MCM should have a support / development process in place that would address the needs of most fishers who 
perhaps are illiterate or who for the first time would manage their own affairs and the allocated resource. 
3. Hold workshops in the communities to ensure applicants have a thorough idea what all is involved in 
acquiring a quota and managing the resource.  
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Attendees (Ocean View 26/04/2004) 
Name 
Phone 
Number 
Rights (from 
attendee) 
++ 
Previous rights held if 
any 
Sectors involved with 
(previous or current) 
Do you belong to a fisher 
organisation? Or Company 
Matthews May 7833 955 LHT Line fishing **, Subsistence Handline fishing Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Charles America 082 
2680449 
Linefish exemption 
(2005) 
**, Subsistence (1998-
2000) 
WCRL, linefish Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Stanley Williams 7835 728 None **, None None Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Peter Melvin May 7832 117 Subsistence **, None None Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Kevin Daniels 7833 955 XLT Linefish  Subsistence WCRL XLT, linefish Artisanal Linefishing 
Association 
Donovan Williams 7835 728 XLT Linefish  None None None 
Johannes Edwards 7832 872 XLT Linefish **, None None Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Devina Christians 7835 728 None  Subsistence WCRL None 
Gershom Hayward 7833 955 None  None Handline fishing None 
Phillip Sanders 7832 607 None oo, None Handline fishing None 
Mark Daniels 7833 955 None **, None ? Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Achmat Davis  None **, None None Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Japie Britz  WCRL, Linefish 
exemption {snoek, 
hotnot}  
**, oo, Handline fishing  Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Heinrich Stoffels 7834 178 None **, Subsistence WCRL WCRL, linefish Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Alexander Louw 7832 045 None **, oo, Subsistence WCRL WCRL, linefish Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
Sharon van Sittert 7830 284 None  None WCRL, abalone, linefish 3 J Fishing Enterprise 
Charmaine Daniels 7833 955 None **, oo, Subsistence WCRL Linefish, WCRL Africa’s Best 249 Ltd 
       
TEAM       
Alison Joubert      UCT 
Theo Stewart      UCT 
Leanne Scott      UCT 
 
+ + Rights information from MCM spreadsheets where these disagrees with attendee: 
 
** Attendee has a west coast rock lobster right as a member of “Africa’s Best 249 Ltd. This company got a 2 T 
right in 2001 as a full commercial applicant.  This is to be split between 60 members.  This may be why 
PMM refers to a “subsistence” quota. 
oo
  Attendee has a linefish exemption (“XLT linefish”) 
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APPENDIX 4: MARINE and COASTAL MANAGEMENT (MCM) 
 
Notes - from Stage 3: Scoring systems and value functions (MCM 27/05/2004) 
 
Access to / ownership of vessel: Definitions: Bareboat - a boat is hired without crew, Charter - a boat is hired with 
crew in place.  So the order of {100% owned  lower percentage ownership  100 percentage purchase 
agreement  lower percentage purchase agreement  bareboat  charter} is in order of increasing exposure to 
risk and / or increasing involvement, so this is the correct order. 
Sven: for simplicity prefer linear value tree. Otherwise:  Sc
or
e
% ownership
 
Or % purchase agreement (linear to percentage as for % ownership).  
Craig and Steve preferred a sigmoid relationship:  Sc
or
e
% ownership
 
 
Scores (graphical format and comparison with actual scores in main body of report): 
VESSEL ACCESS / OWNERSHIP HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT HDP 
75% - 100% Vessel Owner 100 Experimental Permit 100 HDP Female 100 
40% - 74% Vessel Owner 95 Experimental Crew 80 HDP Male 90 
25% - 39% Vessel Owner 80 Commercial Crew 60 Non-HDP Female 80 
1 - 24% Vessel Owner 75 Subsistence Permit 40 Non-HDP Male 0 
50% - 100% Purchase Agreement 50 Processing / Marketing 20   
1 - 49% Purchase Agreement 35 Recreational Permit 10   
Bareboat Charter Agreement 25 No permit / Not crew 0   
Charter / Catching Agreement 0     
 
Weights (graphical format and comparison with actual scores in main body of report): 
 Vessel access / ownership Historical involvement HDP status 
Rank order 3 1 2 
% weight 60 100 90 
Weight normalised to sum to 1 0.2 0.4 0.4 
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Post-it session responses - third MCM meeting (27/05/2004) 
“In order to satisfy this goal (a) what factors need to be considered when choosing rights-holders? and (b) How 
should the extent of goal achievement be measured?”.  Specify where necessary if referring to full or limited 
commercial and new applicants or previous rights-holders.  The question applied to west coast rock lobster. 
• Note that all post-its are recorded (therefore there is repetition) in the participants words. They are organised into 
different sections and where two ideas were joined these are separated and may appear in two separate sections. 
• Note that the expansions in square brackets [text text] were added by the team after the workshop. 
 
1. Goal 1: ECONOMIC: To achieve optimum utilisation and economic growth 
 
1.1 Past / potential financial performance and viability 
Past financial performance (all sectors) ! Past performance 
     ! Past performance (previous limited and full commercial) 
Potential financial performance (new entrants) 
Both potential and past performance could be measured with: 
 .Financial measures: ! Cost incurred per item ! Revenue obtained 
  ! Financial viability of applicant ! Access to funds / cash flow 
  ! Future - business plan and its credibility, ! Proximity to resource (mostly limited  
   particularly financial capacity sector) 
  ! Viability of allocated amount ! Marketing 
  ! Distance to resource [distance is a proxy for one of the cost items - transport] 
  [Interpretation: These measures all relate to the financial viability of the applicant which 
could be indicated by cash flow, calibre of business plan etc.] 
 .Paper quota risk:  ! Agreements (processing, marketing, catching). 
  [Interpretation: Analysing agreements and shareholding can tell about PQR.  PQR affects 
local economies because local economic benefits of a quota held within a zone not felt if 
its sold off to big company (which might be outside the zone). A quota sold off only 
benefits the paper quota holder not the broader community.] 
 .????????? ! Shareholding  ! CC / PTY / Individual 
  [Interpretation: It is not clear what is intended by these post-its. Is shareholding “good” or 
“bad” in terms of economic development? Are CCs better than individuals? Why? Are 
these other ways of determining PQR? Or of determining financial viability?] 
 .Value adding ! how catch is processed. 
  [Interpretation: value adding contributes to multiplier effects in terms of economic 
development.  It could also be seen as indicating “commitment” through investment.] 
Past Compliance record (all sectors) [Interpretation: compliance with Employment Equity Act, Customs 
and Excise, Tax Laws and MLRA. All of these have implications for financial sustainability] 
Level of Investment / Commitment  
 .Investments per item [Interpretation: this could be seen as part of the cash flow of the business, 
but is intended as measures of “commitment” to the industry.] 
 .Employment created [Interpretation: this can also be seen as a measure of “commitment”.] 
 
 
1.2 Technical requirements  Ability to harvest 
! Physical ability to catch allocation ! Vessel utilisation (which vessels they’ll be using) 
! Fishing plan ! Vessel capacity: appropriate vessel (all sectors) 
! Vessel size ! Number of crew 
 
 
1.3 General questions arising from this post-it session 
 ! Economies of scale? ! Unbundling versus monopoly? 
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2. Goal 2: SOCIAL: To achieve human resource development, capacity building and 
employment and to restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances. 
 
2.1 Employment performance record 
Employment 
 ! Number to be employed ! Employment created in relation to local needs 
 ! Duration of employment ! Labour composition 
 ! Salary and how much profits paid to who, where ! Employment by category / skills level, by colour and gender 
Skills / upliftment 
 ! Skills transfer 
 ! Business plan - upliftment of crew [Could be referring to skills or empowerment plans] 
 
2.2 Transformation and empowerment 
! Empowerment agreements and joint ventures (real and apparent) ! Empowerment plan 
! Transformation status ! Transformation percentage, equity. 
! Ownership structure: who owns what ! Shareholding (all sectors) 
! Shareholding composition 
 
2.3 Community development and ownership of resource 
! Distance to the resource ! Geographic community 
 
2.4 Dependence on resource and historical involvement 
Historical involvement in fishing 
Reliance on resource / fishery e.g. proportion of income (limited commercial) 
Alternatives to this fishery: involvement in other fisheries or other occupations 
 
 
3. Goal 3: ECOLOGICAL: To achieve ecologically sustainable development and protect 
the ecosystem including non-exploited species 
 
3.1 Vessel and gear type appropriateness and effect on environment [Note: Traps are more damaging than 
hoopnets, but generally FC use traps and LC hoopnets.  Gear may influence decision on TAC split into FC /LC, but 
can’t be used in comparison of applicants. May be more relevant in other fisheries.] 
! Vessel type / gear : Gear impact.  ! Gear type to be used and Vessel size 
! Gear type and is it appropriate (all sectors). ! Catching method and Gear 
! Vessel size ! Impact of gear on environment 
 
3.2 Access to fishing grounds 
Access to fishing grounds [Interpretation: Unclear: If live closer more likely to have sense of ownership and 
look after resource better?] 
 
3.3 Catch to discard rations 
Potential catch vs. discard ratios 
 
3.4 Responsible fishing record 
! “Responsible fishing”: History (previous rights), business plan (new rights)  
! Compliance history : regulations and permit conditions. ! Previous compliance record (limited and full  
[includes over- and under-catch?] commercial) 
! Track-record in terms of submission of catch returns. ! Previous convictions 
! Compliance - previous transgressions ! The capacity of compliance 
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Ecological and economic information required arising from all three post-it sessions- [i.e. 
these points refer to studies required not to the comparison of applicants.  For helping to decide on TACs, zonal TACs, 
different approaches in different zones] 
Spatial and temporal changes [Important for resource allocation; may change over time] 
 ! Annual fluctuations on global and zonal basis ! Zonal considerations 
 ! TAC for area     ! Relevant MPAs 
 ! Difference in resource productivity over distribution range (i.e. differences in TAC on zonal basis). 
 ! Resource distributions (a) deep vs. shallow, (b) distribution along coast) 
 
Disparity in resource distribution and distribution of poor communities 
Obtain a geographical to local economic profile and look at needs for specific areas - may want to allocate 
differently depending on needs (west coast especially). All sectors. 
TAC / TAE sets limits to number of rights-holders (area based).  Global TAC set, but may need flexibility between 
areas and full commercial and limited commercial. 
 
All sectors: economic value vs. ecological costs 
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Attendees - third MCM meeting (27/05/2004) 
 
Attendees  Team 
Steve Lamberth MCM   
Sven Munkejord MCM  Alison Joubert 
Rob Tarr MCM: Inshore  Leanne Scott 
Craig Smith MCM: Inshore  Theo Stewart 
Chris Wilke MCM: Inshore   
Shamera Daniels Deloitte   
Shaheen Moolla MCM   
Danie van Zyl MCM   
Andy Cockcroft MCM   
Horst Kleinschmidt MCM   
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APPENDIX 5: Local Knowledge 
Local knowledge questionnaire 
Local Knowledge Survey 
University of Cape Town, University of Western Cape, Free University of Amsterdam 
Thank you for agreeing to do this interview.  The University of Cape Town, the University of the Western 
Cape, and a Dutch university are collaborating on a fisheries project.  One part of this is to interview fishers 
in order to gather local knowledge about fish, fisheries and resource management.  We want to try to collate 
this knowledge and to see in what way this knowledge can be used to augment scientific research and 
knowledge. 
We would like to acknowledge you as a source of information in our reports.  But if you would like to 
remain anonymous please let us know. You may decide later if you wish to remain anonymous or not. 
In this questionnaire we specifically want to find out about the west coast rock lobster, but please 
include information about other marine resources if you feel it is relevant. 
Interviewer:______________Interviewee:_______________________________ Place:_________ Date:______ 
Current rights held__________________Previous________________Years in fishing in general________ 
 
 
The first three sections deal with the ecology of the lobster. 
 
Q 1: Spatial distribution 
 
1(i) Where - in what locations - do you find / catch lobster?   (Indicate on map) 
 
1(ii) Where - in which habitats - do you find / catch lobster___________________________________________ 
(If necessary, prompt with e.g. 
what kind of rock, reefs or extensions of land formations,  depth of water, 
distance from land or from high water mark,    predominant wave direction, 
amount / degree of wave action,     other species present / absent 
aspect (facing what direction),     ..… 
 
1(iii) Can you find lobsters in all locations with this kind of habitat?_______if necessary, PROMPT with map) 
 If no, can you suggest a reason why not?______________________________________________________ 
1(iv) Do you find lobsters in different places at different times of the year? _______________________________ 
 
1(v) Are young and adult individuals found in the same area or habitat? __________________________________ 
 If no, how do habitats differ? _______________________________________________________________ 
 (if necessary, PROMPT:   e.g. closer to shore, deeper, difference in wave energy) 
 
1(vi) Do you think that lobsters are found in different locations than they used to be? _______________________ 
 If yes: Why do you think that is?_____________________________________________________________ 
 Only if nec. PROMPT: E.g. climate variability (more storms in some years, colder winters), fishing pressure.. 
 
1(vii) Do you think there are fewer / more lobsters in some locations than there used to be? _________________ 
 If yes: Why do you think that is? ___________________________________________________________ 
 
1(viii) If the eastward migration is not mentioned then PROMPT: 
 Do you think there has been an eastward migration of lobster?_____________________________________ 
 Why do you think this has happened?_________________________________________________________ 
 Only if nec. PROMPT: E.g. climate variability (more storms in some years, colder winters), fishing pressure.. 
 
1(ix) If not mentioned above, then: The quotas have been implemented to prevent overfishing.  Do you think 
fishing pressure has caused a change as to where lobsters can be found? ____________________________ 
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Q 2: Recruitment 
 
Recruitment is a fancy term for when the young of a species joins the adult population, and so can breed but can 
also be caught.  For commercial catches of rock lobster the size limit is 75 mm. 
 
2(i) What proportion (percentage / fraction) of your catch is large enough to keep and what proportion is too 
small?________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2(ii) Is the number / proportion of catchable size lobster the same each year? _____________________________ 
 If not, is there a pattern in how the number of adults change?______________________________________ 
 If necessary, PROMPT:   e.g. fewer / more after particular kinds of weather conditions, few/more after a 
good/bad previous year’s catch, etc.) 
 
2(iii) Has the number / proportion of catchable size showed a trend (getting more and more, getting less and less) 
over recent years? _______________________________________________________________________ 
 If yes, can you suggest a reason for this trend__________________________________________________ 
 
2(iv) Can you estimate the proportions (or number of individuals) of your catch in the following sizes (in the last 
season): 
 75-90 mm______________________ 
 90-120 mm_____________________ 
 >150mm_______________________ 
 
2(v) How long would you say it takes for a very small lobster (say 50mm) to grow big enough to catch?  
 
2(vi) Does this time (to grow to adulthood from 50 mm) vary under different conditions? ___________________ 
 If necessary, PROMPT:   e.g. is growth faster or slower after a cold winter? or after a stormy season? or 
after a summer that is hotter than usual?) 
 
 
Q 3: Species interactions 
 
3(i) Do lobster affect the presence (whether they are there or not), abundance (how many they are) and growth 
(how quickly / slowly they grow) of other species? Which?_______________________________________ 
 In what ways___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3(ii) What other species affect the presence (whether they are there or not), abundance (how many they are) and 
growth (how quickly / slowly they grow) of lobster? ____________________________________________ 
 In what ways____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The next two sections deal with management 
 
Q4. Ecosystem-based management 
 
4(i) Are there marine reserves nearby which could have a good-sized lobster population?___________________  
 If yes, please indicate where they are in relation to your fishing grounds     (indicate on map). 
 
One possible way of protecting lobsters is to set up sanctuaries, areas where they cannot be fished. The 
population in the sanctuary would act as a source of breeders to support a larger population over a larger area 
and outside the sanctuary.  
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4(ii) Do you think that lobsters in local marine reserves could be supporting your fishery? __________________ 
 
4(iii) Can you suggest better or additional areas which could act as sanctuaries? __________________________ 
 What is the reason for your choice? _________________________________________________________ 
 
4(iv) Are there areas where lobsters might be found but fishermen don’t fish there (i.e. excluding reserves)? _____ 
 Why don’t fishermen go there? ______________________________________________________________ 
 
4(v) Are there areas where locals can’t or don’t go but more commercial operators can? _____________________ 
 
4(vi) What kind of gear do you use to catch lobsters? _______________________________________________ 
 Is your gear ever damaged as a result of fishing? e.g. does it get snagged on rocks? ____________________ 
 
4(vii) How much time do you spend repairing gear? ________________________________________________ 
 
4(viii) Is it possible that the habitat suffers damage because of your gear, or when your gear is damaged? ______ 
 
4(ix) Do you ever catch other species in your lobster gear?___________________________________________ 
 Which species? _________________________________________________________________________ 
 What do you do with them? _______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q 5. Quotas, rights and regulations 
 
5(i) Under the quota regulations, how many (number/kilograms) lobsters can you take in a season?_______(kg/#) 
 Could you catch more? ___________________________________________________________________ 
 How much? ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5(ii) Could all of the fishermen operating in this area catch this much more?______________________________ 
 Why or Why not?________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5(iii) Do you think that you could catch this much more as well as the other fishers in the area, this year, next year 
and so on, and still be able to catch the same number in 10 years time?__________________________ ___ 
 
5(iv) What do you think is the aim of the quota system? _____________________________________________ 
 Do you think the quota system achieves this goal(s)?____________________________________ ______ 
 If not, why? ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5(v) Why do you think some fish species (including lobster) have become very scarce all over the world?_____ 
5(vi) Do you think that the prescribed lobster season is appropriate? ___________________________________ 
 Why or why not? ______________________________________________________________________ 
 If not, when would be better? _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Do you wish to remain anonymous or would you agree to have your name acknowledged as 
a source of information?__________________ 
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Local knowledge respondents: Questionnaire 1: Hawston/Hermanus 
(Respondents in alphabetical order:): Jerome Figaji, Tyron Fisher, Jakobus Gillion, Solomon Gillion, Hilton Marais, Mervin 
Matthee, Adam Meyer, Hans Montague, Ernest Raaff, Roger Swart, Stephan Francois Smuts. Responses are not in 
alphabetical order in order to preserve anonymity  
 
Local knowledge responses 
(Note: responses are not in the same order as the respondents above). 
Q 1: Spatial distribution 
1(i) Where - in what locations - do you find / catch lobster? 
1. Between Hermanus and Hangklip 
2. East of Cape Hangklip to Cape Point 
3. West of Hangklip and Danger pt to Quoion pt. 
4. Hangklip, Kaap pt, Kleinmond. Hawston, Hermanus, Danger pt. 
5. Hermanus, Walker Bay. Hawston to Hermanus in excellent condition. Have heard from others that Gansbaai also 
good, Danger pt, up to the point. 
6. Mudge pt to Hermanus. If make zone bigger can make TAC bigger, get more people. 
7. Hangklip to Hermanus 
8. Danger pt to Cape pt 
9. Cape Pt - Buffelsjag 
10. East and west of Cape Hangklip 
11. nn 
1(ii) Where - in which habitats - do you find / catch lobster 
1. Long and short kelp 
2. 25-30 metres 
3. On rocks / banks not too deep (50-60 metre). Could maybe find them deeper, but not generally deeper than 60m. 
Not all locations. Black mussel is the main food. Look at water temperature, that is an indication for WCRL. 
4. Reefs, flat/level places in the sea. Lots of waves. Among kelp. Eat kelp. Among sea urchins - eat sea urchin. 
5. Eats bait. Because of commercial boats there is always bait and dead fish in the water, so there are different reasons 
for them being there. On the reefs, not sand. If you throw your net and come back 20 mins later and you've got 
white crab you know you are on the sand not rocks and you must move. Creep into holes and caves in rocks. Hide 
away there when there's danger. 
6. On reefs where food is, eats kelp and urchins. Mostly at this time of year is about 20-30 m. Resource is healthy: 
Many lobster 
7. reefs with many other species present 
8. Reefs 
9. Rocky areas, reefs 
10. About 20 m 
11. Lots of kelp and a rocky bottom 
1(iii) Can you find lobsters in all locations with this kind of habitat? 
1. N/a 
2. n/a 
3. n/a 
4. Wherever there is kelp and sea urchin. 
5. n/a 
6.  
7. Yes and No. You can find lobster in sandy areas too 
8. yes 
9. yes. 
10. No. Temperature of water plays and important role 
11. Most. 
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1(iv) Do you find lobsters in different places at different times of the year? 
1. Same. 
2. Same. [BUT, from Q1vii]: From Dec to 15 Feb WCRL still in deep water. Must still come in. [From comments]: 
Could catch more, especially from May to June because there are still plenty [AND] In May there weren't many 
females, mostly male. 
3. Yes 
4. Summer (Oct - Dec) are further out - when they are moulting. When waters warm again they come in to breed and 
eat well. More in some locations. Depends on kelp and sea urchin. E.g At Danger pt one month ago got 100 kg in a 
day, cple days ago only 20kg. Difference is e.g. colour of water, if its cold they don't climb in the net, if the west 
wind blows then the climb in well, if the south-easter blows then they don't climb in. 
5. Same 
6. From August lobster move to shallower water, move out from about Feb month when finished breeding. 
7. Yes.  
8. Yes. [ADDED from Q1vii]: Lobsters go more to the bottom after bad storms. [ADDED from Q1ix]: Between Dec 
and Feb there are less lobster. From March on there are a huge amount.  
9. No. Found all over.  
10. Yes.  
11. No 
1(v) Are young and adult individuals found in the same area or habitat? 
1. Same 
2. Same 
3. Changes, sometimes yes, sometimes no. Young larva drift in Benguela as far as S America (Danie van Zyl) 
4. Young are closer inshore than old lobster although no real difference in habitat. 
5. Same. Young always sit around a big lobster (like hen with chickens). 
6. Adults are more in the shallow water, younger are more in deep water 
7. Yes and No. Sometimes smaller lobster are closer to coast. Depends on water temperature. Water temperature plays 
a definite role. 
8. yes. Very dependent on the weather 
9. Yes. 
10. Yes. 
11. Yes 
1(vi) Do you think that lobsters are found in different locations than they used to be? 
1. Different. Moved from places with deep water 
2. Soepiesklip (near Grotto Beach). Fishers catching lots of geelbek, WCRL coming onto lines. This shows there is 
plenty. 
3. Yes. Everything changes in nature. Currents (seestrome) change which changes the water temperature. 
4. More in some locations. (rest of answer belongs in another section) 
5. Complicated. Earlier there wasn't commercial in this area. Last 10 years has been exploited aroung Hangklip to 
Gansbaai. Hout Bay, Cape Point Robben Island (al 'n xx) 
6. Yes east of Mudge pt. Got lots of lobster. In 1999-2001 with experimental quota, in one day got 970 kg (WHERE?) 
from 09h00 to 12h30. In Skulphoek area, did experiment in May. Now there aren't so many in that area. Maybe its 
too early in the year? 
7. Yes. They move after food. Food is the primary reason. 
8. yes. Lobsters migrate. Depends on change in temperature of currents - global warming. 
9. Yes. Food resources 
10. Yes. ONGESTEURDE SEELEWE (ARJ roughly translates: “unbothered sealife”?) Also move after food. 
11. yes. The urchins they eat are less in certain areas and they eat periwinkles. 
1(vii) Do you think there are fewer / more lobsters in some locations than there used to be? 
1. More in some areas. Depends on food like sea urchin 
2. Less. Because of strong winds. From Dec to 15 Feb WCRL still in deep water. Must still come in. 
3. More and less. Water temperature, currents have changed and more kelp in some areas. Black mussels more in 
some areas and less in some areas where it was before 
4. answered in other sections 
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5. A bit less everywhere because of exploitation, but stock not in danger yet. Important to control the catch. Important 
not to think can just take for ever as much as want and also to have a season and a rest period. The legal size also 
plays a role, mustn't be too small. Must think ahead. Those thrown back are future plan. People used to catch 
indicriminately, now regulations have taught us not to. 
6. nn 
7. Yes - more. Besides food reason, strong regulations restrict overexploitations 
8. More in some areas. More food in some areas (perlemoen and urchins). Lobsters go more to the bottom after bad 
storms. 
9. Yes. More lobster in some areas than before 
10. More. As a result of better law enforcement. 
11. yes. They move with their food 
1(viii) Do you think there has been an eastward migration of lobster? 
1. Yes. Breeding season plays a role. Exoskeleton comes off. 
2. yes. Because of red tides and change in sea currents (see strome). 
3. Yes. Red tide can have a big influence, not enough oxygen. Just speculation. WCRL was maybe overprotected as a 
result of the large amount that walked out (Elandsbaai). 
4. yes. They moved after their food (kelp and sea urchin) 
5. no. Population was here, just grew didn't migrate. Before people didn't care about lobster (just fish) and resource 
was healthy. Lobster just sometimes for the pot, not commercial. Population grew because of not being exploited. 
Now many new young fishers have joined the ranks. At first were taken up by linefish industry, now the new ones 
are more interested in lobster - better finances. 
6. Yes, to Buffelsjag, people have got lobster now and every year there are more there. Move after food. Scientists 
think they eat small perlemoen. Could be. Because Buffelsjag is good for perlemoen. Every year going east, 
Gansbaai getting better every year. 
7. Yes. Lobster move after sea urchins  
8. Yes. Currents play a role. Go after food. 
9. Yes. Move after sea urchins 
10. Yes. Continuous disturbance and exploitation 
11. Not sure. 
1(ix) If not mentioned above, then: The quotas have been implemented to prevent overfishing.  Do you 
think fishing pressure has caused a change as to where lobsters can be found? 
1. Not overfished. Thousands of eggs carried by female. WCRL breeds quickly. Won't become too few. 
2. Many WCRL before. Poaching took place. WCRL are [beheaded] at sea. Female, male, eggbearing females.  Just 
in some areas are less because of poaching (Mudge pt to Harder Bay) 
3. Not as far as WCRL goes. Perlemoen and fish in general (not linefishers) are cause of decrease in species. 
4. Too many WCRL. In Elandsbaai thousands washed/walked out, worried that will happen here because there are so 
many. 500 kg is too little for this area 
5. No. Lobster can get out of the way quickly (to avoid trawl nets and other danger etc.) If a school of lobster is out 
grazing, they can get out of the way of trawl nets, best hiding in rocks and kelp where nets don't get to. Also big 
water shelters them (wind and waves), because fishers must wait for calm water. 
6. Not to be seen over the few years we've been fishing. 
7. No. 
8. No. Lobster have different times during which movement occurs. Between Dec and Feb there are less lobster. From 
March on there are a huge amount. 
9. Yes. Fewer big lobsters in some places than before 
10. Yes. Lobster had tails removed, just tails used, rest thrown in the water. 
11. No. 
Q 2: Recruitment 
2(i) What proportion (percentage / fraction) of your catch is large enough to keep and what proportion is 
too small? 
1. Recreational 
2. For export catch 75-80 mm. Big aren't good for export. 
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3. 50:50 to 60:40 (under:size) 
4. 80:20 (under:size) 
5. about 60:40 (under:size) (majority go back). Every female XX. 
6. Feb: 70:30, March 40:60 (under:size).  At the moment, of the undersize ones, about 70% are female. 
7. 40:60 
8. From 30 to 70 are less than 75mm 
9. 70:30 
10. 80:20 
11. 90 (? Too big or too small??) 
2(ii) Is the number / proportion of catchable size lobster the same each year? 
1. same, but weather plays a role. 
2. If the wind is too strong, then catch is bad. 16-20 metres depth (?WAVES), 20 knots. 
3. Changes with time of year. With experimental the numbers of size was better. Can't say if its changed. That was 
end of May. 
4. Undersize getting more and more each year. Size also getting more but not as much. When temperature is higher, 
get more size, if temperature lower get small ones.  
5. Depends on the area; there are more small ones here than on west coast. 
6. Maybe the small ones move more inshore? (Have to by law work a certain distance off-shore, whereas recreationals 
can work close in)  
7. No. More after particular weather conditions 
8. Changes. There is a pattern. Changes after certain weather conditions. 
9. Changes. Adult lobsters getting fewer. 
10. No. Lobster get less in some areas if there is too much exploitation 
11. no. Less adults. 
2(iii) Has the number / proportion of catchable size showed a trend (getting more and more, getting less 
and less) over recent years? 
1. More. Because haven't caught more than should 
2. More. But must be caught at the right time. 
3. More. Don't know 
4. More undersize. Answered in previous 
5. About the same. Size lobsters are exploited, undersize stay in the water. And hope that next season the ones you 
threw back will be size. Difficult to say 
6. MCM has statistics for those three years. 
7. More. More food, less exploitation. 
8. More small lobsters than big ones. Grow slowly, breeding season is not disturbed, because recreational season is 
only seasonal. 
9. Yes - adults getting less. Overexploitation by poachers and commercials 
10. More and more. Lobster migrating to Hawston and Hermanus area. 
11. Less and less. 
2(iv) Can you estimate the proportions (or number of individuals) of your catch in the following sizes (in 
the last season): 75-90mm, 90-120 mm, >150mm 
1. nn 
2. nn 
3. Majority in 75-90m mm class 
4. 60:30:10 
5. mostly 75-90 (more in open sea, not on reefs), 90-120 (recreationals can go for these - divers can go among kelp, 
not common for commercials to go there), >120 (get in some areas, especially restricted areas, specially in kelp) 
6. mostly here are 75. Plenty of them, no change. About 60:30:10 (>120 are mostly close inshore in kelp) 
7. nn 
8. nn 
9. nn 
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10. nn 
11. 40:40:20 
2(v) How long would you say it takes for a very small lobster (say 50mm) to grow big enough to catch? 
1. 2 years 
2. 3 years 
3. Male - about 5 years, female about 6 years. 
4. about 6 months. 
5. ? 
6. nn 
7. Don't know 
8. Not sure. 
9. Don't know 
10. Not sure. 
11. Not sure. 
2(vi) Does this time (to grow to adulthood from 50 mm) vary under different conditions? 
1. Think weather plays a role, grow faster after stormy weather  
2. Same rate. 
3. Don't know. Growth time determined by amount of food and water temperature plays a role. 
4. Yes: In winter they grow faster because they are eating more.  
5. Can't tell unless put in aquarium. 
6. Growth follows food, as lobster moults then he doesn't eat so much until the shell is hard again. 
7. Come more (NA VORE) after stormy weather 
8. Not sure. 
9. Unsure 
10. Not sure. Don't have scientific knowledge. 
11. nn 
Q 3: Species interactions 
3(i) Do lobster affect the presence (whether they are there or not), abundance (how many they are) and 
growth (how quickly / slowly they grow) of other species? Which? In what ways 
1. No 
2. WCRL affect prelemoen (small ones). If there is not enough food, then WCRL eats perlemoen. 
3. Yes. Sea urchins. WCRL eat urchin. Young perlemoen need urchin for growth, and WCRL eat urchins. 
4. No 
5. Some say big lobster can eat small perlemoen. I can't say if this is so. But if lobster in a position to take perlemoen 
off the rock then he WILL eat it, but then it must be a big lobster. So I don't think it’s a danger to perlemoen, 
because there are not so many lobster which are big enough to do anything to a perlemoen. 
6. Lobster eat sea urchin and the small perlemoen hide in the sea urchins and if sea urchins gone then eat perlemoen 
because don't have place to hide away. 
7. Perlemoen, crabs, sea urchins. Small perlemoen hide away under sea urchins. 
8. Yes. Eats perlemoen and urchins. 
9. Yes - completely wipes out sea urchins. Perlemoen. 
10. Yes. Small perlemoen and sea urchin are lobster food. 
11. yes. There are no sea urchins, so the small abalone are left vulnerable and are eaten by lobster 
3(ii) What other species affect the presence (whether they are there or not), abundance (how many they 
are) and growth (how quickly / slowly they grow) of lobster? In what ways 
1. Sea urchins. Main food of WCRL 
2. When WCRL are carrying eggs then they are attacked by fish. If there is too little food in the water then go for the 
females. 
3. Mussels influence growth of WCRL as they are the basic foodstuff of WCRL. 
4. No 
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5. Octopus eat lots of lobster. 
6. We catch linefish too. Used to be lots on kelp 50-60 m water, rocks, bank fish feed there. Bankfish: hottentot, 
rooivis, silwervis aren't on banks anymore, have moved. I think lobster eat all the food off the banks and so the fish 
have moved on.  
7. Bank sharks, bigger fish eat lobster 
8. Yes. Bank sharks, octopus and Hawston inhabitants. 
9. Octopus, bank sharks eat lobster. 
10. Sharks, octopus. Lobster has its predators in the water, besides the poachers. 
11. Shellfish (mussels, abalone). Lobsters food source. 
Q4. Ecosystem-based management 
4(i) Are there marine reserves nearby which could have a good-sized lobster population? 
1. Hermanus area not many. BB more. 
2. Zone F from Mudge Pt to Hermanus. Very big population of WCRL. With experimental quotas just caught at one 
place. Three years (2000-2002). Ten men each had 1 T and got it in 2 days. 
3. Yes. Betty's Bay, Cape Point, Harder Bay, and from Rietfontein to KraalRock. 
4. Betty's Bay (lots) and Groenberg at Cape Point (lots) 
5. Hangklip is a healthy lobster area, right in front of lighthouse, get lobster deep and flat / shallow? Betty's Bay is 
more for perlemoen, big sand areas where don't get lobster, but round lighthouse the reef goes into the water and 
whole area is under lobster. In rocky areas are schools of lobster. 
6. Cape Hangklip. Between RooiEls and Cape Hangklip - commercials get their lobster there (3T etc.) so there must 
be lots there. BB  reserve - must be lots of lobster there, also just in front of Hangklip hotel 
7. Yes. Hermanus/Vermont and Kleinmond / Onrus. 
8. Yes. Mudge Point, Hermanus, Betty's Bay, Harder Bay 
9. Cape point lots - only small lobster. 
10. Betty's Bay, Dyer Island and Hermanus (area between old and new harbour) 
11. nn 
4(ii) Do you think that lobsters in local marine reserves could be supporting your fishery?  
1. Yes. WCRL move and don't stay in one place. 
2. No. (it is not necessary to use reserves for catching WCRL). 
3. Yes. 
4. Yes: As time goes by they move out and into our areas. 
5. Not really. Small lobsters are the eggbearers rather than the big lobster. 
6. Yes. But also lobsters move. 
7. Yes. They swim round 
8. Yes. 
9. yes. 
10. yes. 
11. nn 
4(iii) Can you suggest better or additional areas which could act as sanctuaries? 
1. No. Good enough. 
2. Perlemoen and WCRL [word gemaak). Poaching is still taking place. 
3. As far as WCRL go no,  Banks where fish are caught there are plenty of WCRL, and the water is too deep to drop 
the nets there. 
4. No - those two are enough. 
5. BB not really lobster area. Lobster doesn't need as much protection as perlemoen, because they can move more 
quickly. They can move overnight to another area, so don't really need areas to protect them. BB wasn't established 
for ecological reasons, it was a NP sanctuary. OK, but need to also look at the resources that there are. e.g Elephant 
was protected, then there were too many and had to cull. So shouldn't protect too much, must be protected and 
used. People must not go hungry. 
6. There is a place (in Walker Bay somewhere?) where recreationals can go but not commercials (also because of 
whales - has been declared a sanctuary?) 
7. No. protected areas. 
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8. No. They're the best. 
9. No, just the reserves. Not all areas are reserves 
10. No. They are established in good weather conditions, there is enough to live from. 
11. nn 
4(iv) Are there areas where lobsters might be found but fishermen don’t fish there (i.e. excluding reserves)? 
1. Between Kleinmond and Hawston. No rocks and bamboo. (SO WCRL NOT THERE??) 
2. People don’t take WCRL at Soepiesklip, but do fish. Haven't noticed the WCRL. Need decision from MCM. 
3. Yes. Area between KraalRock and Gansbaai. Banks 40-45 m, plenty of WCRL. 
4. No. 
5. Yes inshore on the vlak kant van die see. Nets get stuck. Lobster sit in the kelp and redbait heads, nets get stuck 
there. Especially the big ones sit there. So they are protected because don't want to put nets there. Only divers will 
get them, but even they can't go everywhere because of currents. 
6. Yes, many lobster right out here in 60-70 m but too deep for ringnets. 
7. yes. Between Hermanus and Stanford. Far too many reefs and rocks. 
8. Beyers Island, Mudge Point to Kleinmond. MCM declares the areas. 
9. Harder Bay. Not opened up for fishing. 
10. Yes. Zones are closed, so its against MCM's regulations. 
11. Strong currents and reefs make them inaccessible 
4(v) Are there areas where locals can’t or don’t go but more commercial operators can? 
1. Can go everywhere 
2. Stanford included in Gansbaai and Hawston can be included with Eof Hangklip. More quotas for Hawston fishers 
[I.e. why the few Kleinmond fishers got bigger quotas - why not give to Hawstonners). Responsible fishers in the 
community who don't have criminal records are getting into poaching of WCRL and perlemoen. Can be included in 
Kleinmond area. 
3. Public can use area from KraalRock to Gansbaai but don't, don't know why. Commercials aren't allowed to catch 
there as its outside the specified zone. 
4. Yes. Hout Bay, very deep water. 
5.  Yes, diesel boats can go to deep areas. E.g. Hout Bay and e.g. a underwater mountain sticking up somewhere 
before cape point 
6. Yes Hangklip area 11 + 8 commercial. In hangklip area 8 where most commercials work and semi-commercials 
can go but don't because don't have kreefvyk (LOBSTER TRAP]. People with ringnets mostly use area 11 hangklip 
because shallower water. 
7. Yes. Between Hawston and Gansbaai. 
8. nn 
9. Yes. Could fish in areas like Robben Island and Dyer Island where commercial fishers go. Whole year is open for 
commercials. 
10. Yes. Areas where its too rocky to fish. 
11. not sure. 
4(vi) What kind of gear do you use to catch lobsters? 
1. Ringnets 
2. Ringnets 
3. Ringnets 
4. Ringnets. 
5. Ringnets. 
6. Ringnets 
7. Ringnets 
8. Ringnets 
9. Diving gear 
10. Ringnets 
11. Diving gear 
4(vii) How much time do you spend repairing gear? 
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1. yes. 1-2 hours/day 
2. Yes. 12 Ringnets. (Takes 1/4 hour to drop the nets with bait etc.) 
3. Yes. 1/3 hour per net 
4. Yes. A few hours per week, fix and put new ropes on. 
5. Yes. Monday got 100kg, lost 3 nets (=R300), yesterday 15kg lost another net (=R100) 
6. Yes. about 2hr/day, depends on number of nets. 
7. Yes. 20 min/ net 
8. Yes. Stuck on rocks, currents, sharks.  1 hour for all the nets. 
9. nn 
10. Yes. Stuck on rocks. About 20 mins depending on damage. 
11. yes. 20 mins 
4(viii) Is it possible that the habitat suffers damage because of your gear, or when your gear is damaged? 
1. No 
2. WCRL which hang on the outside can lose  legs. 
3. It works both ways. If just stick to coral it breaks off and lobsters lose legs. Damage is minimal. 
4. No. Don't stick on coral reefs. 
5. No 
6. No, net tears but it all comes up. 
7. No. 
8. No. 
9. No. 
10. No 
11. no 
4(ix) Do you ever catch other species in your lobster gear? 
1. No 
2. Seeslange, seekatte, hotnotvisse 
3. Kelp sharks, crabs, hottentot (latter not often). 
4. Bank shark, seekatte, seeslakke 
5. Hottentot, silverfish, panga, knorhaan (gurnard). 
6. Bank shark, octopus 
7. Fish, SEESLANGE, etc. 
8. SEESLAKKE, hottentot, SKAAMHAAIE 
9. nn 
10. SEESLAKKE, smaller fish 
11. shellfish 
What do you do with them? 
1. N/a 
2. Throw back. 
3. Throw back, unless its edible. 
4. Throw back. 
5. Use for bait. Don't get a lot, maybe 1 / net, then get a gain for your bait. 
6. Throw back. 
7. Throw back except edible fish 
8. Throw back 
9. nn 
10. Thow back 
11. keep them 
Q 5. Quotas, rights and regulations 
5(i) Under the quota regulations, how many (number / kilograms) lobsters can you take in a season?  
1. Depends on season. 
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2. 500 
3. 500 
4. 500 (150/day restriction) 
5. 500 
6. 500 
7. 500 
8. 4 
9. 4 DIVER 
10. 500 
11. 4/day/weekend DIVER 
Could you catch more? 
1. No 
2. Yes. Especially from May to June because there are still plenty. 
3. not answered 
4. yes. 11/2 to 2 T 
5. yes another 500 (total 1 T) 
6. yes. 1T 
7. nn 
8. nn 
9. no 
10. no 
11. yes. 8/day 
5(ii) Could all of the fishermen operating in this area catch this much more? 
1. Yes. Same 
2. Not answered 
3. Yes. 
4. No, it depends on number of nets and bait and if bait is not right then don't climb in. He uses fishheads, stokvis, 
snoek, sardine. 
5. yes 
6. yes. 
7. nn 
8. nn 
9. nn 
10. no 
11. yes 
5(iii) Do you think that you could catch this much more as well as the other fishers in the area, this year, 
next year and so on, and still be able to catch the same number in 10 years time? 
1. Yes, definitely. WCRL doesn't get wiped out. 
2. Not answered 
3. yes. Everything indicates that. Industry is still young. 
4. Yes. There is still plenty. They have so many eggs so there will still be plenty. It looks like the more you catch the 
more they breed. 
5. Difficult to say. Lobster move from area to area, aren't always caught up. When they move, the move at the top of 
the water with antennae out. 
6. YES.  Lobster who moved here in 1992/1993 when we started with recreational in Hermanus and from that time 
there have been many lobster. The resource can support this amount. 
7. Yes. Lobster have shown a tendency to increase in numbers 
8. Yes. The resource is healthy. 
9. no. Resource being wiped out by commercial rights holders 
10. No. Because of too much exploitation in one area. 
11. nn 
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5(iv) What do you think is the aim of the quota system?  
1. Protect WCRL. 
2. To control poaching. 
3. To prevent overfishing. 
4. To protect lobster from being wiped out. To prevent overexploitation. 
5. That everyone gets a fair deal. 
6. Income for fishers. That resource doesn't get overused. 
7. To protect species 
8. To protect the wiping out of the resource. 
9. To prevent overexploitation 
10. To prevent overexploitation and poaching. 
11. To secure the lobster for the future 
 Do you think the quota system achieves this goal(s)? If not, why? 
1. Yes 
2. They won't get it right. Quota is too small especially for people who live entirely from the sea. 
3. No. Not clear that MCM knows what its own aims are. 
4. yes. 
5. No, Some favoured some prejudiced against. Case in Hawston, took the package, but because had learning could 
fill in the forms properly, got quota, fishers didn't get, don't have education to fill in forms. 
6. yes 
7. no. Poaching still happens on a big scale. 
8. yes 
9. No. Too many commercial rights holders are guilty of wiping out lobster 
10. No. Too many quotas land in the wrong hands. MCM does nothing to solve the crisis. 
11. yes. [BUT LATER]: No. Sports divers suffer and poaching still continues. 
5(v) Why do you think some fish species (including lobster) have become very scarce all over the world? 
1. Foreign boats in deep water - wipe out. 
2. Only in some places 
3. Some species scarce. Overfishing by trawlers and big factory ships. Fishing methods that don't regulate the size 
caught. Trawlers take all species indiscriminately. E.g. If locals bring in one undersize Kabeljou they get a fine etc. 
but trawlers can take tons of kabeljou of that small size. 
4. Because fish are overexploited, take too much out the sea. 
5. Too many people. Resource is overutilised. 
6. Perlemoen poaching: if people get quotas then poaching will drop a bit. They say linefishers overuse the fish, I say 
it is the big trawlers, they bring in tons of undersize fish. If we bring in 1 undersize we get a fine. And trawlers are 
all around the coast 
7. Not all species have become scarce. Commercial boats wipe out species. Newspapers speak about that. 
8. Foreign boats who poach South Africa's fish resources 
9. Overuse by commercial rights holders 
10. Poaching and overexploitation 
11. poaching 
5(vi) Do you think that the prescribed lobster season is appropriate?  Why or why not? If not, when 
would be better?  
1. Right 
2. Not answered. Export to China in Jan, Feb 2004. Best time is from May to June/August, based on experience from 
experimental quota. Should be Monday to Friday only. And from 08h00 to 16h00. Exclude holidays as with 
commercial (????) Recreationals should be in holiday time. 
3. No. March to June. Lobsters have hard shells, females aren't carrying eggs. 
4. no. Should be two months later and two months longer. Say Feb to Aug/Sep. 
5. no. Season used to be15 Nov. I said season wrong, females carrying eggs. Better season March to June/July. 
Caught this week and there were none with eggs. Size is excellent now. 
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6. Westcoast begins earlier because lobster ready earlier. Lobster here, should begin in March maybe Feb, more flesh. 
Now it is December. Ringnets should end in June and big boats end September. Some years moult is earlier, some 
years later. 
7. yes. Lobster skeleton is very hard.. Season can be lengthened - Dec to May. 
8. No. Sep to May 
9. Lobster could be caught the whole year except the time when the lobsters skeleton is soft. 
10. yes (BASED ON REST OF ANSWER THIS SHOULD BE NO). It is breeding time, the shell is still soft. March is 
an excellent time for lobster harvesting. 
11. no. Too short and lobster shells are still soft. 
Comments 
1. 4 / day for recreationals is too few. Poachers take abalone out of shells and insides eaten by WCRL. Plays an 
important part. Before there weren't WCRL from Hermanus to Hangklip. WCRL is good spreader. In Gansbaai 
there aren't a lot of WCRL because of currents. WCRL move like a school of fish, you can actually see it. 
2. Could catch more, especially from May to June because there are still plenty. With experimental quota had to 
record 500 WCRL of all sizes. Only males. Females and undersize had to be returned. Had to give the 500 to the 
MCM observers who recorded it and then had to return them. In May there weren't many females, mostly male. In 
excellent condition. Had to pay R650/day to MCM to catch 1500 (?500?) WCRL.Not allowed to take more. Excess 
over 500 must be returned to Hermanus harbour under supervision of inspector who weigh the WCRL. Soepiesklip 
not yet included (on map - ?in zone? ). Zone F area. 
3. Linefishers: this is their bread and butter. Those that can prove this is their income want to apply for linefishing as a 
traditional fisher. But can only apply for one species (can't have linefish with another right). I applied for lobster as 
a previous experimental quota holder. No politics in fishing on the ground between fishers - all colours get the 
same money for fish. Harmony since the beginning of linefishing because there were not rules and laws. Suggest 
that: the real fishers decide who are the actual fishers. MCM knows who are the main players in the linefishing 
industry. That the verification unit appoints traditional fishers to do the allocation of fishing rights. WCRL rights 
were given to wrong people. In Hermanus the traditional fishers [trek nou dop]. Can't do otherwise. To get work 
they have to move. People who shouldn't get quotas get preference. Allocation fee is too high. Pay for everything 
(ongeboord) unbounded. Service at MCM is pathetic, unacceptable. Fishers are born or not, you have the interest. 
4.  
5. recreationals can take 4/day. Last year only 2 or 3 days a month could go out, the rest too rough. Govt. should say 
for days you couldn't go out you can take another X amount to make up for that. Not talking of weekend fishers. 
6. Not unhappy with 500, but we who did the experiment should have got 1T. People worked with pt system - I got 12 
points, and I got 500, people with 6 pts also got 500). Kleinmond got 1 T - should rather have all got 800). Another 
pt. You have 400  perlemoen or 500 lobster. This is not enough without linefish, but now if get lobster quota then 
take linefish away. 500 kg doesn't last a year, can get in a couple of days, but if have linefish then can take it 
throughout the year. without this, after have got the 500 will drift to poaching. I have 2 boats, one (R80 000) with 
perlemoen 400 kg, three days work and then boat stands. That boat should get linefish, keep the crew going. 
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
 
